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OT Cybersecurity

Seven paths from the internet into an OT network and how to close them

Seven paths an internet attack takes into an OT network, real incidents from 2021-2025 and the steps that close them: from edge devices to IEC 62443 zones.

Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published 15 min read

OT securityICSnetwork segmentationModbusIEC 62443attack surfaceSCADA
Seven paths from the internet into an OT network and how to close them
Contents
  1. What the attacker sees
  2. Seven paths from the internet to the process
  3. Attack stages and controls
  4. Defense in depth
  5. Zones and conduits under IEC 62443
  6. A few numbers
  7. Where we help
  8. Related articles
  9. Sources

An edge router with one unpatched vulnerability is enough for an attacker to reach the controllers and destroy their firmware. The operator then loses view and control, and restoring the system takes longer than the intrusion itself. That is what the attack on the Polish energy sector on 29 December 2025 looked like.

Reports from CERT Polska, CISA and Dragos show that:

  • attackers most often get in through edge devices, meaning routers, firewalls and VPN gateways,
  • once inside, they rely on default passwords and on the absence of zones,
  • in the incidents described, preparation took months to years, so there is time to spot the attack.

This article describes seven paths from the internet into an OT network. For each one it gives a real incident and the steps that close it.

What the attacker sees

Before acting, the attacker checks what the company exposes to the internet. Search engines for internet-connected devices also index controllers and operator panels, often without their owners knowing.

According to Censys data from 2024, more than 145,000 ICS services worldwide were reachable from the internet. Among them, researchers found nearly 7,700 hosts with operator panels (HMI), which in many cases allow control of the process without any knowledge of industrial protocols.

Industrial protocols reachable from the internet

Protocol Typical port Where it is used Security in the base version
Modbus TCP 502 Controllers, RTUs and sensors The protocol has no authentication or encryption.
S7comm 102 Siemens S7 controllers Older controllers have weak protection of access to the program and data.
EtherNet/IP 44818 Rockwell Automation and Allen-Bradley controllers Authentication and encryption require the add-on CIP Security feature.
DNP3 20000 Power and water utilities Authentication requires the add-on Secure Authentication feature.
BACnet/IP 47808 Building automation The base version does not authenticate the sender, and only BACnet/SC adds protection.

WARNING

Any Modbus TCP device reachable from the internet lets anyone read and change its registers without a password. The FrostyGoop attack used exactly this property.

TIP

Check what in your own network is visible from the internet before someone else does. Why: the attacker starts from the same list, and removing one needlessly exposed service costs less than responding to an incident.

Seven paths from the internet to the process

The attacker does not need to reach the controller directly. One weak point at the network boundary is enough to start moving deeper.

1. VPN and edge devices

Routers, firewalls and VPN gateways with vulnerabilities give the attacker a tunnel into the internal network.

Poland, December 2025. The attack hit more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a large combined heat and power plant and a manufacturing plant. At the farms, the attackers damaged the RTU firmware, deleted system files and ran their own wiper, a program that destroys data. Communication with the distribution system operator was cut, while power generation continued. At the CHP plant, EDR blocked the wiper. According to CERT Polska, the manufacturing plant was attacked opportunistically, independently of the energy targets.

CISA identifies vulnerable internet-facing edge devices as the entry point and default passwords as the route to the HMI and RTUs. CERT Polska writes that the attackers’ infrastructure overlaps to a large extent with the cluster known as Static Tundra, Berserk Bear and Dragonfly. According to press reports, Dragos and ESET pointed rather to the Sandworm group, so attribution remains disputed.

Volt Typhoon. CISA assesses with high confidence that this group enters critical infrastructure IT networks through publicly reachable network devices and then looks for a path to OT systems. In some IT environments it kept access for at least five years. In one water utility case, over nine months it moved from a file server to a domain controller and a virtualization management server adjacent to OT assets. It used tools built into the operating system, so it did not trigger alarms.

TIP

Update or replace edge devices that the vendor no longer supports, and change all default passwords. Why: in both attacks described, the first step was a flaw in an edge device and the second was a password nobody had changed.

2. Remote access for vendors and service technicians

Device manufacturers, integrators and service technicians need remote access, and they often set it up in a way that bypasses the operator’s network security.

Water treatment plant in the US, February 2021. An unknown actor raised the sodium hydroxide dose in the SCADA system. Staff noticed the change and reversed it before the system raised an alarm. CISA considers it likely that weak passwords and an outdated operating system enabled the access, and that remote desktop software may have been used, but this was not confirmed. The FBI did not confirm that it was a deliberate attack. We cover this case in more detail in the article on Oldsmar.

TIP

Replace general remote access with a single controlled entry point that has multi-factor authentication, session recording and operator approval of every connection. Why: permanent, uncontrolled access for a service technician works like an open door. The details are in the article on remote access to ICS systems.

3. Vulnerable industrial routers

According to Forescout, routers and switches have on average nearly 32 vulnerabilities per device and make up 34% of devices with the most severe flaws. In the 2026 report, routers ranked first among the riskiest device types.

Lviv, January 2024. The FrostyGoop malware cut heating to more than 600 residential buildings for almost two days. According to Dragos, the attackers got into the network of the municipal district heating company through an internet-facing router as early as April 2023. The vulnerability was not publicly identified, and the media reported that the router was a MikroTik. On the day of the attack, they opened L2TP connections from Moscow addresses and sent commands over Modbus TCP to ENCO controllers that distorted the measurements. Dragos assesses with moderate confidence that port 502 on the controllers was reachable from the internet. The router, the management servers and the controllers were not separated from one another. The article on FrostyGoop describes more.

TIP

Inventory the routers and switches in the OT network, assign an owner to each device and set a patching deadline. Why: intermediate network devices get patched less often than servers, and attackers look for exactly those.

4. Compromised vendor website

Attackers break into the websites of industrial software vendors and replace the installation files. The Dragonfly campaign in 2013-2014 included the website of a VPN router manufacturer, where the client application was swapped. The Havex trojan scanned the network for OPC servers, the points from which controller data can be read. The articles on Dragonfly and Havex give the details.

TIP

Download software only from the vendor’s own site and check checksums or digital signatures before installing it on an engineering workstation. Why: the engineering workstation has access to the controllers, so a malicious installer gets that access along with it.

5. Cloud services connected to OT

OT systems increasingly send data to cloud platforms for analytics, digital twins and remote supervision. A compromised cloud account, API key or OAuth token can give the attacker a path back into the OT network that bypasses edge security. The risk grows when the connection can write to controllers rather than only read data.

TIP

Give cloud connections read-only permissions, and record every exception with a justification. Why: an account with write permission lets an attacker change the process from the cloud. The full description of the risks is in the article on cloud threats in OT.

6. Phishing and lateral movement from IT to OT

An email with a malicious attachment infects a computer on the office network. If the IT and OT networks are not divided into zones, the attacker moves on to engineering workstations, Historian servers and SCADA systems. One compromised Active Directory account with rights to an engineering workstation is enough to change a controller program.

TIP

Put engineering workstations in a separate zone and grant access to it through separate accounts. Why: a workstation with controller programming software in the same segment as office computers hands the controllers to anyone who takes over an office computer.

7. Removable media and personal devices

In environments cut off from external networks, USB media remain the main infection vector. Maintenance staff connect phones as hotspots, service technicians bring laptops with unknown software, and USB drives travel between the office and the production floor. Each of these bypasses network security. Stuxnet is the best-known example, although how it was introduced into the facility in Iran was never conclusively established (Stuxnet).

TIP

Block USB ports on OT workstations, introduce a single kiosk station for scanning media and prohibit personal access points in the OT network. Why: media brought into an OT zone cross all edge defenses at once.

Attack stages and controls

Stage What the attacker does What to do
Reconnaissance Looks for OT services reachable from the internet and gathers data on vendors. Reduce the number of services visible from the internet and monitor changes to them.
Initial access Exploits a vulnerability in an edge device, sends phishing or swaps vendor software. Patch edge devices, enforce MFA and verify vendor software.
Persistence Creates a service account or a webshell and uses system tools. Review accounts and logs, and run EDR on IT servers.
Lateral movement Moves over RDP, SMB and system tools to further computers. Divide the network into zones and collect the traffic between them.
IT-to-OT transition Uses a jump host, a Historian server or a computer with two network cards. Set up a DMZ zone and filter the conduit between IT and OT.
OT discovery Scans industrial protocols and reads controller configuration. Monitor OT communication and detect new connections.
Impact Changes registers, destroys controller firmware or alters logic. Protect the integrity of controller firmware and keep configuration backups.

Defense in depth

Layer 1: Knowing what is visible from the internet

Regularly check which services and industrial protocols the company exposes to the internet, along with unauthorized VPN and WiFi access points and certificates that reveal information about the infrastructure. Why: you cannot secure a device nobody knows about.

Layer 2: Hardening the network edge

  • Patch edge devices first, because in the attacks described they were the entry point.
  • Disable unnecessary services: Telnet, SNMP versions 1 and 2c, and HTTP on management interfaces.
  • Expose management interfaces only to a separate administrative network. Why: an administrative interface reachable from the user network gives an attacker full control of the device.

Layer 3: DMZ zone between IT and OT

A direct connection between the IT network and the OT network is an architectural mistake. Require all communication between these networks to pass through intermediary servers in the DMZ zone, such as a proxy, a Historian replica and an update server. Why: an attacker who takes over the IT network then lands on an intermediary server, not on a controller.

For the most critical segments, consider a data diode, which lets data through in one direction only, from OT to IT. Administrator access to the OT network should go through a single jump host with full logging and session recording.

Layer 4: Remote access control

A standard VPN gives the user access to the whole network segment, which is more than a service technician needs. Deploy a solution in which the user sees only the devices they are authorized for, and each session is authorized separately. Also:

  • require MFA for every remote session,
  • record sessions so they can be reviewed and replayed,
  • disable service accounts once the maintenance window ends,
  • require operator approval of every connection before it is established.

Layer 5: Monitoring and detection

In the incidents described, the attackers had time to prepare: Volt Typhoon kept access for years, and the first network access in the FrostyGoop attack came about nine months before the impact. Monitor OT traffic with a system that understands industrial protocols, collect logs from edge devices, jump hosts and domain controllers in one place, and record a baseline of normal communication. Why: a new connection or a controller register change outside the baseline is the first sign that someone is in the network. The OT network monitoring service describes the details.

Layer 6: Resilience and recovery

Assume the defenses will fail and prepare for recovery:

  • controllers move to a safe state when an anomaly is detected, and safety logic runs independently of control logic,
  • controller configuration backups are checked regularly and stored outside the OT network, and the recovery time is measured,
  • operators know the manual control procedure in case SCADA is lost, and they practice it,
  • the OT incident response plan puts process and personnel safety first, and isolating a segment must not mean losing control of a critical process.

After the incident in Poland, CISA recommends including in the response plan a scenario of OT devices that are down and cannot be repaired quickly.

Zones and conduits under IEC 62443

IEC 62443 describes an architecture based on zones and conduits. A zone is a logical or physical group of systems with common security requirements. A conduit is a communication channel between zones, with its own set of security controls.

Security levels

Level (SL) Protection against
SL 1 Accidental violation
SL 2 Intentional attack with limited resources
SL 3 Intentional attack using sophisticated means and IACS knowledge, with moderate resources
SL 4 Intentional attack using sophisticated means and IACS knowledge, with extensive resources and high motivation

NOTE

The target level (SL-T) of a zone with internet access - direct or indirect (through VPN, cloud, remote service) - follows from the risk assessment under IEC 62443-3-2: the more severe the consequences of a breach and the more capable the likely adversary, the higher the level. Internet access alone does not set the level, but it raises the likelihood of an attack, so the risk assessment has to account for it. The DMZ is a separate intermediate zone that separates the process network from the internet.

Checklist: zones and conduits for systems with internet access

  • All communication paths between OT zones and the internet are inventoried.
  • Every zone and every conduit has a target level SL-T assigned on the basis of the risk assessment.
  • A DMZ zone sits between the IT and OT networks, and the conduit between them is filtered.
  • For each conduit, the security controls (authentication, encryption, filtering) suited to the SL-T of the connected zones are recorded.
  • Traffic on the conduits is monitored and logged.
  • The actual architecture is periodically compared against the zones and conduits model.
  • Accounts with remote access are reviewed every quarter: unused ones are removed, and MFA applies to all the rest.

A few numbers

Number What it means Source
Over 145,000 ICS services reachable from the internet worldwide. Censys, 2024
Nearly 7,700 Hosts with operator panels (HMI) reachable from the internet, in 80 countries. Censys, 2024
Nearly 32 Average number of vulnerabilities per device for routers and switches. Forescout, 2026
34% Share of routers and switches among devices with the most severe vulnerabilities. Forescout, 2026

Where we help

During OT network penetration tests, we check which of the paths described are open in a specific installation: from external reconnaissance and edge device testing, through segmentation verification, to safe reading of industrial protocols. The result is a list of paths with remediation priorities. If the installation needs an assessment of its architecture and zones, we carry out an OT security assessment, and the penetration testing page describes the tests. Feel free to contact us.

Sources

  1. CERT Polska - Energy Sector Incident Report (29 December 2025)
  2. CISA Alert - Poland Energy Sector Cyber Incident (10 February 2026)
  3. CISA Advisory AA24-038A - PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon)
  4. CISA Advisory AA21-042A - Compromise of U.S. Water Treatment Facility
  5. Dragos - FrostyGoop ICS Malware Targeting Operational Technology
  6. Censys - over 145,000 ICS services exposed to the internet (Industrial Cyber report)
  7. Forescout - 2026 Riskiest Connected Devices (Industrial Cyber report)
  8. Dragos - IEC 62443, zones and conduits
  9. Symantec - Dragonfly: Western Energy Companies Under Sabotage Threat

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