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Ransomware - Trends Analysis and Threat Evolution

Ransomware trends 2022-2025 - group rebranding, extortion without encryption, Operation Cronos, RaaS fragmentation. Data from ENISA, Chainalysis, Dragos.

Łukasz DrążekŁukasz Drążek

Published Updated 8 min read

ransomwareENISAthreat analysisREvilDarkSideLockBitdata exfiltrationcybersecurity
Ransomware - Trends Analysis and Threat Evolution
Contents
  1. Ransomware Groups in Law Enforcement Crosshairs
  2. The Brand Carousel - a Survival Strategy
  3. Ransomware by the Numbers
  4. Data Exfiltration and Extortion Without Encryption
  5. Future Outlook
  6. Where We Help
  7. Legal Basis
  8. Sources

Ransomware changes its names, extorts without encryption and splits into smaller groups. The list of names a company knows today will not be enough to assess the threat next year. Backups do not prevent the publication of stolen data.

The ENISA Threat Landscape reports for 2022-2025 and Chainalysis data show that:

  • ransomware groups rebrand on average after 17 months,
  • in 2024, 5,414 attacks were published on leak sites,
  • in 2024-2025 ENISA recorded 82 ransomware variants deployed in the EU, and none of them accounted for more than 11.6% of deployments,
  • ransom payments in 2025 exceeded 820 million USD.

The article on ransomware is a guide to the threat, and the article on ransomware prevention describes how to prevent it.

Indicator Value Source and scope
Attacks published on leak sites 5,414 in 2024, 11% more than in 2023 Cyberint, worldwide.
Ransom payments more than 820 million USD in 2025, 8% less than in 2024 Chainalysis, all cryptocurrency payments worldwide.
Ransomware groups attacking industry 119 in 2025 versus 80 in 2024 Dragos, only groups attacking industrial organizations.
Time to rebrand a group on average 17 months ENISA, 2022 report.

Ransomware Groups in Law Enforcement Crosshairs

Law enforcement action forced some groups to retire, and a few even released decryption keys. International cooperation led to the arrest of members of groups such as REvil, Cl0p, NetWalker, LockerGoga and MegaCortex.

The most important events:

  • Involvement of the US military. According to public reports cited by ENISA, the US military acted against ransomware groups.
  • Arrests of REvil members by the FSB. Russia’s Federal Security Service carried out an operation that may have been motivated by geopolitical goals.
  • White House initiative. The US government coordinated an international response to ransomware, deliberately excluding Russia.
  • CIRCIA. The 2022 US law provides that critical infrastructure entities report a ransom payment to CISA within 24 hours. The obligation will apply once the final rule takes effect, which CISA had not yet published in November 2026.
  • Operation Cronos (February 2024). An international operation led by the UK National Crime Agency (NCA) took over the LockBit infrastructure. The NCA identified 194 affiliates, that is, collaborators of the group, and pointed to about 2,200 BTC (nearly 110 million USD) of unlaundered ransom proceeds. The NCA did not seize that amount, it identified it.

A defender sees the effect of these actions in groups changing names to avoid the attention of law enforcement.

High-profile incidents such as the Colonial Pipeline attack put heavy pressure on ransomware groups. Many of them began announcing retirement and changing brand. ENISA gives the average time of such a rebranding: about 17 months.

ENISA lists four motives for changing a name:

  • The group loses tools or infrastructure, for example after a decryptor is published.
  • The group wants to avoid the attention of law enforcement and the media.
  • The group makes it harder to attribute attacks to itself.
  • Members of the group settle internal disputes.

For a defender one thing follows: indicators of compromise assigned to one name must be carried over to its successors. Why: technical similarities between an old and a new brand often show that the same crew is acting.

Documented Rebranding Cases

  • DoppelPaymer continued as the Grief ransomware.
  • WastedLocker appeared with ransom notes under the names Hades, Cryptolocker, Payloadbin and Macaw (spring-autumn 2021), according to ENISA.
  • DarkSide became BlackMatter after the Colonial Pipeline attack, and then BlackCat/ALPHV (confirmed in February 2022).
  • GandCrab transformed into REvil.
  • LockBit continued after Operation Cronos. ENISA records a LockBit4 variant since April 2025, and Check Point described the announcement of LockBit 5.0 in September 2025. In May 2025 the LockBit program was compromised, and ENISA sees no claims of victims by this group since 27 May 2025.

In 2021-2022 the families Egregor, REvil, BlackMatter and DoppelPaymer disappeared from the landscape. At the same time new ones appeared that had technical similarities to those that had retired.

Ransomware by the Numbers

The figures come from different sources that measure different phenomena and different periods. The 2022 ENISA report covers July 2021 to June 2022, and the 2025 report covers July 2024 to June 2025. FBI IC3 and Dragos report calendar years.

Indicator 2022 2024
Ransomware complaints reported to FBI IC3 in the USA 2,385 3,156, which is 11.7% more than in 2023
Losses reported to IC3 more than 34.3 million USD 12,473,156 USD
Attacks published on leak sites (Cyberint) no data in the sources of this article 5,414
Ransomware groups attacking industry (Dragos) no data in the sources of this article 80 (in 2025: 119)

The IC3 loss figure covers only what victims reported to IC3. It does not include the cost of lost business, time, files, equipment or repairs, and many victims do not report losses at all. For this reason the figure is understated and does not show what ransomware costs.

For 2025 Chainalysis reports more than 820 million USD in ransom payments, 8% less than the updated estimate of 892 million USD for 2024. In the same period the number of claimed victims on leak sites grew by about 50% according to eCrime.ch data. Payments fell while the number of claimed victims rose.

Data Exfiltration and Extortion Without Encryption

Multi-stage extortion has been a clear trend since 2021. Ransomware groups know that stealing data alone can be enough to obtain a ransom, without encrypting the victim’s systems.

This model works on several levels:

  1. Data theft. The attacker takes sensitive information out before encrypting anything.
  2. Threat of publication. Groups run dedicated sites on the Tor network where they publish stolen data.
  3. Use of insurance policies. Groups such as LAPSUS$ and Karakurt refer to the victim’s cyber insurance policy during negotiations.
  4. Dedicated marketplaces. Platforms for selling stolen data appear.

Since 2024 ENISA has also described hacktivism as a distribution channel for ransomware. The CyberVolk group, acting in line with Russian interests, promotes and distributes several ransomware strains (AzzaSec, HexaLocker, Parano), combining ideological and financial motives.

Backups do not protect against the publication of stolen data. An organization must therefore detect and block data exfiltration, in line with the Exfiltration tactic (TA0010) described in MITRE ATT&CK.

Checklist of minimum protective measures:

Measure What to do and why
Outbound traffic monitoring Monitor outbound network traffic with a data loss prevention (DLP) system and network flow analysis (NetFlow). Why: data is taken out before encryption, so it is the last chance to stop the attack.
Network segmentation Divide the network into segments. Why: segmentation limits the attacker’s movement between systems.
Large data transfers Set an alert for large data transfers to external services. Why: stealing a large database usually requires a transfer that deviates from the norm.
Access to data repositories Limit access to repositories of sensitive data to the people who need it. Why: the fewer accounts have access, the fewer accounts are valuable to an attacker.
Response exercises Practice incident response regularly. Why: a team that knows its roles decides faster on isolating systems.
Review of access policies Review and update data access policies periodically. Why: permissions grow over time and need to be reduced periodically.
Least privilege Give accounts with remote access only the permissions necessary for work (the principle of least privilege). Why: taking over such an account gives the attacker only limited access.
Leaked credentials Check whether employee credentials appeared in publicly available leaks and force password changes. Why: a stolen password often serves as the first access.

Future Outlook

Ransomware remains one of the most serious threats to organizations. Data from ENISA reports and other sources point to several lasting trends:

  • Fragmentation of the ecosystem. ENISA recorded 82 ransomware variants deployed against organizations in EU member states in 2024-2025, and the most frequent (Akira) accounted for 11.6% of deployments. Dragos reports that groups attacking industry numbered 119 in 2025 versus 80 in 2024. These are two different measures, not the number of groups in the whole ecosystem.
  • Hacktivism merges with ransomware. Ideologically motivated groups distribute ransomware strains.

Ransomware is a problem of the whole organization, not only of the IT department. Defense requires technical measures, incident response procedures and team exercises.

Where We Help

Penetration tests and red team operations check whether an organization detects and stops the stages of a typical ransomware attack, including data exfiltration. In industrial environments an OT security assessment checks the same.

Topic Where it is
Reporting of ransom payments within 24 hours and incidents within 72 hours by US critical infrastructure entities CIRCIA (2022); obligation after the CISA final rule takes effect

Sources

  1. ENISA Threat Landscape 2022 - ENISA (accessed: )
  2. ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 - ENISA (accessed: )
  3. Ransomware Annual Report 2024 - Cyberint (accessed: )
  4. Crypto Ransomware: 2026 Crypto Crime Report - Chainalysis (accessed: )
  5. Examining the Impact of Ransomware Disruptions: Qakbot, LockBit, and ALPHV-BlackCat - Chainalysis (accessed: )
  6. 2022 Internet Crime Report - FBI IC3 (accessed: )
  7. 2024 Internet Crime Report - FBI IC3 (accessed: )
  8. LockBit leader unmasked and sanctioned - National Crime Agency (accessed: )
  9. Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) - CISA (accessed: )
  10. Dragos 2026 OT Report Shows Surge in Threat Groups and Ransomware - Dragos (accessed: )
  11. LockBit 5.0: Ransomware Gang Returns in Force - Check Point Research (accessed: )

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