Attack encyclopedia
Attack on Polish energy - 29 December 2025
The coordinated attack of 29 December 2025 on over 30 Polish wind and solar farms, two CHP plants and a manufacturer. Facts from the CERT Polska report and the CISA alert.
Józef SulwińskiPublished 11 min read

Contents
Monday, 29 December 2025, around seven in the morning. In a small combined heat and power plant that heats about 50 thousand residents, a steam turbine stops. A moment later the process water treatment station stops too, and cogeneration is interrupted. Maintenance work is under way on site, so the explanation seems obvious: a mistake by the subcontractor’s engineers. The crew quickly brings the installation back, and the event reaches CERT Polska only as an informational report.
Nobody on site yet knows that since 5:30 someone unfamiliar has been inside the plant’s network, and that they will leave it only at 10:10, long after the repair began. Nobody knows, either, that the same attacker struck over 30 wind and photovoltaic farms that same morning and afternoon, a large CHP plant supplying heat to almost half a million customers, and a private manufacturing company.
That day Poland lived through an attack that CERT Polska compared to deliberate arson: it was not about money or data, but about destruction. Outside there was frost and snow squalls, and New Year’s Eve was two days away.
Scale of the strike
The findings of CERT Polska, published in its report of 30 January 2026 and in a later supplement, cover four targets:
| Target | What happened | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Over 30 wind and photovoltaic farms (grid connection substations, GPO) | RTU controllers, IED protection relays, HMI computers and serial port servers destroyed | Loss of communication and remote control between the facilities and the distribution system operators (DSOs). Energy production continued without interruption |
| Large CHP plant (almost 0.5 million heat customers) | Attempt to wipe data on workstations and servers | The EDR system stopped the wiper on over 100 machines on which it had already started |
| Smaller CHP plant (about 50 thousand residents) | PLC controllers switched to STOP mode and locked with a password | Short steam turbine outage, no interruption in heat supply |
| Manufacturing company | Attempt to disrupt operations through a compromised edge device | Opportunistic target, unrelated to the other victims |
According to PSE, the Polish transmission system operator, the attack did not affect the stability of the Polish power system. CERT Polska notes, however, that with the level of access the attacker obtained, there was a risk of halting production at the attacked facilities. Even then, the combined loss of capacity of 30 facilities would not have shaken the system at that time of year.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| March-May 2025 | First traces of the attacker in the network of the large CHP plant: RDP logins to a jump host from an address assigned to a FortiGate device |
| March-July 2025 | Reconnaissance, unauthorised access to data, credential theft attempts, theft of the domain controller database |
| 8 December 2025 | Configuration changes on HMI computers at the farms: administrative shares enabled and a firewall rule named “Microsoft Update” |
| 18-25 December 2025 | Scanning of the distribution system operator’s private APN and reconnaissance of the smaller CHP plant’s network |
| 25 December 2025 | Network scanning and login attempts at all facilities with Mikronika controllers |
| 29 December 2025 | Coordinated destructive attack on all targets, morning and afternoon |
| 30 January 2026 | CERT Polska publishes the incident report |
| 10 February 2026 | CISA publishes an alert for operators in the US, citing the CERT Polska report |
| August 2026 | CERT Polska publishes a supplement to the report on the attack on the smaller CHP plant |
Anatomy of the attack on the farms
The gate that was open
Every attacked grid connection substation had a FortiGate device acting as firewall and VPN concentrator. In every case the VPN interface was reachable from the internet and allowed logins without multi-factor authentication. Some of the devices had in the past, sometimes for long periods, been vulnerable to remote code execution. CERT Polska points to a practice common in the industry: the same accounts and passwords at many facilities. Under that assumption, one compromised account opens the next door.
The networks of the facilities were often divided into separate VLAN subnets. But the attacker had firewall administrator privileges, so they could retrieve the credentials of a VPN account with access to all subnets, or simply change the configuration.
TIP
Treat the edge device that connects an OT facility to the internet as part of the control system, not as an ordinary router. Require MFA on the VPN, unique passwords for each facility and updates in step with patch releases. We describe the principles in the article on remote access to ICS systems.
Factory passwords
Beyond that the attacker did not need sophisticated tools. Factory settings were enough:
- Hitachi RTU560 RTU controllers had a default “Default” account with the right to change firmware. The attacker uploaded a modified image through the web interface: at the start of the program they inserted 240 bytes of 0xFF. The processor hit an invalid instruction and the controller fell into a restart loop. A firmware signature verification feature existed in newer versions, but it had to be enabled manually and was not active at any facility.
- Mikronika RTU controllers run on Linux. The attacker logged in over SSH to the root account with a default password and deleted the system files.
- Hitachi Relion 650 protection relays at two facilities had the FTP service enabled with a built-in account. Deleting the files essential for operation disabled the devices with no possibility of restarting them. In a deployment following the manufacturer’s recommendations, that account would have been disabled.
- HMI computers with Mikronika Syndis software had a default local administrator password. The attacker ran on them the wiper that CERT Polska named DynoWiper. Where the password was different, attempts to crack it failed and the HMI survived.
- Moxa NPort serial port servers were reset by the attacker to factory settings, had their password changed and their IP address set to an unreachable one, e.g. 127.0.0.1. All of it to make the rebuild take longer.
The destruction ran at least partly automatically, in order of IP addresses. If the attack on a given address failed, the script did not go further in that segment.
TIP
Make an inventory of all OT devices with default accounts and services enabled at the factory (FTP, web, SSH). Changing passwords and disabling unneeded services is the cheapest protection there is, and in this attack it decided which HMIs survived. The starting point is an ICS asset inventory.
Two CHP plants
In the large CHP plant the attacker had been active since spring. They took over privileged accounts in Active Directory and on 29 December distributed DynoWiper to workstations through Group Policy Objects (GPO). The file was not detected by antivirus, but the EDR system stopped it while running, thanks to decoy files that raise an alarm on an overwrite attempt. Overwriting stopped on over 100 machines. The same day the attacker tried once more, with a modified version, and again without effect. They also tried to destroy server disks directly, by running a minimal Linux system on them and overwriting data with random bytes.
In the smaller CHP plant the entry route was, according to CERT Polska, previously unknown in publicly described incidents. At stations by the wind farms, cellular routers with a SIM card in the distribution system operator’s private APN are in use. Through this APN the SCADA system talks to the RTU controller. The router in one of the stations had a second interface plugged into the network behind the compromised firewall. The attacker entered the APN this way and found in it a WAGO PFC200 controller with a cellular modem, belonging to the CHP plant, with a web panel on a default password. Through it they set up a tunnel into the plant’s OT network, and on 29 December they switched Siemens S7-300, S7-1200 and S7-1500 controllers to STOP mode and protected them with a password.
TIP
Report unexplained failures to the CSIRT too, not only confirmed incidents. The smaller CHP plant took the outage for a subcontractor’s error. The attack was recognised only because CERT Polska had seen similar events elsewhere.
MITRE ATT&CK for ICS mapping
| Technique | ID | Use in the attack |
|---|---|---|
| External Remote Services | T0822 | VPN logins on edge devices without MFA |
| Valid Accounts | T0859 | Compromised VPN accounts and privileged accounts in Active Directory |
| Default Credentials | T0812 | Factory accounts in RTUs, IEDs, HMIs, Moxa servers and the WAGO controller |
| System Firmware | T0857 | Uploading corrupted firmware to the Hitachi RTU560 |
| Data Destruction | T0809 | DynoWiper on HMIs and workstations, deletion of files in RTUs and IEDs |
| Device Restart/Shutdown | T0816 | RTU restart loop, IED shutdown, PLC controllers in STOP mode |
| Loss of View | T0829 | Distribution system operators lose their view of the facilities |
| Loss of Control | T0827 | No ability to control the farms remotely |
We write more about working with this matrix in the MITRE ATT&CK guide.
Attribution
CERT Polska analysed the infrastructure used in the attack: compromised VPS servers and routers. The communication between them largely overlaps with what Cisco and the FBI described. This infrastructure is attributed to an activity cluster known as:
| Name | Used by |
|---|---|
| Static Tundra | Cisco |
| Berserk Bear | CrowdStrike |
| Ghost Blizzard | Microsoft |
| Dragonfly | Symantec |
According to CERT Polska, this is the first publicly described destructive activity attributed to this cluster. Earlier reports showed its interest in the energy sector and its ability to attack industrial devices.
CERT Polska also notes similarities between DynoWiper and tools of the Sandworm cluster, but assesses them as too weak for attribution. ESET attributed DynoWiper to the Sandworm group with medium confidence, pointing to similarities with that group’s earlier wipers. The CISA alert names no group.
Lessons for OT infrastructure operators
The most important lesson of 29 December is not about advanced tools, but about the basics. Almost every step of the attacker relied on an open VPN without MFA or on a factory password.
TIP
Edge devices. Retire devices without manufacturer support, update the rest and enable MFA on every VPN. This is the first recommendation of the CISA alert.
TIP
Firmware verification. If your controllers support firmware signature checking, enable it. If that cannot be done quickly, prepare a plan to recover a controller that has stopped working: configuration backups, spare hardware, a contact at the manufacturer’s service.
TIP
Default passwords. Change them right away and write into contracts with integrators and OT suppliers an obligation to change them at every deployment.
TIP
Paths between facilities. Check whether cellular routers, private APNs and service links create a route from one facility to another. Proper OT network segmentation also covers backup links.
TIP
Detection in the IT network. In the large CHP plant, EDR with decoy files stopped the wiper on over 100 machines. Monitoring workstations and servers at OT facilities has real value.
SEQRED helps energy operators with OT security audits, remote access reviews and segmentation tests. The same set of questions the attacker asked is worth asking yourself earlier.
Broader context
Poland was not the first country where an attack on the energy sector began with edge devices. In 2023 the Danish SektorCERT described a coordinated campaign against 22 companies in the energy sector, exploiting vulnerabilities in Zyxel firewalls. Earlier, in 2015 and 2016, Ukraine experienced attacks that cut power to customers. We describe them in the articles on BlackEnergy and Industroyer.
December 2025 differs in that it struck IT systems and OT devices of many independent entities at the same time. CERT Polska stresses that such a combination rarely appears in publicly described attacks.
Sources
- CERT Polska - Energy sector incident report of 29 December 2025 (30.01.2026) (PL)
- CERT Polska - Energy Sector Incident Report, English version (PDF)
- CERT Polska - Supplement to the energy sector incident report (PDF) (PL)
- Ministry of Digital Affairs - Cyberattack on energy sector infrastructure in Poland (PL)
- CISA - Poland Energy Sector Cyber Incident Highlights OT and ICS Security Gaps (10.02.2026)
- Cisco Talos - Static Tundra
- ESET Research - Sandworm behind cyberattack on Poland's power grid in late 2025
- The Hacker News - Hackers breach Polish power plant through private APN (August 2026)
- SektorCERT - The attack against Danish critical infrastructure (2023)
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