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Colonial Pipeline - the ransomware attack that halted fuel supplies in the US
The DarkSide ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline (May 2021) - timeline, attack vector, $4.4M ransom, FBI fund recovery, and lessons for critical infrastructure operators.
Józef SulwińskiPublished 8 min read

Contents
An operator of critical infrastructure halts a physical process after an attack on the IT network alone if it cannot tell whether the attack reached the control systems (OT). That is what happened on 7 May 2021 at Colonial Pipeline, the company that runs the largest fuel pipeline in the United States. The testimony of the company’s chief executive before the US Senate and the analyses by INL, CISA and Mandiant show that:
- the attackers entered the network on 29 April through a VPN, using the credentials of an expired account that appeared in a collection of leaked passwords,
- a single password protected the access, because this VPN profile had no second authentication factor,
- the sources do not say that the attackers took over pumps or valves, and the company shut down the pipeline as a precaution,
- the company paid the ransom on 8 May, and the US Department of Justice later seized most of those funds.
The pipeline is 5,500 miles (about 8,800 km) long and runs from Texas to New Jersey. According to INL it carries nearly 2.5 million barrels of fuel a day, and according to the company’s chief executive it supplies nearly half the fuel consumed on the US East Coast. It provides energy for more than 50 million Americans.
Attack vector
According to INL, the attackers logged in on 29 April 2021 through a VPN, using the credentials of an expired account that appeared in a collection of leaked passwords. The company’s chief executive testified that the VPN profile was not intended to be in use and that it was protected by a single factor, the password. The password was complex, and Mandiant was still working out how the attackers obtained it.
For nine days, according to INL, the attackers moved around the company’s IT network and stole about 100 GB of data.
7 May 2021 - the pipeline shutdown
At about five in the morning on 7 May, a pipeline operator saw a ransom note on a screen, and the DarkSide ransomware had encrypted the IT systems. The company notified the FBI the same day.
The chief executive testified before the Senate on 8 June 2021 that the attack encrypted IT systems and that the company shut down the pipeline as a precaution. He told a senator that even a one percent chance of the OT system being compromised justified stopping the pipeline. According to INL, the supervisor halted operations to isolate the OT network, and the entire pipeline was shut down by 6:10 a.m. CISA and the FBI report that the company disconnected some OT systems as a precaution and that no lateral movement to OT was found.
INL also writes, citing a vendor analysis, that information servers connected to SCADA were unavailable because of encryption. The chief executive’s testimony does not confirm this, so that version remains unconfirmed. According to INL, limited manual operation continued until 12 May.
An attack on the IT network therefore halted fuel deliveries, because the operator could not rule out that the attack had moved into OT.
DarkSide - a criminal service with a business model
The DarkSide group operated from August 2020. Mandiant describes it as a service offered on Russian-language forums by a Russian-speaking actor, and the rules for affiliates prohibited attacks on organisations in Commonwealth of Independent States countries. The malware sample Mandiant analysed had a system language check but was configured without it.
DarkSide operated as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS). The developers supplied the software, the server infrastructure and negotiation tools, and affiliates who passed an interview carried out the attacks. According to forum advertisements, the operators took 25% of ransoms below USD 500,000 and 10% of ransoms above USD 5 million.
The group used double extortion: it first stole data and then encrypted systems. When a victim refused to pay, DarkSide threatened to publish the data on a site on the Tor network.
The rules for affiliates prohibited attacks on hospitals, schools, universities, non-profit organisations and public sector entities. According to Mandiant, this may have served to deter law enforcement, because attacks on those sectors draw additional scrutiny.
Crisis timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 29 April 2021 | First traces of the attackers in the Colonial Pipeline network (access through a VPN with the credentials of an expired account) |
| 29 April - 7 May 2021 | According to INL, the attackers exfiltrate about 100 GB of data over nine days |
| 7 May 2021 | DarkSide ransomware encrypts IT systems; the company notifies the FBI |
| 7 May 2021 | Colonial Pipeline shuts down the pipeline as a precaution to isolate the attack from the OT network |
| 8 May 2021 | The company publicly confirms the ransomware attack |
| 8 May 2021 | Colonial Pipeline pays the ransom (USD 4.4 million according to INL) |
| 12 May 2021 | According to INL, the pipeline returns to automatic operation; full restoration of deliveries takes several more days |
| 14 May 2021 | DarkSide announces it is closing the service, citing loss of servers and pressure from the US; Mandiant did not confirm those reasons |
| 7 June 2021 | The Department of Justice announces the seizure of 63.7 bitcoin (about USD 2.3 million) from the ransom paid on 8 May |
The ransom and a partial refund
On 8 May, the day after the attack was detected, Colonial Pipeline paid a ransom of 75 bitcoin, which INL puts at USD 4.4 million. The company decided to negotiate on the evening of 7 May. In his Senate testimony on 8 June 2021, chief executive Joseph Blount called it the hardest decision in his 39 years in the energy industry and acknowledged that at the time of the decision the company did not know how much of its network was affected.
On 7 June 2021 the US Department of Justice announced the seizure of 63.7 of the 75 bitcoin of the ransom. On the day of the announcement they were worth about USD 2.3 million.
Lessons for critical infrastructure operators
1. Document the dependencies of the OT process on IT systems
The sources do not say that the attackers took control of the pumps. An attack on the IT network was enough for the operator to stop the pipeline, because it could not rule out that the attack had moved into OT. The IT systems the OT process needs to operate safely must be documented, and the risk of losing them assessed. Why: an operator that does not know these dependencies stops the process at every attack on IT.
2. Monitor traffic at the IT and OT boundary
Colonial Pipeline did not know whether the attackers had reached the OT network, and so it shut down the pipeline as a precaution. Traffic at the IT and OT boundary must be monitored. Why: without that data the operator cannot assess whether an attack has moved into OT. Visibility tools for industrial networks are described in the article on ICS asset inventory.
3. Require MFA on remote access and disable accounts without an owner
Remote access requires a second authentication factor, and accounts that nobody uses any more must be disabled. Why: at Colonial Pipeline one password for an old VPN profile was enough, a profile the company could not see and that did not show up in penetration tests. The protection of remote access to industrial systems is described in the article Remote access to ICS - threats and best practices.
4. Describe cascading scenarios in the response plan
The incident response plan describes the situation in which an attack on IT forces OT operations to stop, and names the IT systems that are critical for the continuity of physical processes. Why: without such a plan the decision to shut down is made within minutes and without data. Preparation for ransomware incidents is described in the ransomware guide.
5. Decide in advance whether the company pays a ransom
The decision on paying a ransom must be recorded in the response plan before an attack happens. Why: CISA and the FBI do not encourage paying a ransom, because payment does not guarantee that files will be recovered and may fund further attacks. The chief executive of Colonial Pipeline testified that the keys from the criminals helped but were not perfect, and that restoring systems after such an attack takes months.
What happened to DarkSide
On 14 May 2021 DarkSide announced that it was ending its operations, citing the loss of access to its servers and pressure from the US. Mandiant did not confirm those reasons, and some market participants suspected an exit scam.
CISA considers BlackMatter, which appeared in July 2021, a possible rebrand of DarkSide. According to ENISA, BlackMatter ended its operations in November 2021, and in February 2022 the BlackCat group confirmed that its members had previously worked in DarkSide or BlackMatter. ENISA points out that ransomware groups change names to rebuild their operations after losing tools or infrastructure, or to avoid the attention of law enforcement.
Sources
- DarkSide Ransomware Group - Mandiant / Google Cloud - Mandiant / Google Cloud (accessed: )
- Case Study: DarkSide Ransomware Attack on Colonial Pipeline - Idaho National Laboratory (accessed: )
- Testimony of J. Blount, chief executive of Colonial Pipeline, before the US Senate, 8 June 2021 - U.S. Senate / GovInfo (accessed: )
- DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks (AA21-131A) - CISA / FBI (accessed: )
- Department of Justice Seizes $2.3 Million in Cryptocurrency Paid to the Ransomware Extortionists Darkside - U.S. Department of Justice (accessed: )
- DarkSide Ransomware Gang Quits After Servers, Bitcoin Stash Seized - Krebs on Security (14.05.2021) - KrebsOnSecurity (accessed: )
- CISA AA21-291A - BlackMatter Ransomware - CISA (accessed: )
- ENISA Threat Landscape 2022 - ENISA (accessed: )
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