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Colonial Pipeline Incident - When an IT Attack Shuts Down an Entire Pipeline
The DarkSide attack on Colonial Pipeline (2021): ransomware in the IT network, a precautionary shutdown of the whole pipeline, five days of downtime and TSA directives for pipeline operators.
Józef SulwińskiPublished Updated 8 min read

Contents
A stopped pipeline costs the operator days of work and leaves its customers without fuel, even when the attack touched only the office network. In May 2021 ransomware in the IT network of Colonial Pipeline led to the shutdown of the entire pipeline.
The report of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the CISA alert and the testimony of the company’s chief executive before the US Senate show that:
- the attackers got in on 29 April 2021 through a VPN, on a profile that was not meant to be in use and was protected only by a password,
- on 7 May at about 5:00 a.m. an operator saw the ransom note, and by 6:10 a.m. the whole 5,500-mile pipeline was stopped,
- according to CISA there are no indications of lateral movement to OT, and the company disconnected certain OT systems proactively.
The pipeline delivers nearly 2.5 million barrels of fuel a day to 260 locations in 13 states. That scale shows how much the dependence of the OT process on IT systems matters.
Attack timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 29 April 2021 | The attackers connect through a VPN with the credentials of an expired account, which INL links to leaked passwords. |
| 29 April - 7 May | Over nine days the attackers escalate privileges, deploy ransomware and exfiltrate about 100 GB of data. |
| 7 May, about 5:00 a.m. | An operator sees the ransom note, and the supervisor halts operations to isolate the OT network. |
| 7 May, by 6:10 a.m. | The entire 5,500-mile pipeline is stopped. Some operations continue under limited manual control. |
| 8 May | Colonial pays the ransom, which according to INL was $4.4 million. |
| 12 May | The pipeline returns to automated operation, five days after the shutdown. |
| 7 June | The US Department of Justice announces the seizure of 63.7 BTC from the ransom paid on 8 May. |
Why the pipeline was shut down
The reason for the shutdown has not been described unambiguously, and two sources give different explanations.
According to the testimony of Colonial’s chief executive before the Senate on 8 June 2021, the attack encrypted IT systems, and the company shut the pipeline down to isolate the attack from the OT network. The chief executive told a senator that even a one percent chance of an OT compromise justified stopping the pipeline. INL describes the same and adds that the supervisor halted operations to isolate the OT network and that the OT segments stayed intact.
INL also states, citing a vendor analysis, that the information servers connected to SCADA were unavailable because of encryption and that the company judged continued automated operation unsafe. The chief executive’s testimony does not confirm this, so this version remains unconfirmed.
The conclusion for an operator is the same in both versions. When an attack hits the IT network and the company cannot rule out a move into OT, it stops the physical process. The systems the OT process needs for safe operation should therefore be written down, and the effect of losing them assessed. Why: without this knowledge the decision to shut down is made within minutes and without data. More on IT and OT team cooperation.
DarkSide - the business model
The attack was carried out by the DarkSide group, which according to CISA had operated since August 2020 as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS). The developers supplied the software, and affiliates, meaning independent operators, carried out the attacks.
| Feature | Details |
|---|---|
| Model | The ransomware developers share the profit with affiliates who carry out the attacks. |
| Revenue split | According to forum advertisements cited by Mandiant, the operators take 25% of ransoms below $500,000 and 10% of ransoms above $5 million. The rest goes to the affiliate. |
| Target restrictions | Mandiant describes affiliate rules that prohibit attacking hospitals, schools, universities, non-profits, the public sector and organisations in CIS countries. |
| System language | The sample Mandiant analysed contained code that checks the language, but was not configured to execute it. |
| Tactic | The group steals data before encrypting systems, and the ransom covers both decryption and not publishing the data. |
After the attack the group changed its name. ENISA describes that DarkSide was rebranded as BlackMatter after the Colonial Pipeline incident, and in February 2022 BlackCat confirmed its links to DarkSide or BlackMatter. More on the group BlackCat/ALPHV and on ransomware trends.
TSA directives after the attack
After the attack the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued security directives for pipeline operators and renews them every year. Two series are in force.
| Series | What it requires of the operator | Period in force |
|---|---|---|
| 2021-01 (version 01G) | The operator reports an incident to CISA as soon as practicable and no later than 72 hours after identifying it. It also designates a cybersecurity coordinator. | 16 January 2026 to 15 January 2027 |
| 2021-02 (version 02G) | The operator implements the technical measures of sections III.A-E: an inventory of critical systems, network segmentation, access control, continuous monitoring and patching. It also has an incident response plan, a cybersecurity assessment plan and a cybersecurity architecture design review at least every two years. | 3 May 2026 to 2 May 2027 |
Both directives apply to operators that TSA has designated as critical and has notified. In November 2024 TSA also published a proposal for permanent rules (NPRM). As of 20 November 2026, TSA has not published a final rule under this title.
Lessons for critical infrastructure operators
1. The dependence of OT on IT systems
The IT systems that the OT process needs for safe operation should be written down, and the risk of losing them assessed. Why: an operator that does not know these dependencies stops the process at every attack on IT.
2. Multi-factor authentication on every remote access
The operator should require a second factor on every remote access point and disable accounts that nobody uses. Why: at Colonial a password to a VPN profile that was not meant to be in use was enough. More in the article on remote access to ICS.
3. Visibility and segmentation
The IT systems that have access to OT and the connections that are needed should be established. Why: an operator that sees traffic at the IT and OT boundary can judge whether the attack went further and avoid a shutdown for lack of data. Practical guidance is in the article on Defense in Depth in DCS.
4. Manual operation as a fallback
The operator should prepare and regularly rehearse a manual shutdown and restart of the process without IT systems. Why: Colonial returned to automated operation only after five days, and until then the process ran manually to a limited extent.
Checklist for critical infrastructure operators
- Inventory of all remote access points (VPN, RDP, web access). Why: an unknown access point has no second factor.
- Multi-factor authentication on every remote access point. Why: a password from a leak alone is enough to get in.
- A quarterly review of inactive accounts and permissions. Why: an unused account is an entrance that nobody watches.
- A map of IT-OT dependencies: which IT systems must run for the OT process to continue. Why: the map allows downtime risk to be assessed in advance.
- Manual procedures for the loss of IT systems, checked in exercises. Why: a procedure that nobody has rehearsed does not work in a crisis.
- Network segmentation between IT and OT with a demilitarised zone (DMZ). Why: segmentation limits the path an attack can take from IT to OT.
- Monitoring of lateral movement in the network. Why: it shows whether the attack went further.
- Backups of critical systems with a rehearsed rapid restore. Why: backups shorten downtime without paying a ransom.
- Incident response exercises with a ransomware scenario. Why: a team that has rehearsed decides on a shutdown faster.
Where we help
During an OT security assessment we review the architecture and segmentation and compare the actual communication paths between IT and OT with the documentation. An IEC 62443 audit checks the division into zones and conduits. To talk, use our contact form.
Legal basis
| Topic | Where it is |
|---|---|
| Incident report to CISA within 72 hours, cybersecurity coordinator | TSA, SD Pipeline-2021-01G, sections II.B and II.C |
| Response plan, cybersecurity assessment plan, architecture review every two years | TSA, SD Pipeline-2021-02G, sections III.A-E (technical measures), III.F and III.G |
| Proposal for permanent rules | Federal Register, 7 November 2024, “Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management” |
Sources
- DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks (AA21-131A) - CISA / FBI (accessed: )
- Case Study: DarkSide Ransomware Attack on Colonial Pipeline (INL/RPT-22-67337) - Idaho National Laboratory / U.S. Department of Energy (CyOTE) (accessed: )
- Testimony of J. Blount, chief executive of Colonial Pipeline, before the US Senate, 8 June 2021 - U.S. Senate / GovInfo (accessed: )
- Department of Justice Seizes $2.3 Million in Cryptocurrency Paid to the Ransomware Extortionists Darkside - U.S. Department of Justice (accessed: )
- Shining a Light on DARKSIDE Ransomware Operations - Mandiant (accessed: )
- ENISA Threat Landscape 2022 - ENISA (accessed: )
- Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01G: Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity (transmittal memo, January 2026) - TSA (accessed: )
- Renewal of the Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 Series (SD Pipeline-2021-02G, transmittal memo of 1 May 2026) - TSA (accessed: )
- Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), Federal Register, 7 November 2024 - TSA / Federal Register (accessed: )
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