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DDoS Attacks on Industrial Infrastructure - Threats and Protection

DDoS attacks on OT/ICS systems - vectors, incidents (Killnet, NoName057), critical infrastructure protection, and NIS2 requirements.

Michał StępieńMichał Stępień
Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published Updated 11 min read

DDoSDoSOTICScritical infrastructureNIS2availability
DDoS Attacks on Industrial Infrastructure - Threats and Protection
Contents
  1. DoS and DDoS attacks in industrial networks
  2. Incidents - from theory to real losses
  3. DDoS by the numbers - the scale of the problem
  4. Why OT is particularly vulnerable to DoS attacks
  5. DoS attack scenarios on industrial infrastructure
  6. Protecting OT infrastructure from DDoS attacks
  7. NIS2 and DDoS resilience
  8. Where we help
  9. Legal basis
  10. Sources

When a WAN link or an operator panel stops working, the operator loses sight of the process and has to switch to local control. The December 9, 2025, advisory from CISA, the FBI, the NSA, and partner agencies shows that pro-Russian hacktivist groups break into operator panels (HMI) in water, energy, and food sectors. They include Cyber Army of Russia Reborn, Z-Pentest, NoName057(16), and Sector16. Most often they use a remote desktop (VNC) exposed to the internet with weak passwords. In some cases they ran DDoS attacks at the same time to make the break-in easier.

DoS and DDoS attacks in industrial networks

A DoS (Denial of Service) attack disrupts the availability of a system, service, or network. DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) is its distributed variant, where traffic is generated from multiple sources simultaneously. In IT networks, such an attack interrupts a service. In OT networks, it also interrupts the operator’s communication with the physical process.

Industrial automation systems rely on continuous communication. When a PLC (programmable logic controller) loses connectivity with an operator station, its reaction depends on its configuration: it may keep running on the last setpoints or, if configured that way, stop the process. In an energy system, loss of SCADA visibility at substations means the inability to remotely switch circuits. In a wastewater treatment plant, loss of communication with pH sensors leaves the operator without the data needed to control the process.

Four categories of availability attacks in OT

Category Mechanism Example in an industrial environment
Volumetric The attacker saturates the communication bandwidth with a huge amount of traffic. A packet flood on the WAN interface that connects SCADA to substations.
Protocol The attacker exhausts session resources on network devices. A SYN flood on a zone firewall or a full connection table on a managed switch.
Application The attacker overloads the logical layer of a service. A flood of Modbus TCP queries to a PLC on port 502 or excessive OPC UA requests.
Physical / RF The attacker disrupts wireless communication. Jamming of WirelessHART networks or disruption of LTE links to remote RTUs.

WARNING

The classic Modbus RTU/TCP protocol has no authentication or encryption. The Modbus Security variant combines it with TLS and uses port 802. A PLC without an allow list of IP addresses therefore has no mechanism that rejects an unauthorized request on port 502 at the protocol level.

Incidents - from theory to real losses

NERC 2019 - firewall reboots at a US power utility

According to the NERC report, an unauthenticated attacker exploited a known vulnerability in the web interface of perimeter firewalls. Firewalls at a control center and at several remote generation sites rebooted. This caused communication interruptions shorter than five minutes, spread over about 10 hours. Generation was not affected. The manufacturer had released a firmware update before the event. Sites with a redundant pair of firewalls (high-availability mode) kept their communications. Security Affairs, citing a US Department of Energy report, gives the event date as March 5, 2019. According to Energywire (E&E News), it was the first disruptive cyber event on record for the US power grid.

FrostyGoop 2024 - Modbus as a sabotage tool

In January 2024, the FrostyGoop malware sent Modbus TCP commands to ENCO controllers at a district heating company in Lviv. According to Dragos, the Modbus commands caused inaccurate measurements and malfunctions in the heating system. Some 600 residential buildings lost heating in sub-zero temperatures, and remediation took nearly two days. This was an attack on the integrity of data in the controllers whose result was a loss of service. The operator’s network was not segmented. The broader context of the conflict is described in the article on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on cybercrime.

NoName057(16) - the DDoSia platform

The group NoName057(16), active since March 2022, operates the DDoSia platform, which enables volunteers to jointly generate DDoS attacks on targets designated by the group’s operators. According to CISA, the group targets government and private-sector entities in NATO member states and other European countries that Russia views as hostile.

On July 15, 2025, an operation coordinated by Europol and Eurojust disrupted over 100 servers worldwide and ended with 7 international arrest warrants. According to a Cyble report from early 2026, the group quickly rebuilt its infrastructure.

Z-Pentest - intrusions into OT systems

The Z-Pentest group was formed in September 2024 from members of CARR and NoName057(16) and carries out intrusions into OT systems. According to CISA, it largely avoids DDoS attacks. It uses minimally secured VNC connections to reach the operator panels (HMI) of SCADA systems in the water and energy sectors.

DDoS by the numbers - the scale of the problem

A few numbers

Value What it means Source
47.1M In 2025 Cloudflare blocked 47.1 million DDoS attacks, 121% more than in 2024. Cloudflare, DDoS threat report 2025 Q4
31.4 Tbps The largest DDoS attack recorded in 2025 lasted 35 seconds and reached 31.4 Tbps. Cloudflare, DDoS threat report 2025 Q4
100+ The operation of 15 July 2025 against NoName057(16) disrupted more than 100 servers. Eurojust, 2025
+358% In the first quarter of 2025 the number of DDoS attacks was 358% higher than a year earlier. Cloudflare, DDoS threat report 2025 Q1

The Cloudflare data covers that company’s customers in all sectors. The number of mitigated DDoS attacks rose by 121% in 2025, more than doubling. In July 2024, Dragos also found some 46,000 internet-exposed industrial devices that communicate over Modbus.

Why OT is particularly vulnerable to DoS attacks

Industrial environments have characteristics that make them more sensitive to availability attacks than typical IT infrastructure:

  1. Timing requirements of communication - some industrial protocols run in real time and require predictable response times. A delay can then cause a timeout and a process stop.

  2. Lack of defensive mechanisms in protocols - classic Modbus TCP has no authentication or encryption, so the network around the controller has to provide the protection.

  3. Long device lifecycle - PLCs and RTUs (remote terminal units) operate for many years. Many of them do not support TLS, lack sufficient memory for an intrusion detection system (IDS), and cannot receive patches without stopping the process.

  4. Availability is priority number 1 - in IT, the order of priorities is confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA). In OT, the order is reversed: availability, integrity, confidentiality (AIC). Process availability is more important than data confidentiality, because its loss can endanger human lives.

  5. A single communication channel - a facility with one channel between SCADA and field devices loses visibility over the process when a DDoS attack clogs that channel.

DoS attack scenarios on industrial infrastructure

Scenario 1: Volumetric attack on the WAN channel

An attacker directs DDoS traffic at the WAN link connecting the control center to remote substations or pump stations. Operators lose SCADA visibility. If the substations run in autonomous mode, the processes continue. The risk emerges when manual intervention is needed and the operator cannot remotely switch circuits.

Scenario 2: Flood of requests in an industrial protocol

An attacker sends a flood of Modbus TCP requests (function code 0x03, read registers) to a PLC. If the controller serves these requests at the expense of communication with sensors and actuators, and a watchdog with an emergency stop is configured in it, the process will be stopped. This is a hypothetical scenario, because the reaction depends on the specific controller.

Scenario 3: DDoS accompanying an intrusion

According to CISA, pro-Russian hacktivist groups have in some cases run simultaneous DDoS attacks on the victim’s network to facilitate SCADA intrusions. CISA does not describe the mechanism. One possible hypothesis is that the DDoS attack engages the SOC (security operations center) team. Meanwhile, another part of the operation uses a minimally secured VNC connection to change HMI settings.

Scenario 4: Wireless communication disruption

In installations using WirelessHART or LTE communication (for example remote RTUs on pipelines), an attacker can jam the radio signal and prevent the transmission of measurement data. If procedures require closing a gas pipeline section when pressure data is missing, the loss of signal from the sensors can force such a closure.

Protecting OT infrastructure from DDoS attacks

Standard DDoS protection methods (traffic scrubbing centers, CDNs, request limiting in a web application firewall) primarily address IT infrastructure and web applications. In OT, the SCADA links and controllers need protection as well, taking into account industrial protocols and the priority of process availability.

Checklist - 12 steps to protect OT against availability attacks

  • Network segmentation - establishing zones and conduits in accordance with IEC 62443. Details: OT network segmentation
  • Exposure reduction - no OT device should be directly accessible from the internet. This applies particularly to Modbus (502), EtherNet/IP (44818), OPC UA (4840) ports, and VNC interfaces
  • Dedicated zone firewalls - firewalls at the IT/OT boundary with rules permitting only known protocols and addresses, plus deep packet inspection (DPI) of industrial protocols
  • Redundant communication channels - backup links (for example LTE as a backup for WAN links) with automatic failover, and different protocols and transmission media for critical connections
  • Packet rate limiting in the OT network - a limit on the number of packets per second allowed on PLC and RTU interfaces
  • Passive monitoring - intrusion detection systems (IDS) for OT (for example Tenable OT Security) monitoring network traffic anomalies without interfering with the process
  • Firmware updates - regular patching of firewalls and network devices in the DMZ. For OT devices that cannot be patched, compensating network controls must be applied
  • Configuration hardening - disabling unused ports and services on network devices, changing default passwords, disabling web interfaces on field devices
  • Business continuity plan - operational procedures in case of SCADA communication loss, including manual operation mode and alternative communication channels
  • Resilience testing - regular exercises simulating loss of OT system availability and a check that operators can switch to local control
  • VNC/RDP separation - remote access to OT systems exclusively through a dedicated zone with a jump server and multi-factor authentication (MFA), never directly from the internet. Details: ICS remote access
  • Cooperation with the link provider - agreeing on upstream DDoS filtering mechanisms (blackholing, traffic scrubbing) for the control center IP addresses

TIP

The first step is an inventory of OT devices visible from the internet. In July 2024, Dragos found some 46,000 such devices communicating over Modbus, so eliminating unnecessary exposure takes priority over buying DDoS protection tools.

NIS2 and DDoS resilience

The transposition deadline of the NIS2 Directive passed on October 17, 2024. Essential and important entities (including those in energy, transport, water, and manufacturing) must apply proportionate cybersecurity risk-management measures. Protecting the availability of SCADA links falls within these risk-management measures, although the directive does not name DDoS attacks:

Entity obligation Application to DDoS attacks
Risk analysis and security policies The entity assesses the risk of availability attacks on OT systems.
Incident handling The entity has procedures for responding to a DDoS attack, for escalation, and for communication.
Business continuity and crisis management The entity has an action plan for SCADA communication loss, including manual mode.
Supply chain security The entity checks the resilience of its telecommunications providers.
Incident reporting The entity sends an early warning within 24 hours, a notification within 72 hours, and a final report within one month of the notification.

NOTE

The entity selects measures proportionate to the risk. For a facility with a single WAN link to its SCADA system, an appropriate measure may be a redundant LTE link. For a large energy grid operator, an appropriate measure may be a traffic scrubbing service from the link provider.

Where we help

SEQRED helps critical infrastructure operators assess the resilience of OT systems to attacks during an OT security assessment. With a security architect, SEQRED also designs network segmentation according to IEC 62443 and a security architecture that accounts for availability attacks. You can reach us through the contact form.

Step / topic Where it is
Risk-management measures, risk analysis, incident handling, business continuity, supply chain Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Art. 21(1) and (2)(a)-(d)
Early warning, notification, final report Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Art. 23
Transposition deadline Directive (EU) 2022/2555, Art. 41(1)

Sources

  1. Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure (AA25-343A) - CISA (accessed: )
  2. DDoS threat report for 2025 Q1 - Cloudflare (accessed: )
  3. DDoS threat report for 2025 Q4 - Cloudflare (accessed: )
  4. Hacktivist group responsible for cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in Europe taken down - Eurojust (accessed: )
  5. NoName057(16) DDoSia project: 2024 updates and behavioural shifts - Sekoia (accessed: )
  6. Hacktivists Escalate Critical Infrastructure Attacks In 2025 - Cyble (accessed: )
  7. Risks Posed by Firewall Firmware Vulnerabilities - NERC (accessed: )
  8. DoS attack the caused disruption at US power utility exploited a known flaw - Security Affairs (accessed: )
  9. Novel ICS Malware Sabotaged Water-Heating Services in Ukraine - Dark Reading (accessed: )
  10. Modbus Specifications - Modbus Organization (accessed: )
  11. Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) - EUR-Lex (accessed: )

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