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Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict on the Cybercrime Ecosystem
How the Russia-Ukraine war changed cybercrime: hacktivists with ransomware, artificial intelligence in phishing, law enforcement operations, and defensive actions for organisations in the EU.
Łukasz DrążekPublished Updated 5 min read

Contents
An organisation that receives a ransom demand usually assumes that a profit-driven criminal group is behind the attack. Since 2022 this picture is incomplete: the same group may act from political motives, and the same technique serves criminals, hacktivists, and state services. Below is what has changed and what an organisation does in response.
Reports by CERT-UA, Dragos, and Europol show that:
- the number of cyberattacks on Ukraine rose from 2,541 in 2023 to 4,315 in 2024, an increase of about 70%,
- the FrostyGoop malware, according to Dragos the ninth known tool built for industrial systems, cut heating at a Ukrainian heating company for about two days,
- CERT-UA described in 2025 the use of artificial intelligence to write phishing and code,
- Europol and Eurojust took down more than 100 servers of the pro-Russian group NoName057(16) in July 2025.
The course of the attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure is described in a separate article on cyber operations in this conflict. This text describes the effects on the cybercrime ecosystem and defensive actions.
Hacktivism merges with ransomware
A politically motivated group can demand a ransom, so the demand does not reveal its goal. CyberVolk shows this. Rapid7 describes it as a group that declared support for Russia, began as hacktivist, and moved to using ransomware. The group has been active since June 2024, and its campaigns followed arrests of NoName057(16) members.
Hacktivism works on both sides of the conflict. The Ukrainian IT Army announced on 20 June 2024 a DDoS attack on Russian banks and the Mir payment system. According to the newspaper Vedomosti, the Mir problems began around 10 a.m. and peaked around 2 p.m., after which the attack was repelled. The group itself provided the list of banks, and the source did not confirm it.
The groups Z-Pentest and Sector 16 publish recordings of SCADA control panels, including an oil installation in Texas (Cyble, January 2025).
Law enforcement reduces the groups’ infrastructure
Operation Eastwood, led by Europol and Eurojust on 14-17 July 2025, took down more than 100 servers used for DDoS attacks. Two people were arrested, in France and Spain, seven arrest warrants were issued, and 24 house searches were carried out, one of them in Poland. The group’s supporters use automated tools for DDoS attacks. The group is described in a separate article on NoName057(16).
Artificial intelligence in phishing and code
CERT-UA described in a report of October 2025 that attackers use AI to write phishing messages and malicious code. Researchers believe AI helped create PowerShell scripts in the Wrecksteel malware, attributed to the group UAC-0219. CERT-UA also notes that phishing works less well on better-trained users, so attackers more often turn to vulnerabilities that need no click.
An employee therefore verifies every request for payment or a change of details through another channel, regardless of the quality of the message text.
Physical sabotage is rising faster than cyberattacks
CSIS counted in Europe 3 cases of physical sabotage and plots attributed to the Russian government in 2022, 12 in 2023, and 34 in 2024. The dataset includes arson, explosives, and cable damage by anchors. Cyber operations are included only when they had an observable physical effect, and every case required three credible sources pointing to the Russian government. The figures therefore describe physical sabotage, not cyberattacks.
What to do
| Action | Who | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Check that ports of industrial protocols, for example port 502 for Modbus TCP, are not reachable from the internet. | The team responsible for the OT network. | Dragos assessed with moderate confidence that the controllers were attacked through port 502 open to the internet. |
| Divide the industrial network into zones and monitor traffic in industrial protocols. See OT network segmentation and Modbus TCP. | The team responsible for the OT network. | Most antivirus products do not detect FrostyGoop, because the malware uses ordinary Modbus TCP communication. |
| Keep an offline backup and test restoring from it. | The person responsible for IT. | Data-destroying software deletes files without a ransom demand, so only a copy out of the attacker’s reach allows a return to work. |
| Verify requests for payment and changes of details through a channel other than the message that asks for them. | Accounting and the people who approve payments. | AI makes it possible to write correct phishing messages, so the quality of the text is not enough to judge them. |
| Agree with the internet provider who limits DDoS attacks on the company’s services, and how. | The person responsible for IT. | DDoS attacks run by automated tools need a procedure agreed before the attack. |
| Record the contact of the competent CSIRT and know the reporting deadlines. | The person leading incident response. | An essential or important entity reports a significant incident within 24 hours (early warning), within 72 hours (notification), and sends a final report after one month. |
| Rehearse a scenario in which an attack destroys data and does not demand a ransom. | The person leading incident response. | A plan prepared for ransomware assumes the business returns to work after payment or after restoring data. |
Legal basis
| Step / topic | Where it is |
|---|---|
| Reporting deadlines for significant incidents: 24 hours, 72 hours, final report after one month | NIS2 Directive, Article 23(4) |
| Transposition of NIS2 into national law | National law of the Member State, deadline 17 October 2024 |
Where we help
An OT security assessment identifies industrial ports and protocols reachable from the internet and gaps in segmentation. Red teaming checks whether the team detects and stops an adversary acting like an advanced group. An IEC 62443 audit assesses the division of the industrial network into zones and conduits.
Sources
- Cyberattacks on Ukraine increased by 70% in 2024 - Ukrainska Pravda (accessed: )
- Protect Against FrostyGoop ICS Malware Targeting Operational Technology - Dragos (accessed: )
- Russian hackers turn to AI as old tactics fail - The Record (accessed: )
- Russia's Shadow War Against the West - CSIS (accessed: )
- Ukraine IT Army hack bank Russia - Kyiv Independent (accessed: )
- Dark Web Activity: New Hacktivist Group Emerges - Cyble (accessed: )
- Ransomware Groups Demystified: CyberVolk Ransomware - Rapid7 (accessed: )
- Global crackdown hits pro-Russian cybercrime, 100+ systems taken down worldwide - Help Net Security (accessed: )
- NIS 2 Directive, Article 23: Reporting obligations - nis-2-directive.com (accessed: )
- NIS2 Directive - European Commission (accessed: )
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