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Havex - tactics and techniques analysis

Havex (Backdoor.Oldrea) - analysis of the Dragonfly group malware targeting the energy sector. Enterprise and ICS tactics, OPC reconnaissance, installer trojanization, MITRE ATT&CK mapping.

Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published 7 min read

HavexDragonflyMITRE ATT&CKICSOPC
Havex - tactics and techniques analysis
Contents
  1. What is Havex
  2. Infection vectors
  3. Malware architecture
  4. MITRE ATT&CK mapping
  5. What Havex reveals about Dragonfly’s intent
  6. Defense against Havex-type attacks
  7. Sources

Spring 2013. Updated installers appear on the websites of three European manufacturers of industrial system management software. They look identical to the originals. Correct file names, correct sizes, functioning as expected. Except that alongside the legitimate software, they install an additional occupant - a trojan that within minutes begins a systematic inventory of the network, with particular focus on OPC servers, SCADA controllers, and every element of industrial infrastructure it can reach.

This is Havex - one of the first malicious tools designed specifically for ICS environment reconnaissance. A tool of the Dragonfly group, which would go on to systematically penetrate the Western energy sector for years to come.

What is Havex

Havex (also known as Backdoor.Oldrea, Energetic Bear RAT) is a modular Remote Access Trojan (RAT) attributed to the Dragonfly group (MITRE ATT&CK G0035). It was first identified in 2013 by F-Secure, Symantec, and ICS-CERT teams.

Unlike most malware of that era, Havex included a dedicated module for scanning OPC (OLE for Process Control) networks - a protocol enabling communication between industrial control systems. This indicated that the operation’s objective was not business data theft, but critical infrastructure mapping.

Characteristic Details
Type RAT (Remote Access Trojan) with ICS modules
Group Dragonfly / Energetic Bear / Berserk Bear (G0035)
Active period 2013-2014 (first variants), campaign continued through 2017+
Targets Energy sector: oil, gas, power generation, grid operators
Regions USA, Canada, Western Europe, Turkey
Attribution FSB - Center 16 (Russian Federal Security Service)

Infection vectors

Dragonfly employed three parallel distribution methods for Havex, an approach that stood out among APT groups in 2013:

Installer trojanization (Supply Chain Compromise - T1195.002)

The most significant and innovative vector. The group compromised the websites of at least three European ICS software manufacturers:

  • MESA Imaging (Switzerland) - manufacturer of industrial cameras and sensors
  • eWON/Talk2M (Belgium) - remote access software for industrial devices
  • MB Connect Line (Germany) - remote machine service solutions

The attackers replaced legitimate installers with versions containing Havex. Engineers downloading software from official manufacturer websites installed the trojan alongside the tool they needed.

WARNING

Trojanization of ICS software installers is a supply chain attack where the victim follows standard procedures - downloading software from official sources. Traditional phishing awareness training provides no protection against this vector. File integrity verification (hashes, digital signatures) and post-installation behavior monitoring are essential.

Spearphishing (T1566.001)

Targeted email messages with PDF attachments containing exploits or links to malicious software hosting sites. Email campaigns were precisely targeted at energy company employees.

Watering Hole (T1189)

Compromise of websites regularly visited by engineers and energy sector workers. Upon visiting a compromised site, the victim’s browser would automatically download a dropper installing Havex.

Malware architecture

Havex consisted of a core RAT module and loadable components extending its functionality:

Core module (Backdoor.Oldrea)

After installation, Havex performed standard trojan operations:

  • System Information Discovery (T1082) - gathering information about the operating system, installed software, network configuration
  • File and Directory Discovery (T1083) - searching directories for documents, schematics, configurations
  • Process Discovery (T1057) - listing running processes
  • Data Staged (T1074) - compressing and encrypting collected data before exfiltration

C2 communication used HTTP/HTTPS (T1071.001), with data transmitted as encrypted files attached to POST requests.

OPC Scanner module

This component distinguished Havex from other trojans. The module scanned the local network for OPC DA (Data Access) and OPC HDA (Historical Data Access) servers using the DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model) interface.

After locating an OPC server, the module:

  1. Enumerated available OPC tags (process variables)
  2. Collected metadata about the server structure
  3. Identified types of connected devices (PLC controllers, RTUs, HMI panels)
  4. Compiled an inventory report and transmitted it to C2

TIP

Havex’s OPC scanning did not require OPC server passwords - the OPC DA protocol in its default configuration requires no authentication. This illustrates the broader problem of industrial systems designed in an era when network security was not a priority.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Enterprise-side techniques

Tactic Techniques Description
Initial Access T1195.002, T1566.001, T1189 Supply chain, spearphishing, watering hole
Execution T1059, T1204.002 Scripting, user execution
Persistence T1547.001, T1053 Registry run keys, scheduled tasks
Defense Evasion T1036, T1027, T1140 Masquerading, obfuscation, deobfuscation
Credential Access T1003, T1552 Credential dumping, unsecured credentials
Discovery T1082, T1083, T1057, T1046 System info, files, processes, network scan
Collection T1005, T1074 Local data, staged data
C2 T1071.001, T1573 HTTP/S, encrypted channel
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration over C2

ICS-side techniques

Tactic Techniques Description
Discovery OPC DA/HDA scanning OPC tag enumeration, device identification
Collection OPC metadata gathering Server structure, connected controller types
Lateral Movement Cross-segment traversal Using workstations with IT/OT access

What Havex reveals about Dragonfly’s intent

Havex was a reconnaissance tool, not a destructive one. The OPC Scanner module did not attempt to modify process values or disable devices. It collected data about industrial network topology - what systems are installed, how they are connected, what process variables are available.

This is reconnaissance that only makes sense as preparation for future operations:

  • Sabotage - knowledge of OPC tags enables deliberate process manipulation
  • Battlefield preparation - mapping critical infrastructure in anticipation of conflict
  • Industrial espionage - understanding the technological processes of a competitor or adversary

The geopolitical context supports this interpretation. In 2020, the US Department of Justice charged four FSB officers from Center 16, identifying them as operators of the Dragonfly campaign. The indictment revealed that the campaign encompassed not only data collection but also attempts to gain access to nuclear power plant control systems.

Defense against Havex-type attacks

Havex analysis points to several critical defense areas:

ICS software supply chain security. Verifying installer integrity through digital signatures and hashes provided via an independent channel. Monitoring newly installed software behavior.

OT network segmentation. OPC servers should not be accessible from corporate network segments. OPC communication should transit through dedicated gateways (OPC UA with authentication and encryption instead of legacy OPC DA).

Network traffic monitoring. DCOM/OPC scanning generates characteristic traffic patterns that IDS/IPS systems specialized in industrial protocols can detect.

Migration from OPC DA to OPC UA. The OPC UA protocol offers built-in authentication, encryption, and access control - mechanisms that OPC DA lacks entirely.

TIP

Defense checklist against ICS supply chain attacks:

  • Verify SHA-256 hashes of installers from an independent manufacturer source
  • Install ICS software in an isolated test environment before production deployment
  • Monitor DNS and HTTP/S connections from engineering workstations
  • Audit OPC DA servers - restrict DCOM access to authorized hosts
  • Consider migration to OPC UA with X.509 certificates
  • Network segmentation per IEC 62443 (zones and conduits)

SEQRED has experience in OPC environment security audits and industrial network penetration testing covering OPC DA/UA protocols. We help energy sector organizations identify gaps in network segmentation and supply chain security - before an attacker does.

Sources

  1. Symantec - Dragonfly: Western Energy Companies Under Sabotage Threat
  2. F-Secure - Havex Hunts for ICS/SCADA Systems
  3. MITRE ATT&CK - Dragonfly (G0035)
  4. ICS-CERT Alert - ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A
  5. DOJ - Four Russian Government Employees Charged (2022)

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