Attack encyclopedia
Ryuk - the ransomware that hunted big game
Ryuk ransomware - analysis of the Wizard Spider Big Game Hunting model. 705 BTC in the first months, backup destruction, evolution into Conti. MITRE ATT&CK mapping (S0446).
Józef SulwińskiPublished 8 min read

Contents
- Wizard Spider - a Russian-speaking cybercriminal empire
- The attack chain - from phishing to encryption
- 705 BTC in five months - the economics of Big Game Hunting
- The attack on Universal Health Services - when ransomware threatens lives
- MITRE ATT&CK - technique mapping (S0446)
- From Ryuk to Conti - evolution of a predator
- Lessons for defenders
- Sources
Christmas 2018. In the newsrooms and printing plants of the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, and Baltimore Sun, the presses stop printing. The production systems of Tribune Publishing - one of the largest newspaper publishers in America - go down one after another. Millions of copies that were supposed to reach readers the next morning never leave the printing facilities. On the server screens, a message with the .RYK extension and a ransom demand in bitcoin.
This was not a random attack. It was a precision strike - planned, reconnoitered, executed with surgical accuracy at a moment when IT teams were celebrating with their families. This is how Ryuk operated - ransomware designed not for mass infection, but for hunting large targets for large sums of money. A model its creators called Big Game Hunting.
Wizard Spider - a Russian-speaking cybercriminal empire
Behind Ryuk stands the group known as Wizard Spider (CrowdStrike) or Grim Spider (an older name for the ransomware operators themselves, since retired by CrowdStrike) - a Russian-speaking cybercriminal collective that had previously gained notoriety for creating the TrickBot banking trojan. This distinction matters: early analyses incorrectly attributed Ryuk to the North Korean group Lazarus, because the ransomware code contained fragments originating from Hermes - another piece of malware used in 2017 during a SWIFT theft from the Taiwanese bank Far Eastern International. However, Hermes was a commodity sold on forums - anyone could buy it. Further research by CrowdStrike, FireEye, and McAfee established with high confidence that Ryuk was the work of Russian-speaking operators, not North Korea.
Wizard Spider operated like a well-organized enterprise. They maintained their own distribution infrastructure (TrickBot as an initial access vector, supported by Emotet developed by the partner group Mummy Spider), teams of operators penetrating victim networks, and a separate division responsible for negotiations and money laundering.
The attack chain - from phishing to encryption
Ryuk never spread on its own like WannaCry. Every attack was a multi-stage operation, conducted manually by skilled operators.
-
Phishing with Emotet - the victim received an email with an infected attachment or link. Emotet - one of the most prevalent trojans of that era - installed itself on the workstation.
-
Delivering TrickBot or BazarLoader - Emotet downloaded a second agent that enabled deeper network reconnaissance: mapping Active Directory, identifying domain controllers, locating backup servers.
-
Manual escalation - Wizard Spider operators logged into the victim’s network via a reverse shell. They obtained administrative privileges and moved laterally using RDP, PsExec, and PowerShell.
-
Destroying defenses - this was the stage that set Ryuk apart from earlier generations of ransomware. Operators systematically disabled antivirus software, deleted Volume Shadow Copies, stopped database services, and - most destructively - deliberately targeted backup servers. They shut down Acronis, Veeam, SQLSafe, and Zoolz services. They modified access control lists (ACLs) using the
icaclscommand, then ran the GMER tool to detect and disable security software on the backup server. -
Encryption - only after neutralizing defenses did Ryuk encrypt files using AES-256 (symmetric key) protected by an RSA key (asymmetric). Files received the .RYK extension, and a ransom note appeared on the desktop.
TIP
In later versions, Ryuk could wake powered-off computers on the network using Wake-on-LAN packets, encrypting devices that were asleep at the time of the attack. This dramatically increased the scope of destruction.
705 BTC in five months - the economics of Big Game Hunting
Traditional ransomware - such as WannaCry - demanded $300 from each victim and earned pennies despite hundreds of thousands of infections (approximately $85,000 in the first days). Wizard Spider flipped this model. Instead of attacking en masse, they selected a dozen or so large organizations and demanded ransoms in the tens or even hundreds of bitcoin.
The results were staggering. In the first five months of operation - from August 2018 to January 2019 - CrowdStrike identified 52 transactions across 37 BTC addresses linked to Ryuk. The total: 705.80 BTC, which at the time corresponded to $3.7 million. The lowest ransom was 1.7 BTC. The highest - 99 BTC.
| Date | Target | Ransom / Losses |
|---|---|---|
| December 2018 | Tribune Publishing (USA) | Newspaper printing disrupted across the United States |
| March 2019 | Jackson County, Georgia | $400,000 |
| June 2019 | Lake City, Florida | $460,000 |
| September 2020 | Universal Health Services | $67M in losses |
| October 2020 | Sky Lakes Medical Center, Oregon | Switched to paper documentation |
| October 2020 | Lawrence Health System, New York | Electronic systems shut down |
The attack on Universal Health Services - when ransomware threatens lives
September 27, 2020. Ryuk strikes Universal Health Services - one of the largest hospital networks in the United States. UHS medical facilities across the United States lose access to their IT systems. Doctors and nurses revert to paper records. Lab tests have to be ordered manually. Results are delivered by couriers running through hospital corridors.
Restoring systems took three weeks. UHS estimated losses at $67 million - including lost revenue, recovery costs, and spending on strengthened security. A month later, CISA, the FBI, and HHS issued a joint alert (AA20-302A) warning the healthcare sector about a wave of Ryuk attacks on hospitals.
TIP
The CISA alert AA20-302A from October 2020 remains one of the most important reference documents on ransomware threats to the healthcare sector. It describes the full Emotet-TrickBot-Ryuk attack chain and contains detailed indicators of compromise (IoC).
MITRE ATT&CK - technique mapping (S0446)
Ryuk is cataloged in the MITRE ATT&CK framework as S0446. Key techniques:
| Tactic | Technique | ID | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell | T1059.003 | Using the cmd shell to execute commands |
| Persistence | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | T1547.001 | Surviving system restarts |
| Discovery | File and Directory Discovery | T1083 | Searching for files to encrypt |
| Discovery | System Network Configuration | T1016 | Reconnaissance of the victim’s network architecture |
| Impact | Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 | Encrypting victim files (AES-256 + RSA) |
| Impact | Inhibit System Recovery | T1490 | Deleting Volume Shadow Copies and destroying backups |
| Impact | Service Stop | T1489 | Stopping database and backup services before encryption |
Disabling security tools and moving through the network via RDP (T1021.001), described above as actions of the Wizard Spider operators, are not attributed to the S0446 software itself in MITRE.
From Ryuk to Conti - evolution of a predator
In early 2020, Ryuk activity began to decline. Not because Wizard Spider had ceased operations - quite the opposite. The group was developing a successor: the Conti ransomware, which adopted the Big Game Hunting model and extended it with a double extortion mechanism (data exfiltration before encryption and the threat of publication). Conti operated as Ransomware-as-a-Service, recruiting affiliates on criminal forums.
Ryuk did not disappear immediately - sporadic attacks were still recorded in 2021 - but Wizard Spider’s main operational effort shifted toward Conti. And when in February 2022 the internal Conti chats leaked after the group declared support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the world saw from the inside how a professional ransomware organization operates - complete with an HR department, performance bonuses, and regular standup meetings.
Ryuk’s legacy lives on. Groups such as Royal, Black Basta, and Akira - formed from dispersed Conti members - continue the Big Game Hunting model that Wizard Spider perfected.
Lessons for defenders
1. Backups must be attack-resistant
Ryuk proved that simply having backups is not enough. If the backup server resides in the same Active Directory domain as the rest of the infrastructure, an attacker with domain admin privileges will encrypt it along with everything else. Backups require isolation - physical or logical - following the 3-2-1-1 rule (three copies, two media types, one copy offsite, one copy offline/immutable).
2. Segmentation and lateral movement monitoring
Ryuk needed days or weeks for reconnaissance and attack preparation. Lateral movement - RDP sessions to domain controllers, mass PsExec execution, permission changes on backup servers - these are signals that a properly configured monitoring system detects. Network segmentation limits the area an attacker can traverse.
3. Ransomware is an organization-wide problem
Ryuk attacked hospitals, publishers, local governments, logistics companies. They all had one thing in common: large organizations for which operational downtime meant enormous losses - and therefore high motivation to pay the ransom. Defense against ransomware requires not only technical tools but an incident response process, practiced business continuity plans, and management awareness that paying a ransom never guarantees data recovery.
TIP
The time from initial access to launching Ryuk ranged from a few days to a few months (CrowdStrike). This is the window in which a SOC team can detect reconnaissance activity and stop an attack before encryption begins. Key indicators include: unusual RDP logins outside business hours, mass PsExec execution, and changes to backup service configurations.
Sources
- Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware - CrowdStrike (accessed: )
- Timelining GRIM SPIDER's Big Game Hunting Tactics - CrowdStrike (accessed: )
- Ryuk, Software S0446 - MITRE ATT&CK (accessed: )
- Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector (AA20-302A) - CISA / FBI / HHS (accessed: )
- What is Ryuk Ransomware? A Detailed Breakdown - SentinelOne (accessed: )
- Ryuk Revisited - Analysis of Recent Ryuk Attack - FortiGuard Labs (accessed: )
Need help in this area?
Our experts will help you assess the risk and plan next steps.