OT Cybersecurity
MITRE ATT&CK - how to use the framework to protect your organization
A practical guide to MITRE ATT&CK - tactics, techniques, the ICS model, APT groups. How to implement the framework in your organization with a coverage matrix and prioritization.
Bartłomiej BojarczukPublished Updated 16 min read

A security team without a shared language for describing attacks cannot answer which attacker actions its protections cover. An incident report, knowledge about criminal groups and penetration test results then describe the same thing in different words.
In December 2025, more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power plant and a manufacturing company in Poland were attacked (CERT Polska report, January 2026). The attackers damaged the firmware of RTU controllers at the farms, which cut communication with the distribution system operator while energy production continued. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) software blocked the attack on the heat and power plant.
MITRE ATT&CK for ICS describes this incident as the campaign “2025 Poland Wiper Attacks” (C0063) and maps it to 21 ICS techniques. Attribution remains disputed:
- CERT Polska points to a high degree of infrastructure overlap with the cluster Static Tundra, Berserk Bear, Ghost Blizzard and Dragonfly,
- ESET attributes the attack to the Sandworm group with moderate confidence,
- Dragos links it to the ELECTRUM group, which ATT&CK lists as another name of Sandworm.
MITRE ATT&CK
Origins of the Framework
MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) is an open knowledge base of attacker tactics and techniques. Its main source of data is publicly available information on threats and incidents.
MITRE started the project in 2013 as an internal initiative of an organization supporting US government agencies. Since then the framework has grown to three domains, hundreds of techniques and tools for analyzing them.
The Cyber Kill Chain and the Diamond Model describe the general phases of an attack. ATT&CK catalogs concrete techniques: how attackers steal credentials, how they move through a network and which software they use.
Framework Structure - Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
The framework has three levels of detail. Each of them describes a different element of an attack.
| Level | What it describes | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Tactic | The attacker’s goal in a given phase. | Initial Access, that is, gaining the first foothold. |
| Technique | A way of achieving the tactic. | Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001), that is, a message with an attachment. |
| Procedure | A concrete implementation of a technique by a group or a program. | The APT28 group sends a Word document with a VBA macro. |
Each technique in the knowledge base contains a description of the mechanism, related groups, known malicious software and recommendations on detection and mitigation. Since version v18 (October 2025) techniques also have structured detection strategies (Detection Strategies) with analytics that describe the detection logic and the required log sources.
Three ATT&CK Domains
MITRE maintains three separate matrices, and each covers a different area of attack. The table gives data from version v20.1, which has applied since 13 October 2026.
| Model | Tactics | Techniques | Sub-techniques | Groups | Software | Application |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | 15 | 227 | 479 | 178 | 842 | Corporate networks (Windows, Linux, macOS, cloud, SaaS). |
| Mobile | 12 | 78 | 47 | 20 | 129 | Mobile devices (Android, iOS). |
| ICS | 12 | 78 | 26 | 14 | 25 | Industrial systems (SCADA, PLC controllers, DCS systems). |
The knowledge base also contains 706 detection strategies for the Enterprise matrix and 104 for ICS. The figures cover active objects, without revoked ones. New versions appear roughly every six months, in April and October, so the current version should be checked on the MITRE site.
15 Enterprise Tactics - Anatomy of an Attack
The Enterprise model describes the attack cycle in 15 tactics. The order matches a typical sequence of actions, and attackers apply tactics in any order and skip some.
| No. | Tactic | Description | Example techniques |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Reconnaissance | The attacker gathers information about the target. | Open-source intelligence, infrastructure scanning. |
| 2 | Resource Development | The attacker prepares tools and attack infrastructure. | Domain registration, building malicious software. |
| 3 | Initial Access | The attacker gains the first access to the network. | Spearphishing, exploiting a vulnerability in a service reachable from the internet. |
| 4 | Execution | The attacker runs malicious code. | Scripts, command interpreters, system functions. |
| 5 | Persistence | The attacker keeps access after a system restart. | Scheduled tasks, registry modifications. |
| 6 | Privilege Escalation | The attacker obtains higher privileges. | Exploiting kernel vulnerabilities, token impersonation. |
| 7 | Stealth | The attacker hides actions and avoids detection. | Code obfuscation, timestamp changes, rootkits. |
| 8 | Defense Impairment | The attacker weakens or disables protections. | Disabling security tools and firewalls, changing authentication. |
| 9 | Credential Access | The attacker steals credentials. | Password cracking, keylogging. |
| 10 | Discovery | The attacker explores the victim’s environment. | Enumerating networks, services and users. |
| 11 | Lateral Movement | The attacker moves through the network. | Remote desktop, network shares, pass-the-hash. |
| 12 | Collection | The attacker gathers data to exfiltrate. | Screenshots, mail interception. |
| 13 | Command and Control | The attacker keeps remote communication with infected systems. | DNS tunnels, HTTPS channels. |
| 14 | Exfiltration | The attacker takes data out of the organization. | Encrypted channels, transfer over the command channel. |
| 15 | Impact | The attacker destroys data or disrupts systems. | Ransomware, wipers, data manipulation. |
In version v19 the Defense Evasion tactic was split into Stealth and Defense Impairment.
ATT&CK for ICS - Why Industrial Systems Need a Separate Model
In OT networks availability and physical safety matter most, and data confidentiality comes after them. Attackers in an ICS environment aim at manipulating the physical process, damaging devices and halting production. The ICS model therefore contains tactics absent from Enterprise, such as Impair Process Control and Inhibit Response Function (blocking response functions, for example alarms).
The ICS model in version v20.1 has 78 techniques against 227 in the Enterprise model, so some scenarios may not be cataloged yet. The table shows selected ICS groups as described in ATT&CK.
| Group | Attribution | Description in ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|
| Sandworm Team | GRU (Russia), active since at least 2009. | A destructive group. According to a 2020 indictment it is behind the attacks on Ukrainian electric companies in 2015-2016 and NotPetya (2017). Industroyer is linked to it. |
| Dragonfly | FSB, Center 16 (Russia), active since at least 2010. | An espionage group. It attacks through the supply chain, spearphishing and compromised websites, among others companies related to industrial systems. It used Backdoor.Oldrea. |
| TEMP.Veles | A Russia-based group. | It used TRITON/TRISIS, a framework for manipulating industrial safety systems. |
| OilRig | A suspected Iranian group, active since at least 2014. | It targets victims in the Middle East and worldwide, among others in the financial, government, energy, chemical and telecommunications sectors. |
| ALLANITE | A suspected Russian group. | It spies on the electric utility sector in the USA and the United Kingdom. The descriptions do not show destructive capabilities. |
Source: group descriptions in MITRE ATT&CK v20.1.
The table shows selected ICS malware. The column with the technique count shows the ICS techniques linked directly to a given program in the STIX v20.1 data. The program page in ATT&CK may give a different number.
| Software | ICS techniques | Year | Description in ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|---|
| Industroyer | 25 | 2016 | A framework for affecting processes in electrical substations. It was used in December 2016 in attacks on Ukraine’s power grid. According to CCDCOE the outage covered about one fifth of Kyiv’s consumption and lasted more than an hour. |
| Stuxnet | 25 | 2010 | The first publicly reported malware aimed at industrial devices. It was discovered in 2010, and its components were in use as early as November 2008. |
| TRITON | 18 | 2017 | A framework for communicating with Triconex safety instrumented system (SIS) controllers. |
| INCONTROLLER | 20 | 2022 | A set of modules for Schneider Electric and Omron controllers and the OPC UA, Modbus and CODESYS protocols. It can discover devices, download logic to controllers and exploit platform vulnerabilities. |
| Backdoor.Oldrea | 8 | since 2013 | A modular backdoor used by the Dragonfly group against energy companies. Its modules enumerated ICS systems, processes and protocols. |
Source: MITRE ATT&CK for ICS v20.1.
New OT Threat Groups According to Dragos
The Dragos 2026 OT Cybersecurity Year in Review describes three new threat groups targeting critical infrastructure: SYLVANITE, PYROXENE and AZURITE. SYLVANITE acts as an access broker that sells access: it quickly exploits vulnerabilities and hands access over to the VOLTZITE group. KAMACITE mapped control loops, that is, process regulation circuits, in US infrastructure, and ELECTRUM targeted distributed energy systems in Poland.
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| OT threat groups tracked by Dragos | 26, of which 11 were active in 2025 |
| Ransomware groups attacking industry in 2025 | 119 versus 80 a year earlier, that is 49% more |
| Industrial organizations hit by ransomware | 3,300 |
Source: Dragos 2026 OT Cybersecurity Year in Review (February 2026).
ATT&CK Navigator - a Visualization Tool
ATT&CK Navigator is a web application for navigating and annotating ATT&CK matrices. The MITRE instance runs at mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator, and the application code is available in the mitre-attack/attack-navigator repository, so an organization can run it on its own.
Navigator lets you define layers, that is, views of the matrix, for example the techniques used by a chosen group or the techniques for a chosen platform. They can be colored, commented and scored numerically. An organization thereby overlays a detection coverage layer and a group technique layer to see the gaps.
How to Use ATT&CK in Security Management
Five Steps from Framework to Decision
ATT&CK delivers value when the framework supports decisions on security investments, detection coverage and the plan of attack simulations.
Step 1: identify threats for the industry
Start with the groups active in the organization’s industry and region, not with all 227 Enterprise techniques. Why: the full matrix is too large to secure every technique at once. For example, in the energy sector in Europe the groups Sandworm Team and Dragonfly should be considered, in manufacturing the groups using ransomware with an OT component, and in finance the groups APT38 and FIN7. These are examples, not an activity ranking.
For each group the analyst records four things: techniques, software, preferred entry vectors and the region of attacks. The result is the industry threat profile.
Step 2: map existing protections
Assess which techniques from the threat profile the existing protections cover: firewalls, EDR software, the log collection and correlation system (SIEM), network segmentation and access control. For each technique the team records which mechanism detects or blocks it. Why: without such a record the organization does not know what it is protected against and where it has gaps.
Step 3: analyze gaps and set priorities
Compare the threat profile with the coverage and assess each gap against three criteria: how often groups from the profile use the technique, the possible impact on the organization and the cost of reducing the risk. If a technique has a large impact and is used by groups from the profile, it goes into the first wave of work. Why: spending on protections is limited, so it must go where the risk is greatest.
Step 4: detection and response plan
For priority techniques, develop detection rules (SIEM, EDR, the network traffic analysis system NDR), response scenarios and incident procedures. Use the detection strategies from ATT&CK since version v18 as a starting point. Why: they contain ready detection logic and a list of log sources, so they shorten the team’s work.
Step 5: verify in simulations
Check the protections in conditions close to real ones. Penetration tests and red team operations simulate the threats from the profile, and the result is mapped to the ATT&CK matrix. Why: only then is it known which techniques the team detected and which passed unnoticed.
Example: Detection Coverage Matrix
A detection coverage matrix is a document that maps techniques to existing and planned detection mechanisms. The table shows an example fragment for the energy sector. Techniques with identifiers T0xxx belong to the ICS domain.
| ATT&CK technique | ID | Domain | Existing detection | Planned detection | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spearphishing Attachment | T1566.001 | Enterprise | Mail sandbox and spam filter. | Behavioral analysis of attachments. | Medium |
| Valid Accounts | T1078 | Enterprise | Directory service logs and SIEM. | Enforced multi-factor authentication and user behavior analytics (UEBA). | High |
| Remote Desktop Protocol | T1021.001 | Enterprise | Windows event logs. | Network traffic analysis and segmentation of remote desktop traffic. | High |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059 | Enterprise | EDR on workstations. | Script execution logging. | Medium |
| Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 | Enterprise | Canary files. | Behavior detection in EDR and immutable backups. | Critical |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application | T0819 | ICS | Intrusion detection system on the firewall. | OT patch management and anomaly monitoring. | Critical |
| Manipulation of Control | T0831 | ICS | None. | Deep inspection of OT protocols and process monitoring. | Critical |
| Remote Services | T0886 | ICS | VPN logs. | Two-factor authentication, session recording and just-in-time (JIT) access. | High |
Comparing Sandworm Team and Dragonfly
Navigator lets you compare the profiles of two groups and find common and unique techniques. The table compares two Russian groups described in ATT&CK that, according to various sources, may have operated in the energy sector.
| Aspect | Sandworm Team (GRU) | Dragonfly (FSB) |
|---|---|---|
| Active since | 2009 | 2010 |
| Nature | A destructive group. | An espionage group. |
| ICS software | Industroyer. | Backdoor.Oldrea (Havex). |
| December 2025 incident | ESET attributes the attack to it with moderate confidence. | CERT Polska points to infrastructure overlap with a cluster linked to Dragonfly. |
The description of Dragonfly as an espionage group applies to older campaigns. According to CERT Polska the December 2025 incident is the first described destructive activity of this cluster, but attribution remains disputed.
Prioritizing Techniques
The priority of a technique is set from three criteria. For each criterion the organization assigns a score on its own scale and records where the data came from.
| Criterion | How to assess | Where to get data |
|---|---|---|
| Frequency of use | How many groups from the industry profile use the technique. | Group descriptions in ATT&CK and threat reports for the sector. |
| Impact | Whether the effect concerns physical safety or business continuity. | Analysis of effects on the organization’s processes. |
| Cost of risk reduction | How much time and money the protection needs. | Estimate of the security team and the OT team. |
If a technique concerns physical safety or business continuity and appears in groups from the profile, it must be secured first.
Framework Limitations
ATT&CK has limitations that must be taken into account when assessing results:
- Overlapping techniques. Complex software performs several techniques at once, for example a PowerShell script started by CMD and containing exfiltration code, so classification is not always unambiguous.
- Lag. New techniques enter the knowledge base after researchers document them, so the base lags behind the latest threats.
- No risk assessment. The framework describes how an attacker works but does not decide whether it applies to a given organization. That requires a risk assessment with industry context.
- A younger ICS model. The ICS model has 78 techniques against 227 in Enterprise, so some scenarios may not be cataloged yet.
ATT&CK Implementation Readiness Checklist
The checklist shows the stage the organization is at and what needs completing.
| Stage | Item | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Threat identification | Industry profile | Record the groups active in the industry and region. |
| Priority techniques | Select the techniques that concern the organization most, using the criteria from the prioritization section. | |
| Threat information sources | Name the sources, for example MITRE, CISA and sector information sharing centers (ISAC). | |
| 2. Coverage assessment | Tool inventory | Record the security tools and assign ATT&CK techniques to them. |
| Coverage matrix | Visualize covered and uncovered techniques in Navigator. | |
| Gap analysis | Describe the gaps with the greatest impact and plan their removal. | |
| 3. Detection building | Detection rules | Write SIEM and EDR rules for priority techniques. |
| Incident procedures | Assign response procedures to ATT&CK tactics. | |
| Detection strategies | Use the detection strategies from the ATT&CK knowledge base since v18. | |
| 4. Verification | Penetration tests | Simulate selected techniques in controlled conditions. |
| Red team operations | Replay a campaign of a group from the threat profile. | |
| Effectiveness measures | Select detection effectiveness measures from NIST SP 800-55 (volumes 1 and 2, December 2024) and CIS Controls v8.1. | |
| 5. Continuous improvement | Knowledge base updates | Follow new ATT&CK versions, which appear roughly every six months. |
| Incident analysis | Map every incident to ATT&CK techniques. | |
| Reporting | Deliver a coverage report to management and the technical team on a regular cycle. |
Where We Help
Penetration tests and red team operations check which techniques from the threat profile an organization detects. In industrial networks an OT security assessment does the same. We map the result to the ATT&CK matrix so the team sees the gaps in coverage.
Sources
- ATT&CK STIX Data (enterprise-attack, mobile-attack, ics-attack, v20.1) - MITRE (accessed: )
- ATT&CK Versions - MITRE (accessed: )
- ATT&CK FAQ - MITRE (accessed: )
- ATT&CK Navigator - MITRE (accessed: )
- Sandworm Team, Group G0034 - MITRE (accessed: )
- Dragonfly, Group G0035 - MITRE (accessed: )
- Energy Sector Incident Report - 29 December 2025 - CERT Polska (accessed: )
- Dragos 2026 OT Report Shows Surge in Threat Groups and Ransomware - Dragos (accessed: )
- Industroyer - Crash Override (2016) - CCDCOE Cyber Law Toolkit (accessed: )
- Russian Sandworm group attacks energy company in Poland with DynoWiper, ESET Research discovers - ESET (accessed: )
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