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OT Network Segmentation - Protecting Industrial Systems from Cyberattacks

OT network segmentation per IEC 62443 - zones, conduits, implementation methods and monitoring tools. A practical guide with real-world incident examples.

Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published Updated 16 min read

network segmentationIEC 62443OT securityzones and conduitsSCADA
OT Network Segmentation - Protecting Industrial Systems from Cyberattacks
Contents
  1. A few numbers
  2. The Problem and the Framework
  3. How We Do It - The SEQRED Approach
  4. Conclusion
  5. Sources

Attacks on industrial infrastructure are no longer a theoretical scenario. In December 2025, a coordinated attack struck over 30 Polish wind and solar farms, a CHP plant serving half a million customers, and a manufacturing company - damaging RTU controller firmware and severing operator communications (CERT Polska report, January 2026). The attribution of the attack is not clear-cut: CERT Polska points to overlap with the Static Tundra / Berserk Bear / Dragonfly cluster, while ESET and Dragos link it to Sandworm (ELECTRUM). Before that, Colonial Pipeline and COSMICENERGY - each of these incidents demonstrated that a lack of segmentation between IT and OT networks leads to real-world consequences.

This article consists of two parts. The first explains the theoretical framework - what segmentation means under IEC 62443, which methods to apply, and which OT protocols to account for. The second shows how we approach this in practice - with specific matrices, checklists, and control mappings.

A few numbers

Value What it means Source
42 days Ransomware in OT environments takes 42 days on average to be contained; with full OT visibility it takes 5 days. Dragos, OT Cybersecurity Year in Review 2026
119 This many ransomware groups targeted industrial organizations in 2025 (80 in 2024). Dragos, OT Cybersecurity Year in Review 2026
over 2/3 Manufacturing accounted for more than two thirds of ransomware victims among industrial organizations in 2025. Dragos, OT Cybersecurity Year in Review 2026

The Problem and the Framework

Why Segmentation Is Critical

Traditional OT environments were built as isolated networks. That isolation no longer exists - SCADA systems connect to the cloud, engineers remotely service PLCs, production data flows into ERP systems. Without segmentation, an attacker who gains access to one network segment can move laterally until reaching a PLC controlling a physical process.

Lessons from Incidents

Five incidents from recent years illustrate different scenarios where a lack of segmentation enabled or deepened an attack. Each carries a concrete lesson for zone and conduit architecture design.

Incident Year What Happened Segmentation Lesson
Colonial Pipeline 2021 Ransomware encrypted information servers above SCADA (MES/historian layer) - preemptive pipeline shutdown with OT segments left intact OT dependency on IT business systems requires analysis and isolation
Oldsmar Water 2021 Remote change of a chemical dosing setpoint in the control system of a water treatment plant; the FBI did not confirm an intrusion, the cause remains unexplained A remote path to process setpoints requires access control and separation from external networks, and critical setpoints require limits and a second confirmation
COSMICENERGY 2023 Malware interacting with RTUs via IEC 60870-5-104 - switch manipulation OT protocols without authentication require network-level isolation
Volt Typhoon 2024 Chinese APT group pre-positioning in US critical infrastructure IT (techniques mapped in MITRE ATT&CK) Lateral movement from IT to OT as a strategic objective
Polish Renewables Attack 2025 Coordinated attack on 30+ wind/solar farms, CHP plant (500k customers), manufacturing company. RTU firmware damaged, wiper malware, operator communications severed Destructive (not financial) attack - OT device firmware damage requires physical separation and monitoring

Sources: CISA Alert AA21-131A, FBI/CISA/EPA joint advisory, Mandiant Threat Research, CISA Advisory AA24-038A, CERT Polska “Energy sector incident” (January 2026).

Zones and Conduits - The IEC 62443 Model

The Purdue Model (ISA-95) defines the industrial network hierarchy (levels 0-5), but the rigid level-based division does not capture the complexity of modern OT environments. IEC 62443-3-2 introduces a more flexible approach:

  • Zone - a group of assets with common security requirements
  • Conduit - a controlled communication channel between zones
  • Each zone receives a Security Level Target (SL-T) on a scale from SL 1 to SL 4
  • Zone boundaries are derived from risk assessment - not imposed top-down

Segmentation Methods - Comparison

In practice, OT network segmentation relies on several methods, often used in combination. Physical separation and DMZ protect the IT/OT boundary, firewalls with DPI control inter-zone traffic, and VLANs with micro-segmentation complement protection within zones. Method selection depends on the zone’s target Security Level (SL-T) - the higher the SL, the stronger the mechanisms.

Method Description When to Use Limitations
Physical separation Separate switches, cables, infrastructure SIS, most critical systems Increasingly difficult as data exchange needs grow
DMZ zone Buffer with firewalls on both IT/OT sides Always - every installation should have a DMZ Requires maintaining intermediary servers
VLANs with ACLs Logical network division on switches Basic segmentation within zones Vulnerable to VLAN hopping, insufficient alone
Firewalls with DPI Deep inspection of OT protocols (Modbus, OPC UA) Boundaries between IEC 62443 zones Requires OT protocol expertise
Data diodes Hardware-enforced unidirectional data flow Telemetry export from OT to IT No return communication - not suitable for all scenarios
Micro-segmentation Granular per-device policies (Zero Trust) Supplement to zone-based segmentation Early-stage adoption in OT environments

OT Network Protocols - What to Know for Segmentation

Below are protocols that traverse Ethernet/IP networks and can be controlled by firewalls, ACLs, and DPI systems. Serial protocols (Modbus RTU, PROFIBUS, HART 4-20mA, CANbus) are not included here - they operate below the network layer and require physical protection, not network segmentation.

Control and SCADA communication protocols:

Protocol Port Auth. Encr. Application Segmentation Notes
Modbus TCP 502 None None PLC, RTU, SCADA Filter by function code on DPI firewall
OPC UA 4840 X.509 cert. TLS System integration Best secured - enforce signed+encrypted mode
OPC Classic (DA) 135+ Weak (DCOM) None Legacy SCADA systems DCOM requires many ports - difficult to firewall
DNP3/TCP 20000 Optional (SA v5) Optional Energy, water utilities SA v5 adds HMAC - many deployments without SA
IEC 60870-5-104 2404 None None Power grid Targeted by COSMICENERGY and Industroyer - isolate or DPI
S7comm 102 None None Siemens controllers Exploited by Stuxnet. S7comm-plus (v4+) adds integrity

Industrial automation protocols (Ethernet):

Protocol Port / Layer Auth. Encr. Application Segmentation Notes
EtherNet/IP (CIP) TCP 44818, UDP 2222 None* None* Rockwell/Allen-Bradley *CIP Security adds TLS/DTLS with X.509
PROFINET L2 (EtherType) None None Siemens, factory automation RT/IRT bypasses IP stack - requires L2-aware firewalls
EtherCAT L2 (0x88A4) None None Motion control, robotics “Processing on the fly” - compromising one slave threatens the entire network
IEC 61850 MMS TCP 102 None None Electrical substations MMS over TCP - controllable by firewall
IEC 61850 GOOSE L2 (0x88B8) None None Electrical substations L2 multicast without authentication - VLAN as only isolation

Building management and IoT protocols:

Protocol Port Auth. Encr. Application Segmentation Notes
BACnet/IP UDP 47808 None* None* BMS, HVAC, access control *BACnet Secure Connect (2019) adds TLS. Segment from process OT
MQTT TCP 1883 / 8883 Optional TLS (port 8883) IIoT, telemetry Do not allow port 1883 in production - enforce TLS
CoAP UDP 5683 DTLS (opt.) DTLS (opt.) Resource-constrained IoT Verify endpoints and proxy configuration

Source: protocol specifications (modbus.org, opcfoundation.org, IEEE 1815), NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3.

Segmentation Below the Network Layer - Fieldbus and Serial Protocols

IEC 62443 zones and conduits apply to all assets - not just networked ones. An RS-485 cable between a PLC and an RTU is a conduit under the standard, just like an Ethernet connection. The problem is that for fieldbus/serial protocols there are no equivalents of firewalls or ACLs. The only available mechanisms are physical protection and device hardening.

Serial/fieldbus protocols in the segmentation context:

Protocol Physical Layer Auth. Encr. Protection Mechanism
Modbus RTU RS-485 / RS-232 None None Physical cable and cabinet protection. Control at serial-to-Ethernet gateway (converter as inspection point)
PROFIBUS DP/PA RS-485 / MBP (IEC 61158-2) None None Physical protection. Disable unused master ports. Controller-level segmentation
HART (4-20mA) Analog current loop with FSK None None Physical junction box protection. Restrict access to configuration handhelds
WirelessHART IEEE 802.15.4 (2.4 GHz) Yes (network keys) AES-128 Only fieldbus with built-in encryption. Manage join/session/network keys
FOUNDATION Fieldbus H1: IEC 61158-2, HSE: Ethernet None (H1) None (H1) H1: physical protection. HSE: segment as Ethernet
CANbus / CANopen Differential bus (ISO 11898) None None Every node sees all traffic. CAN gateways as segmentation point between domains
AS-Interface 2-wire (data + power) None None Simple sensor/actuator protocol. Physical protection is the only option

What this means in practice:

  1. Physical protection is segmentation - for serial protocols, a locked control cabinet, access control to technical rooms, and seals on junction boxes serve the same role as a firewall on an Ethernet network
  2. Protocol gateways as control points - a Modbus RTU -> Modbus TCP converter or PROFIBUS -> PROFINET gateway is the only place where fieldbus traffic can be inspected and filtered
  3. Device hardening - disable unused communication ports on PLCs and controllers, lock programming mode, password-protect configuration
  4. WirelessHART as the exception - the only fieldbus protocol with built-in encryption (AES-128) and key management. However, wired protocols have a significant advantage over wireless: disrupting communication requires physical access to the cable, which significantly raises the bar for an attacker. Wireless protocols, even with encryption, are vulnerable to radio jamming

Consequence for zone architecture: Under IEC 62443-3-2, a Security Level Target (SL-T) is set for each zone and each conduit from a risk assessment. Human user authentication and authorization enforcement apply from SL 1, and from SL 2 the system must also authenticate software processes and devices. Serial protocols (Modbus RTU, PROFIBUS, HART) cannot authenticate devices, so the capability (SL-C) of components that use them is often lower than the zone’s SL-T. This gap can be closed with compensating countermeasures, for example at the zone boundary on the PLC/RTU controller, which links the fieldbus to the Ethernet network and can authenticate traffic and control access.


How We Do It - The SEQRED Approach

SEQRED Documentation Example: Zone-to-Zone Flow Matrix

In segmentation projects we use a zone-to-zone flow matrix - a table defining permitted connections, protocols, and communication direction for each pair of zones. This is the key document that becomes the basis for firewall configuration.

Zone definitions:

Zone Description Example Assets SL-T
Z1 - Control Controllers and field devices PLC, RTU, sensors, actuators SL 3
Z2 - Supervisory Visualization and engineering systems HMI, engineering workstations, OPC server SL 2
Z3 - Operations Production management Historian, MES, reporting servers SL 2
Z4 - DMZ IT/OT buffer zone Jump host, data mirror, OPC gateway SL 2
Z5 - IT Corporate network ERP, email, Internet SL 1

Flow matrix (source -> destination):

Source \ Dest Z1 Control Z2 Supervisory Z3 Operations Z4 DMZ Z5 IT
Z1 Control - Modbus TCP (read), OPC UA Deny Deny Deny
Z2 Supervisory Modbus TCP (r/w), OPC UA - OPC UA (read) Deny Deny
Z3 Operations Deny OPC UA (read) - SQL, HTTPS (to mirror) Deny
Z4 DMZ Deny Deny SQL (read) - HTTPS, SMTP
Z5 IT Deny Deny Deny HTTPS, RDP (jump host) -

Key principles:

  1. No direct access from IT to the control zone - traffic from Z5 to Z1 traverses three intermediate zones
  2. DMZ as the only contact point - Z4 is the only zone communicating with both OT (Z3) and IT (Z5)
  3. Read/write differentiation - an HMI operator (Z2) can write to PLCs (Z1), but the historian (Z3) can only read from Z2
  4. Default policy: deny all - only explicitly listed flows are permitted

SEQRED Documentation Example: Segmentation Method vs Security Level Matrix

After defining zones and assigning target Security Levels (SL-T), you need to select appropriate segmentation methods. The matrix below shows which methods are sufficient and which require supplementation depending on SL. We use this as a starting point for client discussions - the final selection follows from risk assessment of the specific installation.

Segmentation Method SL 1 SL 2 SL 3 SL 4
VLANs with ACLs Sufficient Supplement Insufficient Insufficient
Firewall with DPI Excessive Sufficient Sufficient Supplement
DMZ zone Recommended Required Required Required
Data diode Optional Optional Recommended Required
Physical separation Optional Optional Recommended Required

Sources: IEC 62443-3-2:2020, CISA “Layering Network Security Through Segmentation” (2022), NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3. Matrix is a SEQRED development.

NIST SP 800-53 Control Mapping to OT Segmentation

Below is a mapping of key controls from the NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 catalog to OT network segmentation methods:

Control Description OT Application
SC-7 Boundary Protection Communication control at interfaces Firewalls at zone boundaries, DMZ
SC-7(5) Deny by Default Default traffic blocking Deny-all policy between zones
SC-7(21) Isolation of Components Component isolation SIS separation from the rest of OT
AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement Authorized flow enforcement DPI rules controlling OT commands
AC-4(7) One-way Flow Hardware unidirectional flow Data diodes (Waterfall, Owl)
SC-3 Security Function Isolation Security function isolation Separate zone for SIS
CA-3 Information Exchange Information exchange management IEC 62443 conduits

Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 “Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations.”

Implementation Process - Step by Step

  1. Asset inventory - passive asset discovery (Nozomi, Claroty) without active scanning
  2. Risk assessment and zone definition - grouping assets into zones, assigning SL-T
  3. Conduit definition - permitted protocols, direction, control mechanism. Default: deny all
  4. Incremental deployment - starting with the most critical zones (SIS), gradual expansion
  5. Monitoring and validation - verifying that traffic complies with zone policy

Legacy environment challenges: lack of authentication in older PLCs (e.g., Siemens S7-300), flat networks in 10+ year installations, downtime risk during topology changes, temporary vendor remote access that is never removed.

Segmentation Readiness Checklist

Before starting a segmentation project, verify organizational readiness across five areas corresponding to implementation stages. The table below serves as a progress tracking tool - the “Status” column allows marking which elements are already in place and which require work.

Stage Element Status
1. Inventory Complete list of OT assets (PLCs, HMIs, engineering workstations, servers, network devices)
Documentation of network connections and data flows
Identification of communication protocols (Modbus TCP, OPC UA, DNP3, EtherNet/IP, S7comm)
List of remote access connections (VPNs, vendor service tunnels)
Passive monitoring tool deployed for asset discovery
2. Risk assessment and zone definition Security zones defined (IEC 62443-3-2)
Target Security Levels (SL-T) assigned to each zone
Conduits between zones identified
Impact assessment of losing access to each zone on production
3. Conduit definition Zone-to-zone flow matrix completed for all zone pairs
Permitted protocols and communication direction defined per conduit
Default deny-all policy confirmed
Firewall and ACL rules prepared for deployment
4. Incremental deployment Maintenance windows agreed for implementing changes
Rollback plan prepared
Operators informed and trained
Deployment order established - starting with most critical zones (SIS)
5. Monitoring and validation Passive monitoring verifying traffic compliance with zone policy
Firewalls with OT protocol support deployed at zone boundaries
Centralized security event logging (SIEM or log collector)
Incident response procedures defined per zone

Passive OT Network Monitoring Tools

Segmentation without monitoring is half the job - you cannot know whether network traffic complies with zone policy or whether unauthorized devices have appeared. Passive monitoring tools listen to traffic without interfering with production systems and provide asset inventory, anomaly detection, and vulnerability identification.

Tool Vendor Key Features
Guardian / Vantage Nozomi Networks Passive monitoring, asset inventory, anomaly detection
CTD / xDome Claroty Asset visibility, vulnerability management, secure remote access
Platform Dragos Threat detection, ICS-specific threat intelligence
OT Security Tenable (formerly Indegy) Asset discovery, risk-based vulnerability management
Defender for IoT Microsoft (formerly CyberX) Agentless monitoring, Microsoft Sentinel integration

Conclusion

OT network segmentation is not a one-time project - it is a continuous improvement process. The Purdue Model provides the vocabulary, IEC 62443-3-2 provides the method (zones and conduits), and passive monitoring tools provide visibility.

The key is a pragmatic approach: asset inventory, risk assessment, incremental deployment, and continuous monitoring. Every step toward segmentation reduces risk and gives security teams time for detection and response.

NOTE

Data from the Dragos 2026 OT Cybersecurity Year in Review confirms that organizations with full OT visibility detected and contained ransomware incidents in an average of 5 days - compared to the industry average of 42 days. Visibility and segmentation work together: without asset inventory you do not know what to segment, and without segmentation even good visibility will not stop an attacker’s lateral movement.

Sources

  1. IEC 62443-3-2:2020 Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 3-2: Security risk assessment for system design - IEC (accessed: )
  2. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 control catalog (OSCAL) - NIST (accessed: )
  3. Energy Sector Incident Report - 29 December 2025 - CERT Polska (accessed: )
  4. DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks - CISA / FBI (accessed: )
  5. Compromise of U.S. Water Treatment Facility (AA21-042A) - CISA (accessed: )
  6. PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure - CISA / NSA / FBI (accessed: )
  7. Dragos 2026 OT Report Shows Surge in Threat Groups and Ransomware - Dragos (accessed: )
  8. Layering Network Security Through Segmentation Infographic - CISA (accessed: )
  9. Case Study: DarkSide Ransomware Attack on Colonial Pipeline (INL/RPT-22-67337) - Idaho National Laboratory / U.S. Department of Energy (CyOTE) (accessed: )
  10. Russian Sandworm group attacks energy company in Poland with DynoWiper, ESET Research discovers - ESET (accessed: )

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