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NoName057(16) - pro-Russian hacktivism at industrial scale

NoName057(16) - pro-Russian hacktivist group, DDoSia platform, 1500+ attacks on NATO. Tactics, techniques, and defense.

Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published 7 min read

NoName057hacktivismDDoSRussiaNATODDoSia
NoName057(16) - pro-Russian hacktivism at industrial scale
Contents
  1. Origins - a war that spawned a volunteer army
  2. Timeline of events
  3. Anatomy of DDoSia - crowdsourcing destruction
  4. Links to CARR and Z-Pentest
  5. Operation Eastwood - law enforcement response
  6. MITRE ATT&CK mapping
  7. How to protect yourself
  8. Sources

March 7, 2022, twelve days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a new account appears on Telegram. No logo, no manifesto - just a short post in Russian and a string of characters in the name: NoName057(16). On the first day, they publish a list of Ukrainian government websites that stopped responding. On the second - they add Polish and Lithuanian public services. On the third - Czech news portals. No one in the cybersecurity industry takes them seriously yet. That mistake will cost hundreds of organizations across NATO countries thousands of hours of downtime.

Over the course of three years, this group - with no fixed headquarters, no formal hierarchy - will carry out more than 3,700 attacks on unique targets in Europe and North America, build a crowdsourced DDoS platform with 4,000 volunteers, and become the most active pro-Russian hacktivist collective in the world.

Origins - a war that spawned a volunteer army

The beginning of NoName057(16) is inseparable from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its impact on the cybercrime ecosystem. When Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, cyberspace became a second front. Groups like the IT Army of Ukraine attacked Russian services. On the Russian side, the response came from hacktivist collectives - KillNet, Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), and NoName057(16).

According to findings by CISA and the FBI published in December 2025 (advisory AA25-343A), the Center for Internet Studies and Youth Network Monitoring (CISM) - an organization operating on behalf of the Kremlin - created NoName057(16) as an operational project. Senior CISM staff and developers designed and maintained a proprietary DDoS tool called DDoSia. These were not random activists at their keyboards. This was a project with institutional backing.

Timeline of events

Date Event
2022 (March) NoName057(16) declares its formation on Telegram; first attacks on Ukrainian and Polish websites
2022 (June) Launch of the DDoSia platform - initially a simple Python tool
2022 (autumn) Attacks on government services in Lithuania, Czechia, and Bulgaria following declarations of support for Ukraine
2023 (Q1) DDoSia 2.0 - the tool rewritten in Go, with versions for Windows, Linux, and macOS
2023 (June) Sekoia.io publishes a detailed analysis of DDoSia infrastructure; cryptocurrency payment mechanism exposed
2024 (October) Attacks on 13 local councils in the UK; 6 lose continuity of online services
2025 (January) Attacks on Italian ministries and critical infrastructure during President Zelensky’s visit to Rome
2025 (July) Operation Eastwood - Europol and Eurojust coordinate arrests across 12 countries
2025 (December) CISA, FBI, and NSA publish advisory AA25-343A warning about pro-Russian hacktivism

Anatomy of DDoSia - crowdsourcing destruction

How the platform works

DDoSia is not a classic botnet. It is a crowdsourced model - something like “Uber for DDoS attacks.” Any sympathizer can join. The process works as follows:

  1. Registration - a volunteer contacts a Telegram bot and receives a unique identifier
  2. Cryptocurrency wallet - the participant sets up a TON wallet (via the @CryptoBot bot on Telegram)
  3. Tool download - the bot sends a link to download the DDoSia executable (available for Windows, Linux, and macOS) along with a configuration file containing the participant’s ID
  4. Attack - the tool automatically retrieves a target list from the C2 server and generates HTTP/HTTPS traffic
  5. Reporting - the DDoSia client periodically sends statistics to the server (notably in plaintext, which allowed researchers to analyze the data)
  6. Compensation - participants generating the highest traffic volume appear on leaderboards and receive cryptocurrency payouts

The most active participant could receive up to 80,000 Russian rubles (approximately USD 800 in 2023). Europol estimates the platform gathered around 4,000 active participants recruited through pro-Russian channels, forums, and messaging groups.

Attack technique - more than brute-force flooding

DDoSia does not limit itself to simple packet flooding. The tool targets specific HTTP and HTTPS endpoints, generating requests that demand costly server-side processing - database lookups, page rendering, session handling. These are layer 7 (application) attacks, harder to filter than volumetric attacks at lower layers.

Recorded Future analysis (July 2025) found an average operational tempo of 50 unique targets per day. The most frequently attacked sectors are public administration, transport, and finance - always in countries that publicly expressed support for Ukraine.

NoName057(16) does not operate in isolation. According to the US Department of Justice, the group has ties to Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR) - a collective backed by GRU military unit 74455 (GTsST). In September 2024, the Z-Pentest group emerged, composed of members from both CARR and NoName057(16). While NoName057(16) specializes in DDoS attacks, Z-Pentest focused on OT system penetration - exploiting unsecured VNC connections to control devices in the water, energy, and food sectors.

This shift from denial-of-service attacks to physical manipulation of critical infrastructure represents a fundamental change in the hacktivist threat - which we cover in more detail in our article on DoS attacks on industrial infrastructure.

Operation Eastwood - law enforcement response

Between July 14 and 17, 2025, Europol and Eurojust coordinated simultaneous operations across twelve countries: Czechia, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United States. Support was provided by ENISA and authorities from Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Denmark, Latvia, Romania, and Ukraine.

The operation’s outcome: seizure of over 100 servers, two arrests (in France and Spain), seven arrest warrants, 24 searches, 13 individuals questioned, and five suspects placed on the EU most-wanted list.

The effect? A temporary disruption of operations. The group immediately published a statement on Telegram, downplaying law enforcement actions and declaring it would continue its attacks. Imperva analysis showed that DDoSia activity dropped for a few weeks before returning to previous levels using new infrastructure.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Technique ID Description in the context of NoName057(16)
Network Denial of Service T1498 Primary tactic - application-layer DDoS attacks (HTTP/HTTPS) on NATO targets
Application or System Exploitation T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service - targeting costly endpoints (search, forms)
Phishing T1566 Recruiting volunteers via Telegram using social engineering and financial incentives
Command and Control T1071 C2 servers distributing target lists and collecting attack statistics
Resource Hijacking T1496 Leveraging volunteers’ computing resources to generate attack traffic

How to protect yourself

Layer 7 DDoS attacks - particularly those carried out by thousands of distributed clients with real IP addresses - pose a challenge that a firewall alone cannot solve.

TIP

Multi-layered DDoS protection - deploy an anti-DDoS solution operating at both the network layer (L3/L4) and the application layer (L7). CDN services with WAF capabilities (e.g., Cloudflare, Akamai, Imperva) can absorb attack traffic before it reaches the server.

TIP

Rate limiting and geoblocking - configure per-IP request limits and consider restricting traffic from regions where you do not serve customers. DDoSia generates traffic primarily from IP addresses in Russia, CIS countries, and VPN networks.

TIP

Monitoring and alerting - establish baseline traffic patterns for critical endpoints. A sudden spike in requests to specific URLs (search, API, forms) is a typical sign of a DDoSia attack. Automated alerts enable rapid response.

TIP

Business continuity plan - prepare procedures for DDoS incidents: switching to a static page, communicating with users, escalating to the protection provider. Test this plan regularly.

TIP

Securing OT access - given NoName057(16)‘s links to Z-Pentest and attacks on critical infrastructure: disable direct VNC access from the internet to OT devices. All remote access should go through a VPN with multi-factor authentication.

Sources

  1. CISA Advisory AA25-343A: Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure
  2. Europol - Global Operation Targets NoName057(16) Pro-Russian Cybercrime Network
  3. Recorded Future - Inside DDoSia: NoName057(16)'s Pro-Russian DDoS Campaign Infrastructure
  4. Sekoia.io - NoName057(16)'s DDoSia Project: 2024 Updates and Behavioural Shifts
  5. Imperva - Operation Eastwood: Measuring the Real Impact on NoName057(16)
  6. DOJ - Justice Department Announces Actions Against Russian Cyber Criminal Hacking Groups
  7. Picus Security - How NoName057(16) Uses DDoSia to Attack NATO Targets

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