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OT and IT Security - Together or Separate?
IT vs OT differences - priorities, technologies, lifecycle - and the answer to the question in the title: separate at the network layer, together in risk management and incident response.
Józef SulwińskiPublished Updated 10 min read

Contents
When IT and OT teams work separately, an operating system update can disrupt supervision of a production process, and an incident from the office network reaches production without warning. Reports from Omdia, Fortinet and Dragos show that:
- according to Omdia, 75% of the most significant incidents in the surveyed manufacturing firms started in IT while OT bore the consequences,
- according to Dragos, OT incidents are often mischaracterized as “IT only” because engineering workstations and HMI panels run Windows,
- according to Fortinet, 52% of organizations assign responsibility for OT to the chief security officer, up from 16% in 2022.
The Colonial Pipeline attack and NotPetya are examples of consequences of this split.
TIP
Fortinet reports in its 2025 State of OT that 52% of organizations placed responsibility for OT within the CISO structure, up from 16% in 2022. Responsibility for OT is moving from maintenance departments to integrated cybersecurity teams.
Differences between IT and OT environments
1. Working conditions
IT servers run in air-conditioned server rooms with dedicated power. OT devices sit in field cabinets on production floors, where there is dust and humidity, and during disinfection foam or hot water sprays the enclosures. Enclosures need a suitable ingress protection rating (IP), and devices in cabinets must withstand vibration, temperature and electromagnetic interference (EMC). In explosive atmospheres, the amount of energy supplied to devices is limited.
2. Technologies used
| Aspect | IT | OT |
|---|---|---|
| Software | Organizations use products available on the market, for example office suites and ERP systems, and adapt them to their needs. | Systems are programmed for a specific process. |
| Protocols | Networks use standard internet protocols such as TCP/IP, HTTP and SMTP. | Networks use industrial automation protocols such as Modbus, Profinet and EtherNet/IP. |
| Vendors | The organization chooses among many vendors. | According to Fortinet, 78% of organizations use one to four OT device vendors. |
| Programming language | Developers write in languages such as Python, Java and C#. | Automation engineers write in IEC 61131-3 languages: LD, ST and FBD. |
| Patching | Patches are installed in regular maintenance windows. | Patches require a planned outage, so they are installed less often. |
In OT environments, automation engineers often choose the solutions of a single vendor, because a shared platform for programming operator panels, PLCs and drives shortens deployment time.
3. Design approach
IT system designers analyze a system from the perspective of networks and applications, and build the security of communication channels and configuration into the design process.
OT designers see a system as a set of physical devices: pumps, tanks, valves and reactors. Their main goal is to drive components and read measurement signals such as temperature, volume and flow. Historically, requirements concerned reliability and physical safety, not information security.
The IEC 62443 standard introduces security-by-design requirements for OT systems, including the division of a system into zones and conduits. Many existing installations, however, were built without considering cyber threats.
4. Security priorities and goals
| Priority | IT | OT |
|---|---|---|
| Main goal | The IT team puts confidentiality of data first (CIA: Confidentiality first). | The OT team puts availability and continuous operation first (AIC: Availability first). |
| Main requirement | The team protects personal and business data. | The team ensures production continuity and avoids hazardous events. |
| Latency tolerance | Delays of seconds to minutes are acceptable. | In some control loops, for example closed-loop regulation, milliseconds matter. |
| Downtime tolerance | Outages happen in planned maintenance windows. | Every outage means production losses. |
| Incident response | The IT team isolates the affected system and analyzes the incident. | The OT team keeps the process in a safe state. |
In ICS, availability, reliability and determinism of functions matter most. Data integrity and real-time transmission must be ensured without delays and disruption.
5. Pace of change
According to IEC 62443-2-1:2024, an IACS can operate for more than twenty years, often with hardware and software that no longer have vendor support. Managing such components should therefore be planned in advance.
Modernization is triggered by the result of a risk analysis, the profitability of the investment or limited availability of spare parts. Modernization must proceed without unnecessary downtime.
OT networks are static and do not change over a short horizon, and user groups are stable. IT network architecture changes often and scales easily.
6. Organizational approach
In large organizations, IT staff specialize in fragments of the process: some are responsible for databases, others for communication, still others for maintenance work.
In OT, maintenance staff are responsible for the whole. They handle communication between devices, device parameterization, replacement of faulty components, up-to-date documentation and routine maintenance.
Scale of the problem - 2024-2025 data
| Indicator | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Operational outages that impacted organizations’ revenue | 42% (previously 52%) | Fortinet 2025 State of OT |
| Number of ransomware groups targeting industrial organizations | up 49%, from 80 to 119 groups in 2025 | Dragos 2026 Year in Review |
| Manufacturing firms with a significant increase in security incidents or breaches within 12 months | 80% | Omdia for Telstra International, 2024 survey of 513 firms (sponsored study) |
| Most significant incidents that started in IT and affected OT | 75% | Omdia for Telstra International (2024) |
WARNING
In the 2024 study, 80% of manufacturing firms recorded a significant increase in security incidents or breaches. Connected networks therefore need a well-thought-out architecture and layered defense (Defense in Depth).
Together or separate - the answer for architecture
At the network layer, IT and OT should be separated, while in risk management and incident response they should be joined.
Networks should be separated because incidents most often travel from IT to OT. According to Omdia, 75% of the most significant incidents started in IT, and OT bore the consequences as downtime, incident handling costs or a breach. Omdia recommends network segmentation, physical or virtual, that separates industrial networks from corporate systems and tightly controls remote access. As additional measures, Omdia lists micro-segmentation, next-generation firewalls, zero trust architecture and IT and OT security operations tools. According to IEC 62443-3-2, the system under assessment is divided into zones and conduits.
Response should be joined because IT and OT teams see different parts of the same incident. Fortinet recommends including OT in security operations and incident response plans, and describes the target model as joint IT and OT security operations. The first step is a response playbook that covers the OT environment. Dragos reports that organizations with full OT visibility detected and contained ransomware incidents in OT in 5 days on average, while the industry average is 42 days. Dragos also notes that OT incidents are sometimes described as “IT only”. Assets should therefore be classified together with the OT team.
Why collaboration is necessary
IT and OT teams notice different threats, so together they give a fuller picture of risk. Collaboration brings four benefits:
- Both groups state their needs already at the design stage, so the project needs no later rework.
- IT safeguards do not disrupt OT processes, and OT safeguards do not block IT work.
- The teams build a shared language, so they understand each other’s warnings.
- Security policies cover the whole organization and leave no gaps where the environments meet.
Practical steps toward collaboration
| Step | What to do | Who |
|---|---|---|
| Joint exercises | Incident scenarios that cover IT and OT should be rehearsed so that both teams know their roles before an incident occurs. | Security team and maintenance manager |
| Mutual training | Automation engineers learn the basics of cybersecurity, and IT staff learn the specifics of the processes, so they understand the consequences of their own decisions. | Managers of both teams |
| Joint inventory | Connections between IT and OT networks should be mapped, because connections nobody knows about cannot be protected. | OT team together with the IT team |
| Agreed procedures | Patching, account management and incident response policies must cover both environments, otherwise an IT safeguard can stop an OT process. | Process owners |
| Shared language | A glossary should be written, for example “zone” and “VLAN” or “control loop” and “controller”, so both teams understand the same words. | Both teams |
| Joint risk assessment | One risk assessment method should be used, and for OT zones and conduits the method from IEC 62443-3-2, so that the results of both teams are comparable. | Security team |
IT-OT collaboration checklist
- An owner of OT security should be named in the organizational structure, because without one nobody is responsible for decisions about OT.
- IT and OT assets should be inventoried together, because each side sees different devices.
- Dependencies should be mapped, that is, which IT systems must run for OT to continue the process, because their failure stops production.
- Joint incident response procedures should be developed, because an incident usually moves from IT to OT.
- Joint exercises should be planned at least once a year, because procedures nobody rehearsed fail in a crisis.
- A patching policy should be agreed for both environments, because IT maintenance windows do not match OT outages.
- Network segmentation in a zones and conduits layout should be implemented, because it limits the consequences of an incident that started in IT.
- Joint security metrics should be set, because without them the teams cannot compare the results of their work.
- Risk should be assessed regularly across the whole IT-OT chain, because changes on one team’s side change the risk on the other’s.
Where we help
SEQRED supports industrial organizations in building IT-OT collaboration. During an OT security assessment and an IEC 62443 audit, the SEQRED team examines the zones and conduits architecture and the connections between IT and OT, and penetration testing verifies whether segmentation stops traffic from the office network to production. To start a conversation, use the contact form.
Technical basis
| Topic | Where it is |
|---|---|
| Division of a system into zones and conduits | IEC 62443-3-2, requirement ZCR 3 |
| IACS lifecycle of more than twenty years | IEC 62443-2-1:2024, scope of the standard |
| 75% of the most significant incidents started in IT; segmentation recommendation | Omdia for Telstra International, figure 8 and the section on threats |
| Ransomware groups up 49%; 5 days versus 42 days; classification as “IT only” | Dragos 2026 Year in Review, press release |
| 52% of organizations with OT under the CISO; 42% outages affecting revenue; joint security operations | Fortinet 2025 State of OT, press release |
Sources
- Fortinet Report: OT Cybersecurity Risk Elevates within Executive Leadership Ranks (2025 State of Operational Technology and Cybersecurity) - Fortinet (accessed: )
- Dragos 2026 OT Cybersecurity Year in Review - Dragos (accessed: )
- Secure manufacturing: the challenges of IT/OT convergence (Omdia research for Telstra International) - Omdia / Telstra International (accessed: )
- IEC 62443-2-1:2024 Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners - IEC (accessed: )
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