Cybersecurity
Ransomware - what it is, how an attack unfolds and how to respond
How ransomware works: encryption and data theft, the course of an attack, the RaaS market, impact on OT, CISA response steps and NIS2 reporting duties.
Józef SulwińskiPublished Updated 17 min read

Contents
- What ransomware is
- Incidents that changed how organisations defend
- How an attack unfolds
- Who operates in the ransomware market
- Ransomware in industrial environments
- What to do once an attack is detected
- Prepare the response plan before an attack
- Response checklist
- A few numbers
- Where we help
- Legal basis
- Related articles
- Sources
In the morning, staff see a ransom demand on their screens, and the file servers and accounting system do not respond. The company cannot issue invoices or ship goods until it restores its systems. The criminals also threaten to publish customer data they stole a few days earlier.
The CISA guide, the Mandiant M-Trends 2026 report and the Chainalysis analysis show that:
- before encrypting, criminals usually steal data and delete or encrypt any backups they can reach,
- in 2025 the median time from the first intrusion to handing access to another group was 22 seconds,
- according to the Chainalysis estimate, about 28% of victims paid a ransom in 2025.
Preventive controls and the order in which to deploy them are described in the article on ransomware prevention.
What ransomware is
Ransomware is malicious software that encrypts an organisation’s data and locks the systems that depend on it. The criminals demand payment for the decryption key. According to NIST, they may also steal data and demand an extra payment for not publishing it.
The program encrypts files with a fast symmetric cipher and protects the file keys with an asymmetric cipher. According to CrowdStrike, Ryuk encrypted each file with its own AES-256 key and protected the keys with RSA-2048. A backup out of the criminals’ reach is therefore usually the only way back to the data without their key.
| Variant | What the criminals do | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Encryption with a ransom demand | The criminals encrypt data and servers and demand payment in cryptocurrency for the key. | Ryuk from 2018 |
| Double extortion | The criminals first steal data, then encrypt it and threaten to publish it if the victim does not pay. | DarkSide at Colonial Pipeline, 2021 |
| Extortion without encryption | The criminals steal data and demand payment only for not publishing it. | The variant is described in the 2023 CISA #StopRansomware guide. |
| Destructive program posing as ransomware | The program shows a ransom demand and destroys data or disks, so payment does not restore access. | NotPetya, 2017 |
Incidents that changed how organisations defend
| Incident | What happened | Lesson for organisations |
|---|---|---|
| WannaCry, May 2017 | According to the UK NAO, the program infected at least 81 of 236 NHS trusts in England and 603 other organisations, including 595 GP practices. At least 6,912 appointments were cancelled. The infected organisations ran unpatched or unsupported Windows systems. | Systems must be updated and unsupported ones retired, because these were exactly the systems the program infected. |
| NotPetya, June 2017 | According to CISA, the program entered through the Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc. It stole credentials and attacked systems without the MS17-010 patch for SMBv1, which Microsoft released on 14 March 2017. It also encrypted the master boot record. | Organisations must assume that a ransom may not restore data, because according to CISA decryption could be impossible even after payment. |
| Ryuk, from August 2018 | The group targeted large organisations and counted on high ransoms. According to CrowdStrike, by January 2019 it had received at least 705.80 BTC in 52 transactions, about USD 3.7 million. Before encryption, scripts stopped services and removed backups. | Backups must be kept out of reach of domain accounts, because criminals delete them before encrypting. |
| Colonial Pipeline, May 2021 | The criminals entered on 29 April through a VPN with the leaked credentials of an expired account. For nine days they escalated privileges and stole 100 GB of data. On 7 May the company shut down its 5,500-mile pipeline, and it paid the USD 4.4 million ransom within a day. | Unused accounts must be removed and MFA required, because one old VPN account opened the way into the network. |
| Change Healthcare, February 2024 | According to the testimony of the UnitedHealth Group CEO, the criminals entered on 12 February with compromised credentials through a remote desktop access portal without MFA. They moved through the network and stole data. The ALPHV/BlackCat group deployed ransomware nine days later. | MFA must be required at every external access point, because one portal without MFA was enough for the attack. |
| Attack on the Polish energy sector, December 2025 | According to CERT Polska, the attack hit more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power plant and a manufacturing company. The attackers damaged controller firmware and launched a program that destroys data, which EDR software blocked at the combined heat and power plant. CERT Polska describes the objective as purely destructive. | Recovery must be planned for attacks without a ransom demand too, because a backup is then the only way back. |
Older families are covered in the articles on CryptoLocker, LockBit and ALPHV/BlackCat.
How an attack unfolds
Encryption is the last stage of an attack. At Colonial Pipeline and at Change Healthcare, nine days passed between entry and encryption. For all intrusions it investigated, Mandiant reports a median attacker dwell time of 14 days.
Each stage leaves traces that CISA lists for checking after an attack. Technique names come from MITRE ATT&CK version 20.1, the public knowledge base of attack techniques described in the MITRE ATT&CK guide.
| Stage | What the attacker does | ATT&CK technique | What the logs show |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial access | The attacker logs in to a VPN or portal with a stolen password, exploits a vulnerability in an internet-facing service or sends a phishing message. | Valid Accounts (T1078), External Remote Services (T1133), Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190), Phishing (T1566) | A login from a new address or from an account nobody uses. |
| Discovery | The attacker scans the network for domain controllers, file servers and backup systems. | Network Service Discovery (T1046) | Unusual connections between workstations and reads of Active Directory data. |
| Credentials and privileges | The attacker extracts passwords from system memory and creates or takes over administrator accounts. | OS Credential Dumping (T1003) | Reads of LSASS process memory, new accounts or new memberships in the domain admins group. |
| Lateral movement | The attacker connects to further computers through remote desktop, file shares and remote commands. | Remote Services (T1021) | Workstation-to-workstation connections and unexpected use of PowerShell or remote management tools. |
| Data theft | The attacker packs data into archives and sends it to a file storage service. | Archive Collected Data (T1560), Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) | High outbound traffic and connections to file storage services. |
| Inhibiting recovery | The attacker deletes volume shadow copies, backups and restore points. | Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) | Runs of vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit or wmic with shadow copy commands. |
| Encryption | The program encrypts files on workstations, servers and virtual machines, then shows the ransom demand. | Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) | Mass renaming and rewriting of files and a ransom note in directories. |
According to M-Trends 2026, ransomware groups targeted backup infrastructure, identity services and virtualisation management systems in 2025. Taking over a hypervisor lets them encrypt many servers at once.
Who operates in the ransomware market
In the RaaS model (ransomware-as-a-service), the authors of the program make it available to affiliates, who carry out the attacks, and take a share of the ransom. CISA described the DarkSide group that attacked Colonial Pipeline this way.
| Role | What it does | Source of the description |
|---|---|---|
| RaaS operator | The operator develops the encryption program, the negotiation panel and the site where victims’ data is published. | CISA on DarkSide; Secureworks on DragonForce |
| Affiliate | The affiliate runs the attack from network entry to encryption and passes part of the ransom to the operator. | CISA on DarkSide |
| Access broker | The broker breaks into networks and sells the access to other groups. M-Trends measures the time to hand access to a secondary group, and its median in 2025 was 22 seconds. | M-Trends 2026; CISA, #StopRansomware Guide |
According to Secureworks, the DragonForce group announced a cartel model on 19 March 2025. Affiliates can create their own ransomware brands and use its infrastructure, encryption tools and data leak site.
According to The Register, on 28 January 2026 the RAMP forum domains showed a seizure notice attributed to the FBI. On the forum, RaaS groups and access brokers traded access and recruited affiliates. The FBI declined to comment on the seizure.
Ransomware in industrial environments
At an industrial plant, an attack on the office network can stop production even if the program never touches the controllers. According to Dragos, 119 ransomware groups attacked industrial organisations in 2025, up from 80 a year earlier. The attacks hit 3,300 organisations, and more than two-thirds of the victims were manufacturers.
Dragos reports an average ransomware dwell time of 42 days in OT networks. Organisations with comprehensive OT visibility detected and contained such incidents in 5 days on average.
At Colonial Pipeline the OT network stayed intact, but the information servers linked to the SCADA system were encrypted. According to CyOTE, the company judged further automated operation unsafe and shut down the pipeline. CISA found no indication of direct impact on the OT network. Details are in the articles on ransomware in OT environments and OT network segmentation.
What to do once an attack is detected
The steps come from the response checklist in the #StopRansomware guide by CISA, MS-ISAC, NSA and the FBI. The first three steps must be done in order. Why: an attacker who notices the response may speed up encryption.
Step 1. Determine which systems are affected and disconnect them from the network immediately.
When many systems or subnets are affected, the network should be taken offline at the switch level. Systems essential for daily operations should be isolated first. In the cloud, a snapshot of the volumes should be taken for later analysis.
The disconnection should be coordinated by phone or another channel outside the company network. Why: the attackers may be reading email and chat, and once warned they encrypt faster and more widely.
Step 2. Power down a device only if it cannot be disconnected from the network.
Why: powering down stops the program from spreading but erases traces held in memory. CISA recommends it only when neither the network nor individual computers can be disconnected.
Step 3. Set the restoration order from the list of critical systems.
The list covers systems needed for the health and safety of people, systems that revenue depends on, and the systems they depend on. Restoration takes place on a clean network. Systems the attack did not touch should be recorded on a separate list.
Step 4. Look for traces of an earlier intrusion.
New accounts and new privileges in Active Directory, unusual VPN logins and deletion of shadow copies should be checked. Unexpected remote management tools, reads of LSASS process memory and high outbound traffic should also be searched for. Why: according to CISA, ransomware is often the last stage of an earlier, unresolved intrusion, so restoring without removing it gives the attackers their access back.
Step 5. Preserve evidence.
A disk image and a memory capture should be taken from a sample of affected devices. Logs, malware samples, encrypted files and communications with the attackers should also be kept. A copy of the ransom note should be kept. Why: CISA lists it among the information to pass to the authorities when reporting.
Step 6. Report the incident and inform the people who need to know.
The response plan names the people to inform: top management, IT, security service providers and the insurer. Under the NIS2 Directive, as transposed in each Member State, an essential or important entity must report a significant incident. It sends an early warning to the CSIRT or competent authority within 24 hours of becoming aware of it. It submits the incident notification within 72 hours and the final report within one month.
When the criminals stole personal data, the controller notifies the supervisory authority where feasible within 72 hours. The exception is a breach that is unlikely to result in a risk to people. When an incident is suspected to be criminal, the CSIRT or competent authority also gives guidance on reporting it to law enforcement. Entities covered by a sector-specific EU act with equivalent reporting duties report under that act.
Step 7. Check whether a free decryptor exists.
Researchers find flaws in the encryption of some ransomware families and publish decryption tools. The No More Ransom site, launched by the Dutch police and Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre with private partners, collects such tools. CISA also recommends asking law enforcement about decryptors.
Step 8. Close the routes the attackers used to enter and could use to return.
The accounts and systems used in the initial breach should be identified. Until the network is clean, VPNs, remote access servers, single sign-on and public-facing resources should be disabled. Mechanisms that let the attackers return, such as accounts, scheduled tasks and services, should also be searched for.
Step 9. Rebuild the systems and only then change passwords.
Systems should be rebuilt from golden images and data restored from offline backups in the order set in step 3. Only verified systems should be connected to the recovery network. Passwords of all affected accounts should be changed once the environment is fully clean. Why: a password changed on a network where the attacker is still active goes straight back to the attacker.
Step 10. Record lessons learned and update the response plan.
Lessons from the incident change the procedures, the plan and the scenarios of the next exercises. The person designated in the plan declares the incident over, using the criteria written in the plan.
The ransom
The ransom should not be paid. Why: CISA, NSA and the FBI state that payment does not guarantee decryption, removal of the attackers from the network or that the data will not leak. Coveware adds that promises to delete stolen data cannot be verified and that paying rarely removes the obligation to notify.
According to Coveware, nearly 80% of incidents in Q3 2026 ended without payment. An organisation subject to US jurisdiction also risks breaching sanctions. According to OFAC, the US Treasury’s sanctions office, liability for paying a sanctioned party does not depend on fault. OFAC treats prompt reporting of the attack to law enforcement as a mitigating factor.
Prepare the response plan before an attack
A team without a plan works out during the attack who decides on disconnecting the network and who talks to the regulator. CISA recommends that the incident response plan and the communications plan cover ransomware and data breaches. Top management approves both plans in writing, according to CISA the CEO or equivalent.
NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 of 2025 describes incident response as part of risk management under CSF 2.0 (the Cybersecurity Framework, NIST’s framework for managing cybersecurity risk).
| Plan element | Who is responsible | What must be ready before an attack |
|---|---|---|
| Hard copy and offline version | Plan owner | The plan is printed and stored off the network, because IT systems may be unavailable during an attack. |
| List of critical systems | Process owners and IT | The list gives the restoration order and the dependencies between systems. |
| Contacts and emergency channel | Incident coordinator | The list holds phone numbers for management, IT, legal, the insurer, the CSIRT and suppliers, and the team knows the channel outside the company network. |
| Reserved decisions | Top management | The plan states who approves disconnecting the network, public statements and talks with the attackers. |
| Notifications | Person responsible for contact with the CSIRT | The plan contains templates for the early warning, the incident notification and the personal data breach notification. |
| Exercises | Incident coordinator | The team regularly exercises the plan on a ransomware scenario, and the exercise dates are written in the plan. |
Response checklist
- Affected systems are disconnected from the network, and the disconnection was coordinated over a channel outside the company network.
- Power was cut only where a device could not be disconnected from the network.
- The restoration order follows the list of critical systems.
- The team checked new accounts, VPN logins, shadow copy deletion and outbound traffic.
- Disk images, memory captures, logs and the ransom note are preserved.
- The early warning, the incident notification and the data breach notification each have an owner and a deadline.
- The team checked whether a free decryptor is available.
- The initial entry routes and the attackers’ ways back are closed.
- Systems are rebuilt from golden images and data restored from offline backups.
- Passwords were changed after the environment was cleaned.
- Lessons learned are recorded and the response plan is updated.
A few numbers
| Number | What it means | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 7,419 | This many ransomware attacks were recorded worldwide in 2025, including 1,173 confirmed by victims. The rest were claimed by the groups on their sites. | Comparitech, 2026 |
| 28% | This share of victims paid a ransom in 2025, according to an estimate based on cryptocurrency payments. Payments exceeded USD 820 million. | Chainalysis, 2026 |
| nearly 80% | This share of incidents handled by Coveware in Q3 2026 ended without payment. | Coveware, 2026 |
| 22 seconds | This was the median time from intrusion to handing access to another group in 2025. In 2022 it was more than 8 hours. | Mandiant M-Trends 2026 |
| 119 | This many ransomware groups attacked industrial organisations in 2025, compared with 80 in 2024. | Dragos, 2026 |
Where we help
During incident response preparation we write the response plan and the ransomware scenario, then test them in an exercise with the team and management. Penetration tests and Red Team operations show whether an attacker can get from initial access to the domain controller and the backups. In industrial plants we test the route from the office network to OT during an OT security assessment, and we welcome a conversation through the contact form.
Legal basis
| Step / topic | Where it is |
|---|---|
| Early warning within 24 hours, incident notification within 72 hours, final report within one month | NIS2 Directive, Article 23(4)(a), (b) and (d), as transposed nationally |
| Notifications to the CSIRT or competent authority | NIS2 Directive, Article 23(1) and (4) |
| CSIRT guidance on reporting to law enforcement | NIS2 Directive, Article 23(5) |
| Precedence of equivalent sector-specific EU acts | NIS2 Directive, Article 4(1) |
| Personal data breach notification within 72 hours | GDPR, Article 33(1) |
| Sanctions risk when paying a ransom, mitigating factors | OFAC, Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments (21.09.2021) |
| Response steps 1-10 | CISA et al., #StopRansomware Guide, part 2 (response list for ransomware and data extortion) |
| Response and communications plan | CISA et al., #StopRansomware Guide, part 1; NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 |
Related articles
- Ransomware prevention - controls and the order to deploy them - what to deploy before an attack and in what order
- Ransomware in OT environments - the impact of an attack on industrial plants
- Ransomware trends analysis - changes in groups and attack methods
- Colonial Pipeline - the course of the attack on the pipeline operator
Sources
- CISA, MS-ISAC, NSA, FBI - #StopRansomware Guide (version of 19.10.2023) - CISA (accessed: )
- NIST IR 8374 Rev. 1 - Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Community Profile (June 2026) - NIST (accessed: )
- NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 - Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management (April 2025) - NIST (accessed: )
- M-Trends 2026: Data, Insights, and Strategies From the Frontlines - Mandiant / Google Cloud (accessed: )
- CrowdStrike - Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware (10.01.2019) - CrowdStrike (accessed: )
- National Audit Office - Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS - National Audit Office (UK) (accessed: )
- CISA - Petya Ransomware (alert of 1.07.2017) - CISA (accessed: )
- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010 - Critical - Microsoft (accessed: )
- CyOTE - Case Study: DarkSide Ransomware Attack on Colonial Pipeline - Idaho National Laboratory / U.S. Department of Energy (accessed: )
- CISA AA21-131A - DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption - CISA (accessed: )
- Testimony of A. Witty (UnitedHealth Group) before a House subcommittee, 1.05.2024 - U.S. House of Representatives (accessed: )
- CERT Polska - Energy Sector Incident Report (published 30.01.2026, incident of 29.12.2025) - CERT Polska (accessed: )
- Dragos - 2026 OT/ICS Cybersecurity Year in Review (press release of 17.02.2026) - Dragos (accessed: )
- Secureworks CTU - Ransomware groups evolve affiliate models - Sophos (Secureworks Counter Threat Unit) (accessed: )
- The Register - Ransomware crims forced to take off-RAMP as FBI seizes forum (28.01.2026) - The Register (accessed: )
- Comparitech - Worldwide ransomware roundup: 2025 end-of-year report - Comparitech (accessed: )
- Chainalysis - ransomware in 2025 (26.02.2026) - Chainalysis (accessed: )
- Coveware - quarterly report for Q3 2026 (28.10.2026) - Coveware (accessed: )
- OFAC - Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments (21.09.2021) - U.S. Department of the Treasury (accessed: )
- No More Ransom - About the project - No More Ransom (accessed: )
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2 Directive), Articles 4 and 23 - EUR-Lex (accessed: )
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 33 - EUR-Lex (accessed: )
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise - techniques (v20.1) - MITRE (accessed: )
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