Attack encyclopedia
Dragonfly (Energetic Bear) - the Russian APT group hunting the energy sector
Dragonfly (Energetic Bear / Berserk Bear / Crouching Yeti) - analysis of a Russian APT group linked to the FSB, responsible for the Havex/Backdoor.Oldrea campaigns against Western energy companies. MITRE ATT&CK G0035 mapping.
Józef SulwińskiPublished 10 min read

Contents
- Who is Dragonfly?
- Campaign chronology
- Havex (Backdoor.Oldrea) - the trojan that came with an update
- Dragonfly 2.0 - from reconnaissance to sabotage readiness
- DOJ indictment - the people behind the aliases
- Poland, December 2025 - Berserk Bear returns
- MITRE ATT&CK mapping (G0035)
- Lessons for OT security
- Sources
Sometime in 2013, an engineer at a European energy company downloads a software update for industrial remote access management. The installer looks identical to the original - it comes from the vendor’s official website, has the correct filename, the correct size. The engineer runs it according to procedure. The software installs properly, works flawlessly. Except that alongside the tool he ordered, something else has nested itself on his computer - a trojan that within minutes will establish a connection to a server controlled by Russian intelligence and begin systematically scanning the network for OPC servers, SCADA controllers, and every other element of industrial infrastructure it can reach.
This was no accident. This was an operation by the Dragonfly group - one of the longest-running and most patient APT groups in the history of industrial cybersecurity.
Who is Dragonfly?
Dragonfly is a cyberespionage group linked to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), specifically its Centre 16. Depending on which research firm is tracking it, the group operates under many names: Energetic Bear (CrowdStrike), Berserk Bear (CrowdStrike, later classification), Crouching Yeti (Kaspersky), IRON LIBERTY (Secureworks), DYMALLOY (Dragos), Ghost Blizzard (Microsoft), and TEMP.Isotope (Mandiant). In the MITRE ATT&CK database, it is catalogued as G0035.
This multitude of aliases is not the result of naming chaos - it reflects the fact that the group has operated continuously since at least 2010 and over that time has come under the scrutiny of virtually every major Threat Intelligence team in the world.
Initially, Dragonfly focused on the defense and aviation sectors. Around the turn of 2012-2013, priorities shifted - the primary target became energy infrastructure: oil and gas companies, power plants, transmission and distribution grid operators in the United States, Canada, Turkey, Switzerland, and many European countries.
Campaign chronology
| Period | Event |
|---|---|
| 2010-2012 | First group operations; targets in the defense and aviation sectors |
| 2013 (spring) | Pivot toward the energy sector; first variants of the Havex trojan |
| 2013-2014 | Trojanization of installers from three European ICS software vendors |
| 2014 (June-July) | Symantec, F-Secure, and ICS-CERT publish Havex/Backdoor.Oldrea analyses |
| 2015 (December) | Start of the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign - spear-phishing targeting energy companies |
| 2016-2017 | Escalation of Dragonfly 2.0; screenshots from control systems, credential theft |
| 2017 (September) | Symantec publishes its Dragonfly 2.0 report; warning about sabotage potential |
| 2022 (March) | US DOJ indicts three FSB officers: Akulov, Gavrilov, Tyukov |
| 2025 (December) | Coordinated attack on Polish renewable energy infrastructure; CERT Polska links the incident to the Berserk Bear/Dragonfly activity cluster |
Havex (Backdoor.Oldrea) - the trojan that came with an update
At the heart of the first Dragonfly campaign (2013-2014) was the Havex trojan, also known as Backdoor.Oldrea. This RAT (Remote Access Trojan) gave attackers full remote access to an infected system - from stealing files and credentials to enumerating network resources.
Three infection vectors
Dragonfly simultaneously used three methods to deliver Havex:
- Spear-phishing - targeted email messages with PDF attachments containing an exploit
- Watering hole - compromising websites visited by energy sector employees; the LightsOut and Hello exploit kits redirected victims to malicious servers
- Supply chain trojanization - the most refined vector, a direct parallel to the infection mechanism used in the Stuxnet attack
It was the third vector that made Dragonfly truly dangerous. The group seized control of the websites of three European ICS software vendors:
| Vendor | Country | Profile |
|---|---|---|
| MESA Imaging | Switzerland | Industrial cameras for distance measurement |
| eWON (Talk2M) | Belgium | Industrial remote access solutions |
| MB Connect Line | Germany | mbNET industrial routers and mbCONNECT24 VPN service |
In each case the pattern was identical: the attackers broke into the vendor’s server, replaced legitimate software installers with versions bundled with the Havex trojan, and then waited for customers to download the infected files themselves. The user downloaded a seemingly genuine installer from the vendor’s official website - not from a suspicious forum, not from an email from a stranger - from the official website. And it was precisely this apparent legitimacy that made the attack so effective.
OPC server scanning - industrial infrastructure reconnaissance
What set Havex apart from a typical espionage trojan was its dedicated module for scanning OPC (Open Platform Communications) servers. OPC is the standard communication interface between SCADA systems and field devices in Windows environments - the heart of many industrial installations.
The Havex OPC module used the DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model) protocol to connect to OPC servers on the victim’s network and collected detailed information: CLSID identifiers, server names, program identifiers, OPC versions, vendor data, operational status, group counts, and server throughput. It could also enumerate OPC tags - the names of process variables corresponding to specific measurement and control points in an installation.
TIP
Havex’s OPC scanning constituted reconnaissance - mapping the architecture of control systems. It did not cause destruction on its own, but it provided attackers with precise knowledge of what devices existed on the network, how they were configured, and how to control them. This is the knowledge required to prepare sabotage.
ICS-CERT (now CISA) warned that the scanning process itself caused instability - tests showed that the Havex OPC module triggered intermittent failures in popular OPC platforms, which could lead to loss of communication with field devices.
In total, the Havex campaign affected more than 17,000 unique devices in the United States and over 135 other countries.
Dragonfly 2.0 - from reconnaissance to sabotage readiness
In December 2015, Symantec identified the start of a new campaign it called Dragonfly 2.0. This time the group was not limited to passive data collection. Researchers discovered screenshots from infected workstations - named according to the pattern [machine_description_and_location].[organization_name]. Many filenames contained the string “cntrl” (control), indicating that the compromised machines had access to control systems.
In its September 2017 report, Symantec stated the matter plainly: Dragonfly had achieved a level of access that would have enabled sabotage - deliberate disruption or destruction of energy infrastructure. It had not done so (yet), but it had the capability.
Targets of the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign included energy companies in the US, Turkey, and Switzerland. Methods involved spear-phishing with documents that stole network credentials (using the Phishery tool), watering hole attacks, and attacks on authentication protocols.
DOJ indictment - the people behind the aliases
On 24 March 2022, the United States Department of Justice declassified an indictment from August 2021, naming three FSB officers as operators of the Dragonfly campaign:
- Pavel Aleksandrovich Akulov
- Mikhail Mikhailovich Gavrilov
- Marat Valeryevich Tyukov
The charges included computer fraud, wire fraud, identity theft using technical means, and causing damage to energy infrastructure. The indictment described two phases of the operation: the first (2012-2014) based on the Havex trojan and supply chain trojanization, and the second (2014-2017) focused on remote access and credential theft.
None of the defendants have been apprehended.
Poland, December 2025 - Berserk Bear returns
On 29 December 2025, in the middle of winter freezes, Polish energy infrastructure was hit by a coordinated cyberattack. Within a single day, dozens of wind and photovoltaic farms, a private manufacturing company, and a combined heat and power plant serving nearly half a million consumers were attacked.
The attackers struck at grid connection points (GPO) - critical nodes linking renewable energy installations to the distribution grid, managed remotely. They exploited vulnerabilities in VPN devices and firewalls, gained administrative privileges, and carried out automated destructive actions, including resetting devices to factory settings. In the case of the combined heat and power plant, the infiltration had lasted far longer - the first traces of hacker presence dated back to March 2025.
TIP
The CERT Polska report from January 2026 links this attack to the activity cluster known as Static Tundra, Berserk Bear, Ghost Blizzard, and Dragonfly - that is, FSB Centre 16. This is the same actor that over a decade earlier trojanized installers from European ICS software vendors. The method changed, but the target remained the same: energy infrastructure.
Although the power grid maintained stability and there were no interruptions in energy supply, CERT Polska classified the nature of the actions as destructive - the goal was not espionage but inflicting maximum damage.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping (G0035)
Dragonfly is catalogued in the MITRE ATT&CK database as G0035. Below are the key techniques associated with this group’s campaigns:
| Technique | ID | Description in the Dragonfly context |
|---|---|---|
| Supply Chain Compromise | T1195 | Trojanization of ICS software installers (MESA Imaging, eWON, MB Connect Line) |
| Drive-by Compromise | T1189 | Watering hole on websites visited by energy sector employees |
| Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment | T1566.001 | Targeted messages with credential-stealing documents (Phishery toolkit) |
| Valid Accounts | T1078 | Use of stolen credentials for remote access |
| Screen Capture | T1113 | Screenshots from control systems (Dragonfly 2.0) |
| Indicator Removal | T1070 | Deletion of logs, scripts, screenshots, and registry keys after the operation |
| Remote Services | T1021 | C2 communication over TCP ports 445, 139 and UDP 137, 138 |
| Commonly Used Port | T1043 | Hiding C2 communication within traffic on standard ports |
In the ICS context, Havex is additionally catalogued as S0093 with techniques including OPC scanning (T0887 - Remote System Information Discovery).
Lessons for OT security
1. The supply chain is a vector, not an exception
Dragonfly proved that compromising an ICS software vendor is a real and repeatable attack vector. Downloading an installer from a vendor’s official website does not guarantee its integrity. Verifying checksums, applying application whitelisting, and monitoring software changes are fundamental defensive measures.
2. OPC scanning as an early warning signal
OPC scanning activity on an industrial network should be treated as a security incident. Monitoring OPC/DCOM traffic, detecting unusual tag enumerations, and identifying connections from unauthorized hosts enables early-stage reconnaissance detection.
3. Segmentation and remote access control
The attack on Polish renewable energy farms in December 2025 showed that VPN interfaces accessible from the internet without multi-factor authentication (MFA) are an open door. Using the same credentials across multiple sites allows an attacker to escalate from one facility to dozens. Every remote access point must be protected with MFA, and credentials must be unique for each site.
4. Twelve years of patience
Dragonfly has been active since 2010. It changes tools, changes aliases, but it does not change its target. A group that systematically builds access to energy infrastructure across three continents over more than a decade is not doing it out of curiosity. It is doing it because someone may one day issue the order “shut it down”.
Sources
- MITRE ATT&CK - Dragonfly (G0035)
- Symantec - Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group
- CISA - ICS Focused Malware (Havex)
- Palo Alto Unit 42 - Why Havex Is a Game-Changing Threat to Industrial Control Systems
- CERT Polska - Report on the energy sector incident of 29 December 2025
- DOJ - Four Russians Charged with Dragonfly Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
- Netresec - Full Disclosure of Havex Trojans
- Forsal.pl - Cyberattack on Poland is a dangerous breakthrough. The Russian Berserk Bear has awakened
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