Protocol Encyclopedia
DNP3 - telecommunications protocol for energy and critical infrastructure
DNP3 (port 20000) - SCADA protocol for energy and water utilities. Secure Authentication v5 (HMAC), IEEE 1815, known attacks, OT network segmentation.
Józef SulwińskiPublished 10 min read

Contents
DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol 3) is a communication protocol designed specifically for SCADA systems in the energy, water, and gas sectors. Developed by Westronic (later Harris Distributed Automation Products, now part of GE) based on early IEC 60870-5 specifications, and maintained by the DNP Users Group since November 1993, it became one of the main telecontrol protocols in North America. In Europe, its counterpart is IEC 60870-5-104 - both protocols serve the same purpose (SCADA master-outstation communication), but DNP3 offers a richer feature set and - critically - an optional authentication mechanism that IEC 104 lacks natively (it is added only by IEC 62351-5).
How DNP3 works
DNP3 handles communication between a dispatch center (master station) and field devices (outstation) - typically RTUs (Remote Terminal Units), PLCs, and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). The protocol supports:
- Telemetry (monitoring) - the RTU reports binary states (circuit breakers, signaling), analog values (voltage, current, temperature), counters (energy), and timestamped events
- Telecommands (control) - the master sends commands to open/close circuit breakers, change regulator setpoints, switch operating modes
- File transfer - transferring configuration files, logs, and firmware to field devices
- Unsolicited responses - the outstation can independently report events without polling (event-driven), which reduces network traffic and shortens response time
Layered architecture
DNP3 uses a three-layer model (Enhanced Performance Architecture - EPA):
| Layer | Function |
|---|---|
| Application Layer | Data objects (Binary Input, Analog Output, Counter…), fragmentation, function codes |
| Transport Layer | Segmentation and reassembly, sequence numbering |
| Data Link Layer | Addressing (source/destination, 16-bit), CRC-16 per 16-byte block, acknowledgements |
In the DNP3-over-TCP variant (most commonly used in modern networks), the DNP3 layers are encapsulated in TCP/IP on port 20000.
Data Link frame structure
The 0x0564 signature enables identification of DNP3 in network traffic. CRC-16 is calculated per 16-byte block (not per frame) - this is a unique DNP3 feature ensuring integrity at the data link layer.
Application Layer function codes
| Function Code | Name | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0x01 | Read | Low | Reading data objects (states, measurements) |
| 0x02 | Write | High | Writing to objects - changing setpoints |
| 0x03 | Select | High | Selecting a control command (SBO - Select Before Operate) |
| 0x04 | Operate | Critical | Executing the selected command (opening/closing a circuit breaker) |
| 0x05 | Direct Operate | Critical | Direct execution without Select (if permitted) |
| 0x06 | Direct Operate No Ack | Critical | As above, without acknowledgement (no response from the outstation) |
| 0x0D | Cold Restart | Critical | Device restart |
| 0x0E | Warm Restart | High | Application restart without hardware restart |
| 0x81 | Response | - | Outstation response to master request |
| 0x82 | Unsolicited Response | - | Spontaneous event reporting |
WARNING
SBO (Select Before Operate) mode requires two steps (FC 0x03 + FC 0x04), providing a detection window between command selection and execution. Direct Operate (FC 0x05) and Direct Operate No Ack (FC 0x06) bypass this mechanism. If the device configuration allows Direct Operate - an attacker can issue a control command in a single packet.
Technical parameters
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Port | 20000/TCP (DNP3-over-TCP), 20000/UDP (optional) |
| Transport | TCP/IP or serial links (RS-232, RS-485) |
| Authentication | None (standard DNP3), HMAC (SHA-1 or SHA-256) in Secure Authentication v5 |
| Encryption | None (natively), optionally TLS (IEC 62351-3) |
| Integrity | CRC-16 at the Data Link layer, HMAC at the application layer (SA v5) |
| Standard | IEEE 1815-2012 (IEEE status: Inactive-Reserved since 2023, revision P1815 in progress) |
| Organization | DNP Users Group (dnp.org) |
Secure Authentication - security evolution
Secure Authentication v2 (IEEE 1815-2010)
The DNP Users Group developed the Secure Authentication (SA) mechanism, incorporated into the IEEE 1815-2010 standard. This version introduced:
- Challenge-response with a pre-shared key
- HMAC-SHA-1 for verifying the integrity of critical messages (control commands, configuration changes)
- Aggressive Mode authentication - after one successful challenge-response, subsequent messages in the session can skip the full handshake
This version supported pre-shared keys only: they had to be installed in every field device, with no remote update, which in energy networks with thousands of RTUs meant a heavy logistical burden.
Secure Authentication v5 (IEEE 1815-2012)
Version 5, incorporated into the IEEE 1815-2012 standard and based on IEC 62351-5, resolved the biggest problem of version 2 - key management:
- HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-256 (truncated) selectable as the integrity mechanism
- Remote key update (Update Key Change) - symmetric or asymmetric (PKI) methods, without a physical visit to the device
- Separate update keys for individual devices or users
- Error/Attack detection - mechanism for detecting and reporting unauthorized access attempts
The SA v5 specification is aligned with IEC 62351-5 and is part of the IEEE 1815-2012 standard.
Security assessment
Standard DNP3 (without SA)
Many DNP3 installations still operate without Secure Authentication. Standard DNP3 has no authentication - any host capable of establishing a TCP connection on port 20000 can send control commands to an outstation. The protocol does not encrypt data - process values, control commands, and configuration information are transmitted in cleartext.
Known attacks and research
- Adam Crain & Chris Sistrunk - Project Robus (2013-2014) - using fuzzing, the researchers found improper input validation vulnerabilities (CWE-20) in DNP3 implementations from many vendors (including GE, SEL, Schneider Electric, Cooper Power Systems). The flaws allowed DoS by sending specially crafted DNP3 packets. CISA described them in the consolidated advisory ICSA-13-291-01, which refers to 18 vendor advisories.
- Industroyer/CrashOverride (2016) - the Industroyer malware had modules for IEC 101, IEC 104, IEC 61850 and OPC DA communication; its modular architecture allows support for additional SCADA protocols to be added.
MITRE ATT&CK for ICS
| Technique | ID | DNP3 context |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized Message: Command Message | T1692.001 | Sending control commands without authentication |
| Manipulation of Control | T0831 | Changing circuit breaker states, regulator setpoints |
| Point & Tag Identification | T0861 | Enumerating DNP3 objects (Binary Input, Analog Output) |
| Denial of Service | T0814 | Fuzzing DNP3 implementations, packet flooding |
| Monitor Process State | T0801 | Reading telemetry data from outstations |
Segmentation and protection recommendations
TIP
DNP3 Secure Authentication v5 is the primary protocol-level security mechanism available for DNP3 communication in the energy sector. If your devices support it - enable it. If not - network segmentation and encrypted tunnels (TLS or IPsec) are the only alternatives. Remember that SA protects the integrity of control commands but does not encrypt process data. Guidelines for designing zones and conduits per IEC 62443 are described in the article OT network segmentation - zones and conduits.
Key recommendations
-
Deploy Secure Authentication v5 - if the RTU/IED manufacturer supports DNP3-SA v5, configure HMAC-SHA-256 authentication for control commands and configuration changes. Plan a key distribution and rotation procedure.
-
Encrypt transport - DNP3-SA protects integrity but not confidentiality. For segments where process data confidentiality is required, use TLS (DNP3-over-TLS) or IPsec tunnels between the master station and outstations. Guidance for DNP3 over TLS is provided by IEC 62351-3.
-
WAN network segmentation - DNP3 communication between dispatch centers and field stations often traverses WAN networks (MPLS, LTE, satellite). Apply site-to-site VPN with strong encryption. Never expose port 20000 directly to the internet.
-
Firewall filtering - on the OT firewall between the SCADA network and the RTU/IED segment, configure rules allowing DNP3 only between authorized master-outstation pairs. Firewalls with DNP3 DPI (Fortinet, Palo Alto, SEL-3620) can filter messages at the function code level - blocking control commands from unauthorized sources while allowing reads.
-
Monitoring and anomalies - deploy passive DNP3 traffic monitoring (Dragos, Claroty, Nozomi Networks). Alert on: control commands from unknown IP addresses, unusual DNP3 objects, unsolicited responses from unexpected outstations, fuzzing attempts (malformed packets).
-
NERC CIP compliance - in North America, DNP3 communication in BES (Bulk Electric System) networks is subject to NERC CIP-005 (Electronic Security Perimeters) and CIP-012 (Communications between Control Centers) regulations. In Europe, analogous requirements stem from the NIS2 directive and national energy sector regulations.
DNP3 vs. IEC 60870-5-104 comparison
| Feature | DNP3 | IEC 60870-5-104 |
|---|---|---|
| Typical region of use | North America, Australia | Europe, Asia, Middle East |
| Port | 20000/TCP | 2404/TCP |
| Authentication | Secure Authentication v5 (HMAC) | None (natively) |
| Unsolicited responses | Yes | Yes (spontaneous) |
| File transfer | Yes | Yes (optional) |
| Standard | IEEE 1815-2012 | IEC 60870-5-104:2006 |
| Reference attacks | Project Robus | Industroyer, COSMICENERGY |
Typical region of use: indicative, based on market practice.
Summary
DNP3 is a protocol that - unlike many other OT standards - has an optional security mechanism (Secure Authentication v5) providing communication integrity. Unfortunately, many existing installations do not use it, and many older field devices do not support it. For organizations in the energy and water sectors, the priority should be: deploy SA v5 where possible, encrypt transport (TLS/IPsec), and apply strict network segmentation for all remaining installations. DNP3 without Secure Authentication offers the same security level as Modbus TCP - which is none.
Open source tools
| Tool | Language | Description | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| opendnp3 | C++11 | Reference DNP3 implementation (master and outstation); development ended on 1 September 2022 (repository archived) | GitHub |
| pydnp3 | Python | Python bindings for opendnp3 - scripting DNP3 sequences | GitHub |
| Wireshark | C | Built-in DNP3 dissector - traffic analysis on port 20000 | Wireshark |
TIP
pydnp3 enables scripting non-standard DNP3 sequences - useful for verifying that an outstation properly rejects unauthorized control commands.
Sources
- Overview of the DNP3 Protocol - DNP Users Group (accessed: )
- IEEE 1815-2012 - IEEE Standard for Electric Power Systems Communications - Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) - IEEE (accessed: )
- DNP3 - Wikipedia (accessed: )
- IEEE revises industrial control system security standards - Infosecurity Magazine (accessed: )
- DNP3 User Group, NOJA Power Demo DNP3-SAv5 Interoperability and Security - T&D World (accessed: )
- DNP3 Implementation Vulnerability (Update B) - ICSA-13-291-01B - CISA (accessed: )
- Industroyer, Software S0604 - MITRE ATT&CK (accessed: )
- Updates - April 2026 (ATT&CK v19) - MITRE ATT&CK (accessed: )
- opendnp3 - GitHub (accessed: )
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