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Bezpieczeństwo kodu dla sterowników PLC
– InfraSEC Forum 2021

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Ransomware – Zapobieganie i Łagodzenie – najlepsze praktyki – część 3

Założenia Ramowe Cyberbezpieczeństwa – Identyfikacja

Ransomware – Zapobieganie i Łagodzenie – najlepsze praktyki – część 2

Źródła zagrożeń, Podatności i Incydenty – część 3

Ransomware – Zapobieganie i Łagodzenie – najlepsze praktyki – część 1

Źródła zagrożeń, Podatności i Incydenty – część 2

VOLT TYPHOON – ‘Living off-the-Land’ – Taktyki, Techniki i Procedury

Źródła zagrożeń, Podatności i Incydenty – część 1

Wpływ konfliktu między Rosją a Ukrainą na ekosystem cyberprzestępczości

Zastosowanie ‘Defense in Depth’ w Rozproszonych Systemach Sterowania

Ransomware – analiza trendów

SCADA Systems Defense in Depth Implementation

Hackers for Hire

Cybersecurity Architecture Considerations

Cybercriminals on Cloud 9

Defense-in-Depth Architecture Capabilities

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 11 – State Sponsored Actors

Cybersecurity Architecture

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 10 – Supply Chain Attacks

OT Security – Introduction – OT Overview

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 9 – Disinformation & Misinformation

The impact of IT threats on OT environment

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 8 – Impact of Russian war

‘Insecure-by-Design’ – Impact and Mitigation

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 7 – DDoS attacks

The Legacy of ‘Insecure-by-Design’

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 6 – Threats Against Data

ELECTRUM, ERYTHRITE & WASSONITE – 2022 update

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 5 – Social Engineering

KOSTOVITE, KAMACITE & XENOTIME – 2022 update

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 4 – Malware

CHERNOVITE and BENTONITE – New Threats of 2022

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 3 – Ransomware

Asset visibility for defendable OT

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 2 – Prime Threats by Proximity and Sector

How to effectively utilise MITRE ATT&CK for ICS

ENISA’s Threat Landscape Report 2022 – Part 1 – Introduction

Cloud Computing – 2022 Top Threats – part 6

Ransomware in OT – Response Strategy

Cloud Computing – 2022 Top Threats – part 5

Preparing for and detecting ransomware attacks in OT environments

Cloud Computing – 2022 Top Threats – part 4

Cloud Computing – 2022 Top Threats – part 3

Ransomware in Operational Technology (OT) Environments

Cloud Computing – 2022 Top Threats – part 2

The Five Critical Operational Technology (OT) Cybersecurity Controls

Cloud Computing – 2022 Top Threats – part 1

Bring Your Own Device Security Strategies – Part 7

Top 10 Emerging Cyber-Security Threats for 2030

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 10 – Third Parties Security Management

Bring Your Own Device Security Strategies – Part 6

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 9 – Security Monitoring

Bring Your Own Device Security Strategies – Part 5

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 8 – Host Security

Bring Your Own Device Security Strategies – Part 4

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 7 – Security Architectures

Bring Your Own Device Security Strategies – Part 3

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 6 – ICS Network Architectures

Bring Your Own Device Security Strategies – Part 2

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 5

Bring Your Own Device Security Strategies – Part 1

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 4

Anti-patterns in security architecture – part 6

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 3

Anti-patterns in security architecture – part 5

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 2

Anti-patterns in security architecture – part 4

Defense in Depth strategies – Part 1

Anti-patterns in security architecture – part 3

IEC62443 – Examples of practical requirements implementation – Part 4

Anti-patterns in security architecture – part 2

IEC62443 – Examples of practical requirements implementation – Part 3

Anti-patterns in security architecture – part 1

IEC62443 – Examples of practical requirements implementation – Part 2

Enterprise Connected Devices – a cyber security challenge – Part 2

IEC62443 – Examples of practical requirements implementation – Part 1

Enterprise Connected Devices – a cyber security challenge – Part 1

The State of Global Operational Technology 2022 – part 3

Karakurt Data Extortion Group

The State of Global Operational Technology 2022 – part 2

Paving the way for Post-Quantum Cryptography

The State of Global Operational Technology 2022 – part 1

Chinese Campaign exploits Network Providers and Devices Worldwide

Cybersecurity of Smart Buildings

Phishing Attacks & Mitigation – part 2

Phishing Attacks & Mitigation – part 1

Smart Meters in the context of Smart Grid and AMI architecture. Security, Vulnerability and Best Practice – Part 4

Smart Meters in the context of Smart Grid and AMI architecture. Security, Vulnerability and Best Practice – Part 3

Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program – Part 3

Smart Meters in the context of Smart Grid and AMI architecture. Security, Vulnerability and Best Practice – Part 2

Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program – Part 2

Smart Meters in the context of Smart Grid and AMI architecture. Security, Vulnerability and Best Practice – Part 1

Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program – Part 1

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations – Part 8

Man in the Middle Attacks & Mitigation

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations – Part 7

Denial of Service & Distributed Denial of Service Attacks & Mitigation

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations – Part 6

Software Defined Network Security Benefits

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations – Part 5

Secure Messaging

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations – Part 4

Social Media Privacy & Security

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations – Part 3

Everyday Network Security – Part 2

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations – Part 2

Everyday Network Security – Part 1

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations – Part 1

Sensible Computing

Havex’s Tactics and Techniques in the Enterprise domain + mitigations

Smart Home Security & Privacy

Critical ROCKWELL AUTOMATION PLCs vulnerabilities

Compute in the cloud relevant security considerations

TRITON’s Tactics and Techniques in the ICS domain

Mobile Device Security

‘Pipedream’ – a surfacing threat targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

Email Security Enhancement

Havex’s Tactics and Techniques in the ICS domain + mitigations

‘Denonia’ – the first cryptominer built for AWS Lambda

New malicious tools targeting ICS / SCADA systems and mitigations

Shared Responsibility for Security in the Public Cloud

Industrial Control Systems Best Practices

Best Authentication Practices

Industrial Network Security Architecture – Network Protection

FSB’s Global Energy Sector Intrusion Campaign 2011-2018

Industrial Network Security Architecture – Asset and Network Management

The Cloud and the Dark Web

Industrial Network Security Architecture – Network Segmentation

Software Defined Perimeter

Industrial Network Security Architecture – Introduction

Best Practices for Securing your Cloud

Common Attack Vectors in the Cloud

Common Cloud Vulnerabilities

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 21 – Trap false negatives and false positives for critical alerts

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 20 – Monitor PLC memory usage and trend it on the HMI

Cyber Threats – Detection, Response, Mitigation II

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 19 – Log PLC hard stops and trend them on the HMI

Cyber Threats – Detection, Response, Mitigation I

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 18 – Log PLC uptime and trend it on the HMI

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 17 – Summarise PLC cycle times and trend them on the HMI

Security Operations Centre – part 5

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 16 – Define a safe process state in case of a PLC restart

Security Operations Centre – part 4

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 15 – Restrict third-party data interfaces

Security Operations Centre – part 3

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 14 – Disable unneeded / unused communication ports and protocols

Security Operations Centre – part 2

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 13 – Validate inputs based on physical plausibility

Security Operations Centre – part 1

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 12 – Instrument for plausibility checks

Zero Trust Architecture

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 11 – Assign designated register blocks by function (read/write/validate)

Data Privacy, Data Security. Vol. 4

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 10 – Validate indirections

Data Privacy, Data Security. Vol. 3

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 9 – Validate HMI input variables at the PLC level, not only at HMI

Data Privacy, Data Security. Vol. 2

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 8 – Validate and alert for paired inputs / outputs

Data Privacy, Data Security. Vol. 1

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 7 – Validate timers and counters

Small Business Cyber Security Response and Recovery. Part VI – Learn from the incident

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 6 – Use cryptographic and / or checksum integrity checks for PLC code

Small Business Cyber Security Response and Recovery. Part V – Report the incident to the wider stakeholders

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 5 – Use PLC flags as integrity checks

Small Business Cyber Security Response and Recovery. Part IV – Resolve the incident

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 4 – Leave operational logic in the PLC wherever feasible

Small Business Cyber Security Response and Recovery. Part III – Identify what’s happening

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 3 – Track operating modes

Small Business Cyber Security Response and Recovery. Part 2 – Prepare for incidents.

The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 2 – Modularise PLC code

Small Business Cyber Security Response and Recovery. Part 1 – Introduction.

Small Business Cyber Resilience Improvement Guide. Part I – Introduction

Podsumowanie incydentu w Colonial Pipeline

MITRE ATT&CK – analiza przeprowadzonych ataków w celu skuteczniejszej ochrony

Wiele podatności w Gameloop

Czwartki OT

Przeczytaj o bezpieczeństwie systemów przemysłowych

Zgłoszone podatności:

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Cyberataki uznane zostały za jedno z 10 globalnych zagrożeń i mogą dotknąć każdą organizację.

Wykorzystując wieloletnie doświadczenie oraz zaawansowane technologie wesprzemy Twoją organizację w ochronie przed cyberzagrożeniami oraz w wykrywaniu i reagowaniu na incydenty. Przeprowadzimy skuteczne audyty bezpieczeństwa, pomożemy w identyfikacji obszarów ryzyka i dobierzemy najlepszą ochronę.
Pomożemy w zapewnieniu Twoim produktom najwyższego poziomu bezpieczeństwa.

Cyberataki uznane zostały za jedno z 10 globalnych zagrożeń i mogą dotknąć każdą organizację.

Wykorzystując wieloletnie doświadczenie oraz zaawansowane technologie wesprzemy Twoją organizację w ochronie przed cyberzagrożeniami oraz w wykrywaniu i reagowaniu na incydenty. Przeprowadzimy skuteczne audyty bezpieczeństwa, pomożemy w identyfikacji obszarów ryzyka i dobierzemy najlepszą ochronę.
Pomożemy w zapewnieniu Twoim produktom najwyższego poziomu bezpieczeństwa.

W świecie, w którym każdego dnia do Internetu podłącza się 8 mln nowych urządzeń, cyberbezpieczeństwo musi być traktowane priorytetowo. Niestety, nie wszyscy producenci i dostawcy inteligentnych urządzeń dbają o ich bezpieczeństwo. Nie zawsze też użytkownicy posiadają wystarczającą wiedzę, aby bezpiecznie skonfigurować urządzenie.