Attack encyclopedia
Sandworm Team - the most destructive APT group in cybersecurity history
Sandworm Team (APT44, G0034) - complete analysis of the Russian GRU Unit 74455 group responsible for BlackEnergy, Industroyer, NotPetya and Olympic Destroyer. Campaign timeline 2014-2025, MITRE ATT&CK ICS mapping, DOJ indictment.
Józef SulwińskiPublished 13 min read

Contents
Moscow, the building at Khitrovsky Lane 22. An unremarkable headquarters of military unit 74455 of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - the GRU, for short. From the outside, nothing sets this building apart from dozens of other government institutions. Inside works a team that, over the span of a decade, has carried out more destructive cyberattacks on critical infrastructure than any other known group in the world. They knocked out power in Kyiv - twice. They released the most devastating malware in history. They sabotaged the Winter Olympics. And then, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, they shifted to cyber support for military operations on a scale never seen before.
This is Sandworm Team. A group whose story is also a chronicle of the evolution of cyber weapons targeting industrial systems.
Identity - from pseudonym to indictment
The name “Sandworm” first appeared in 2014, when researchers at iSIGHT Partners (later acquired by FireEye, then Mandiant) uncovered a spear-phishing campaign exploiting the zero-day vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 in Windows. In the malicious files, they found references to Frank Herbert’s novel “Dune” - hence the name referencing the desert worms.
Over the years, the group has operated under many designations:
| Name | Assigned by |
|---|---|
| Sandworm Team | iSIGHT Partners / MITRE ATT&CK (G0034) |
| ELECTRUM | Dragos |
| Telebots | ESET |
| IRON VIKING | Secureworks |
| Voodoo Bear | CrowdStrike |
| IRIDIUM / Seashell Blizzard | Microsoft |
| FROZENBARENTS | Google TAG |
| APT44 | Mandiant (since 2024) |
In April 2024, Mandiant took an unprecedented step - formally “promoted” Sandworm to APT status, assigning it the designation APT44. The rationale: no other group combines such a broad spectrum of operations - from industrial system sabotage, through destructive wipers, to information operations conducted through fake personas on social media.
TIP
Key fact On 19 October 2020, the US Department of Justice charged six GRU officers from Unit 74455: Yuriy Andrienko, Sergey Detistov, Pavel Frolov, Anatoliy Kovalev, Artem Ochichenko, and Petr Pliskin. The charges included conspiracy to commit computer fraud, wire fraud, and identity theft - in connection with the BlackEnergy, NotPetya, Olympic Destroyer attacks, and operations against France and Georgia. It was the first-ever indictment featuring names and photographs of operatives responsible for cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.
Campaign timeline (2014-2025)
The history of Sandworm is a history of escalation - from reconnaissance, through energy sabotage, to global destructive operations.
| Date | Campaign | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 (September) | Spear-phishing campaign with CVE-2014-4114 | Targets: NATO, Ukrainian government, energy sector in Western Europe. First public attribution of the group. |
| 2015 (23 December) | Attack on Ukraine’s power grid (BlackEnergy / KillDisk) | First documented cyberattack causing a blackout. 230,000 customers without power for several hours across the Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, and Cherkasy regions. Operators hijacked VNC sessions and manually opened circuit breakers. |
| 2016 (17 December) | Industroyer/CrashOverride - attack on Ukrenergo’s “Pivnichna” substation | The first fully automated ICS cyber weapon. One-fifth of Kyiv left without power. Malware communicated using native ICS protocols (IEC 104, IEC 61850, OPC DA). |
| 2017 (27 June) | NotPetya - supply chain attack via M.E.Doc | The most devastating cyberattack in history. Over $10 billion in losses worldwide. Maersk, Merck, Saint-Gobain, TNT Express, Mondelez - all paralyzed. A wiper disguised as ransomware. |
| 2017 (April-May) | Campaign against the French presidential election | Spear-phishing and data leaks targeting Emmanuel Macron’s campaign team (“MacronLeaks” operation). |
| 2018 (9 February) | Olympic Destroyer - attack on the Pyeongchang Winter Games | Sabotage of the opening ceremony. Wi-Fi systems, ticket gates, and the official Games website taken down. Malware deliberately forged forensic indicators to appear as a Lazarus Group attack. |
| 2018 (April) | Attack on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) | Attempted breach of the OPCW headquarters Wi-Fi network in The Hague - during the Skripal poisoning investigation. Dutch intelligence (MIVD) intercepted the operation mid-execution. |
| 2018-2019 | Campaigns against Georgia | Defacement of over 15,000 Georgian websites, attacks on media and courts. |
| 2022 (February-March) | Wave of wipers accompanying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine | WhisperGate, HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, CaddyWiper - a series of destructive attacks on Ukrainian government and commercial institutions in the first days of the war. |
| 2022 (8 April) | Industroyer2 - attempted attack on Ukraine’s power grid | ESET and CERT-UA detected and neutralized the attack before it caused a blackout. Malware compiled on 23 March, scheduled for 8 April. Accompanied by wipers CaddyWiper, ORCSHRED, SOLOSHRED, and AWFULSHRED. |
| 2023 (August) | Infamous Chisel - Android malware | The Five Eyes alliance attributed to Sandworm a spyware tool targeting tablets and phones of Ukrainian soldiers. |
| 2024 (January-March) | Campaigns against investigative journalists | Attacks on Bellingcat and other outlets conducting investigations into GRU activities. |
| 2024-2025 | ZEROLOT / Sting - wipers against the energy sector | New destructive tools deployed via Active Directory Group Policy against Ukrainian energy and logistics companies. |
| 2025 (December) | Attack on Polish energy infrastructure | ESET identified a series of attacks on Polish combined heat-and-power plants and renewable energy systems (29-30 December 2025). The first confirmed Sandworm attack on critical infrastructure of a NATO member state. |
TIP
Why Ukraine? Since 2014, Ukraine has served as something of a testing ground for Sandworm - an environment where the group refines new tools and techniques before potentially deploying them at a larger scale. Each successive campaign was more advanced than the last: from manual control in 2015, through automated ICS protocols in 2016, to mass supply chain compromise in 2017. This is no coincidence - it is a systematic development of offensive capabilities.
MITRE ATT&CK ICS - technique mapping (G0034)
Sandworm Team is catalogued in the MITRE ATT&CK database as G0034. The group operates in both the Enterprise and ICS domains - making it one of the few threat actors with documented capabilities in both areas. Below are the key ICS techniques attributed to this group, organized by tactics (based on analysis of the BlackEnergy, Industroyer, Industroyer2 campaigns, and related malware):
More about the framework: MITRE ATT&CK - the complete guide
Initial Access
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Spearphishing Attachment | T0865 | BlackEnergy campaigns (2014-2015) - Word documents with macros delivered to energy sector employees |
| Internet Accessible Device | T0883 | Scanning and exploiting publicly accessible ICS devices |
| Remote Services | T0886 | Hijacking VNC/RDP sessions to HMI systems (2015 attack) |
| Supply Chain Compromise | T0862 | NotPetya - trojanized M.E.Doc update as the OT network entry vector |
Execution
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Command-Line Interface | T0807 | Remote command execution on OT workstations |
| Scripting | T0853 | PowerShell and Python scripts in the attack chain |
| Change Operating Mode | T0858 | Industroyer - changing the operating mode of substation devices |
Persistence
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Valid Accounts | T0859 | Using stolen credentials for long-term OT network access |
| Modify Controller Tasking | T0821 | Industroyer2 - scheduled task launching the malware at a predetermined time |
Evasion
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Masquerading | T0849 | Industroyer backdoor disguised as a legitimate Windows service |
| Rootkit | T0851 | Concealing malware components on OT systems |
| Indicator Removal on Host | T0872 | Deleting logs and traces after attack execution |
Discovery
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Remote System Discovery | T0846 | OT network scanning to identify RTUs, IEDs, and OPC servers |
| Remote System Information Discovery | T0888 | Gathering ICS device configuration data |
| Network Connection Enumeration | T0840 | Mapping connections between SCADA systems and field devices |
Lateral Movement
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Default Credentials | T0812 | Exploiting default ICS device credentials |
| Lateral Tool Transfer | T0867 | Moving tools between IT and OT systems |
| Remote Services | T0886 | Using RDP/VNC to traverse network segments |
Collection
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Automated Collection | T0802 | Industroyer - automatic collection of ICS device configuration |
| Point & Tag Identification | T0861 | Identifying OPC DA tags and data points within the substation |
Command and Control
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Standard Application Layer Protocol | T0869 | Industroyer - C2 communication via the Tor network |
| Commonly Used Port | T0885 | Using standard ports (80, 443) to conceal C2 traffic |
Inhibit Response Function
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Block Command Message | T0803 | Industroyer - blocking legitimate SCADA operator commands |
| Block Reporting Message | T0804 | Blocking reports from field devices to the control center |
| Denial of Service | T0814 | DoS attack on SIPROTEC protective relays |
| Data Destruction | T0809 | Wipers (KillDisk, CaddyWiper, ZEROLOT) destroying data on OT systems |
| Device Restart/Shutdown | T0816 | Forced restart of ICS devices |
Impact
| Technique | ID | Sandworm context |
|---|---|---|
| Manipulation of Control | T0831 | Changing the state of power circuit breakers at the substation |
| Unauthorized Command Message | T0855 | Sending ICS commands without operator authorization |
| Loss of Availability | T0826 | Power outage resulting from a cyberattack (2015, 2016) |
| Loss of Control | T0827 | Loss of control over the electrical substation |
| Loss of View | T0829 | Loss of visibility into device status in the SCADA system |
| Theft of Operational Information | T0882 | Theft of OT network configuration and topology data |
TIP
29 ICS techniques Sandworm Team is one of only a handful of APT groups for which MITRE ATT&CK documents techniques in the ICS domain. The total number of attributed techniques (Enterprise + ICS) exceeds 100, making Sandworm the most broadly mapped group in the entire ATT&CK database. For comparison, Lazarus Group (G0032) has a dozen or so ICS techniques attributed, while most APT groups have none at all.
Tools in Sandworm’s arsenal
Understanding Sandworm requires looking at the evolution of their tooling - from off-the-shelf components to purpose-built ICS cyber weapons:
| Tool | Year | Type | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| BlackEnergy | 2014-2015 | Backdoor / toolkit | Originally crimeware, repurposed for attacks on the energy sector. KillDisk modules, network scanners. |
| KillDisk | 2015-2016 | Wiper | Destroying data on disks after the power grid attack, hindering recovery. |
| Industroyer/CrashOverride | 2016 | ICS cyber weapon | The first automated ICS malware - four industrial protocol modules. Details: Industroyer |
| NotPetya | 2017 | Wiper (fake ransomware) | Mass destruction via supply chain. EternalBlue + Mimikatz. Details: NotPetya |
| Olympic Destroyer | 2018 | Wiper + false flag | Olympic Games sabotage with deliberately forged attribution indicators. |
| VPNFilter | 2018 | IoT botnet | Over 500,000 infected routers across 54 countries. Capable of MITM attacks and firmware destruction. |
| Exaramel | 2018-2019 | Backdoor | BlackEnergy successor, Linux and Windows variants. |
| Industroyer2 | 2022 | ICS cyber weapon | Simplified, single-module Industroyer variant (IEC 104 only). Detected before execution. |
| CaddyWiper | 2022 | Wiper | One of a series of wipers accompanying the invasion of Ukraine. |
| Infamous Chisel | 2023 | Mobile malware (Android) | Espionage on devices of Ukrainian soldiers. |
| ZEROLOT | 2024-2025 | Wiper | Distributed via Active Directory GPO, attacks on the energy sector. |
Operational methods - what sets Sandworm apart
Analysis of a decade of Sandworm operations reveals several distinctive traits that differentiate this group from other state-sponsored actors:
IT/OT duality. Sandworm is one of the few groups that consistently pivots from corporate IT networks to industrial OT control networks. This requires competencies that even advanced APT groups lack - knowledge of ICS protocols, power substation architecture, and PLC logic.
False flags. Olympic Destroyer deliberately embedded code artifacts pointing to Lazarus Group (North Korea) and APT3 (China). This was the first documented case of deliberate attribution forgery at a technical level - and a cautionary tale for anyone relying solely on technical indicators for analysis.
Escalating destructiveness. From BlackEnergy (a reconnaissance tool with a destructive module) through Industroyer (an automated cyber weapon) to NotPetya (mass destruction spiraling beyond control) - each successive campaign was more devastating.
Information operations. Mandiant’s 2024 report revealed that Sandworm is behind fake online personas - including “Cyber Army of Russia Reborn,” “XakNet,” and “Solntsepek” - that publicly claimed responsibility for attacks on critical infrastructure. This blurs the line between cyber and information operations.
Global ambitions, Ukrainian testing ground. While most destructive operations targeted Ukraine, NotPetya proved that Sandworm can - and intends to - strike globally. The attack on Polish energy infrastructure at the end of 2025 confirms that the group’s ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine.
Implications for OT security
Sandworm Team is not an abstract threat from analyst reports. This is a group that knocked out power in the capital of a European country twice, caused losses exceeding $10 billion with a single attack, and in 2025 struck the energy infrastructure of a NATO country for the first time.
For organizations operating industrial systems - particularly in the energy sector - the takeaways are as follows:
IT/OT segmentation is not optional - it is a necessity. Every Sandworm campaign started from the IT network and pivoted to OT. Proper segmentation with an industrial DMZ and unidirectional data flow is the fundamental barrier.
ICS protocol monitoring. Industroyer used native industrial protocols - its commands were technically valid. The only way to detect this is passive ICS traffic monitoring with behavioral anomaly detection.
OT incident response planning. Ukrenergo operators restored power in 2016 by switching to manual mode. Organizations should regularly practice scenarios in which SCADA systems are unavailable.
Credential and GPO management. The latest campaigns (ZEROLOT) use Active Directory Group Policy to deploy wipers at scale. Protecting Domain Admin accounts and monitoring GPO changes are critical defense elements.
Supply chain verification. NotPetya entered networks through a trusted software update. Every software component in an OT environment should undergo integrity verification.
Summary
Sandworm Team is not just the most dangerous APT group in the ICS domain - it is an actor that has repeatedly demonstrated that a cyberattack can have real, physical consequences. From knocking out power in Kyiv to paralyzing global corporations, from sabotaging the Olympic Games to attacking NATO energy infrastructure - the history of Sandworm is a history of continuous escalation.
A decade of this group’s activity reveals one thing with absolute clarity: industrial system security is not a technical problem that can be solved with a single audit or a single product. It is a continuous process that demands understanding of threats, network segmentation, anomaly monitoring, and - above all - readiness for scenarios that, until recently, seemed impossible.
Sources
- Sandworm Team, Group G0034 - MITRE ATT&CK
- Sandworm (hacker group) - Wikipedia
- APT44: Unearthing Sandworm - Mandiant / Google Cloud Blog
- Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded - ESET WeLiveSecurity
- Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology - Google Cloud Blog
- GRU Hackers' Destructive Malware and International Cyber Attacks - FBI
- US Indicts Sandworm, Russia's Most Destructive Cyberwar Unit - Security Magazine
- Sandworm: A tale of disruption told anew - ESET WeLiveSecurity
- Mapping MITRE ATT&CK to SandWorm APT's Global Campaign - ReliaQuest
- Inside Sandworm: Decade of Cyber Sabotage - Picus Security
- Understanding Sandworm: A State-Sponsored Threat Group - ISACA
- ZEROLOT Analysis: Inside Sandworm's Destructive New Wiper - Immersive Labs
- Wiper Attack on Polish Power Grid Linked to Russia's Sandworm - Infosecurity Magazine
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