Cybersecurity
Russia's War on Ukraine and OT Systems in Europe - Attacks Since 2015 and the Safeguards They Call For
Attacks on power, district heating and HMI panels from 2015 to 2025: what the attackers did, how certain the attributions are and which OT safeguards to put in place.
Józef SulwińskiPublished Updated 14 min read

Contents
An operator of a district heating plant, a waterworks or a wind farm in Europe uses the same kinds of controllers and protocols that have been attacked in Ukraine since 2015. These methods have already reached Norway and Poland. An operator panel reachable from the internet with a factory password is enough for an outsider to change process setpoints.
The reports of CISA, CERT Polska, Dragos and ESET show that:
- in January 2024 more than 600 apartment buildings in Lviv lost heating for almost two days after Modbus commands were sent to heating controllers,
- pro-Russian hacktivist groups search the internet for HMI panels with a remote screen service (VNC) and log in with default or weak passwords,
- on 29 December 2025 an attacker damaged controllers at no fewer than 30 Polish wind and solar farms after entering through VPN without multi-factor authentication (MFA).
OT means systems that control a physical process, for example a substation, a heating network or a dam. The cybercrime ecosystem during the war is covered in a separate article on the impact of the conflict on cybercrime.
Attacks on control systems since 2015
In the attacks described, the attackers used paths that also exist in European installations: remote access, real or factory passwords and protocols that execute commands without checking the sender. According to the Ukrainian agency SSSCIP, Ukraine recorded 4,315 cyber incidents in 2024 and 2,541 a year earlier.
| Date and place | What happened | Lesson for an OT operator |
|---|---|---|
| December 2015, western Ukraine (BlackEnergy) | According to CISA, several people remotely opened breakers at three distribution companies over VPN connections. The companies believe the attackers had obtained real credentials beforehand. About 225,000 customers lost power. | MFA and approval of every remote session should be required, because a login with a real password looks like normal operator work. |
| December 2016, Kyiv (Industroyer) | According to ESET, the malware controlled substation breakers through four power-sector protocols, including IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850. Part of Kyiv was without power for an hour. | Industrial protocol commands should be monitored, because the malware issues them exactly as the SCADA system does. |
| April 2022, Ukraine (Industroyer2) | According to ESET, the attackers prepared an attack on an energy provider’s high-voltage substations for 8 April. Next to the control malware they prepared data-wiping programs, known as wipers. | Configuration backups and a recovery plan should be in place, because the attackers also destroy the computers needed for repair. |
| January 2024, Lviv (FrostyGoop) | According to Dragos, the attackers possibly entered through a vulnerable internet-facing router, and the network was not adequately segmented. Modbus TCP commands to the heating controllers caused inaccurate measurements and malfunctions. | Controllers should be separated from edge devices by zones, because the router and the controllers sat in one poorly segmented network. |
| April 2025, Bremanger, Norway | According to Reuters, the attackers took control of a dam and opened a flood gate for four hours. Water flowed at 500 litres per second, and nobody was hurt. | An alarm should be set for remote changes to the state of equipment, because the flood gate stayed open for four hours before the attack was detected. |
| 2025, USA and other countries | According to CISA, pro-Russian groups logged in to HMI panels over VNC, changed setpoints, disabled alarms and stopped devices. The most common result was a temporary loss of view of the process. | Remote accounts should be limited to viewing, with an alarm on setpoint changes, because the groups changed settings from the operator screen. |
| 29 December 2025, Poland (attack on Polish energy) | According to CERT Polska, the attacker entered through VPN interfaces without MFA and used factory accounts on telecontrol units (RTUs). The farms lost communication with the distribution system operators, while electricity generation continued. | Factory passwords should be changed and firmware verification enabled on controllers, because these two gaps allowed the devices to be destroyed. |
Who is behind the attacks and how certain the attributions are
Attribution, meaning assigning an attack to a specific group, differs between sources. It should be given with the level of confidence stated by the source and with the name of the institution that made it. Why: safeguards chosen for a wrongly named attacker protect against the wrong methods.
| Attack | Who attributes it to whom | Level of confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Ukraine, 2015 | In a 2026 article, ESET describes this attack as orchestrated by the Sandworm group. | ESET gives no level of confidence in this description. |
| Industroyer2, 2022 | ESET attributes the attack to the Sandworm group. | ESET states high confidence. |
| Lviv, 2024 | According to TechCrunch, Dragos noted connections to Moscow-based IP addresses. The attack remains unattributed to any group or state. | Dragos does not publish attributions, in line with its policy. |
| Bremanger, 2025 | According to Reuters, the head of the Norwegian counter-intelligence service PST attributed the attack to Russian hackers and spoke of the activity of pro-Russian cyber actors. | Reuters names no group. |
| HMI panels, 2025 | CISA names the groups CARR, Z-Pentest, NoName057(16) and Sector16. According to CISA, unit 74455 of the Russian military intelligence GRU likely supported the creation of CARR. | CISA uses the word “likely” and, according to CISA, NoName057(16) was created as a covert project of the organisation CISM, established on behalf of the Kremlin. Sector16 may have received indirect support from the Russian government. |
| Poland, 2025 | ESET attributes the attack to the Sandworm group. CERT Polska found that the attacker’s infrastructure largely overlaps with that of the Static Tundra cluster, also known as Berserk Bear and Dragonfly. | ESET states medium confidence. CERT Polska rates the similarity to Sandworm tools as too low and does not determine whether that group took part. CISA names no actor. |
Hacktivists at HMI panels
The groups in the CISA advisory attack anyone who has exposed a panel to the internet, regardless of sector and country. According to CISA, they look for VNC services on port 5900 and neighbouring ports up to 5910, then break default, weak or empty passwords. Once logged in, they change setpoints and device names, disable alarms and lock operators out.
CISA reports that the most common result is a temporary loss of view, which requires manual operation of the installation. The costs are downtime, the work of a controller programmer and network remediation. CISA also warns that these groups regularly make false or exaggerated claims about their attacks.
A group’s claim should be checked against the logs of the company’s own systems before the company announces an incident. Why: an exaggerated claim is meant to attract attention, and the real scope can only be established from traces in the systems.
On 15 July 2025, 12 countries together with Eurojust and Europol took action against the NoName057(16) group. According to Eurojust, more than 100 servers were disrupted and seven international arrest warrants were issued. The group ran DDoS attacks, that is floods of requests, against targets including power suppliers and public transport. HMI panels reachable from the internet remain just as reachable for the next group after such an action.
Poland as an example of an attack on many sites at once
According to CERT Polska, on 29 December 2025 the same attacker hit at least 30 wind and solar farms, a large combined heat and power (CHP) plant and a private manufacturing company. The CHP plant supplies heat to almost half a million customers. CERT Polska stresses that the attack hit IT systems and OT devices at the same time, which publicly described incidents rarely show.
- At every site, the VPN interface of the firewall was reachable from the internet and allowed logins without MFA. According to CERT Polska, the industry often uses the same accounts and passwords across many sites.
- The site networks had separate VLAN subnets. The attacker, however, had firewall administrator privileges and could change its configuration.
- The RTUs, protection relays, HMI computers and serial device servers had factory accounts. The attacker uploaded corrupted firmware to the RTUs, deleted files and reset devices to factory settings.
- Newer firmware versions of the RTUs allowed verification of the uploaded file’s signature once this feature was switched on manually. None of the devices that supported it had it enabled.
- At the CHP plant, the endpoint detection system on workstations (EDR) stopped the data-wiping program on more than 100 computers where it had already started.
The course of the attack is described in the article on the attack on Polish energy, and the consequences for power grid operators in the article on cyber threats to the power sector.
What to do
Step 1. HMI panels, controller management interfaces and VNC services should be removed from the internet.
CISA recommends disconnecting OT devices from the public internet and finding assets that someone exposed unintentionally. Exposure should be checked from the outside, also for systems set up by integrators and service technicians. Why: the groups in the CISA advisory search the internet for exactly these services.
Step 2. Phishing-resistant MFA should be required for every remote access, and access should be enabled only for the duration of the work.
Phishing-resistant MFA is a method in which the user does not copy a code, for example a hardware key. Why: in Poland, VPN without MFA opened the way to every site, and in 2015 the attackers worked with real passwords. The principles are described in the article on remote access to ICS.
Step 3. Factory passwords should be changed, and every site should have its own passwords.
Factory accounts and services that nobody uses, for example FTP on protection relays, should be disabled. The obligation to change passwords at every deployment should be written into contracts with integrators, as CISA recommends. Why: one password used at many sites gives the attacker access to all of them.
Step 4. Edge devices should be updated, and devices without vendor patches should be replaced.
An edge device is a firewall, router or VPN gateway where the site network meets the internet. Why: CISA points to vulnerable edge devices as an entry route, and in Lviv and in Poland they were the entry point.
Step 5. The network should be divided into zones and conduits, and the OT network should be separated from IT by a DMZ.
A zone is a group of assets with common security requirements, and a conduit is a controlled connection between zones. According to IEC 62443-3-2, the organisation groups assets into zones based on a risk assessment, and the target security level of a zone (SL-T) follows from that assessment. Administrative access to firewalls on zone boundaries should be protected as strictly as access to controllers. Why: in Poland, an attacker with firewall administrator privileges could bypass the subnet separation. Zone design is described in the article on OT network segmentation.
Step 6. Remote accounts should be limited to viewing, and viewing should be separated from control.
CISA recommends enabling control system features that separate view and control functions, and requiring authentication before any change to a controller’s state, logic or files. Why: the hacktivists changed setpoints from an operator screen to which they had full access.
Step 7. Traffic in the OT network and setpoint ranges should be monitored.
Monitoring should detect unusual logins, unexpected protocols and commands that change a controller’s operating mode or program. Setpoint values should be compared with the permitted range, with an alarm on deviation. Why: in the attacks CISA describes, the attackers changed setpoints and disabled alarms on HMI screens, so those changes must be detected.
Step 8. Manual operation and device recovery should be prepared.
Backups of the logic, configuration and firmware of controllers and HMI panels should be kept outside the OT network, and their restoration should be tested regularly. Where a controller supports firmware verification, it should be enabled. Why: according to CISA, OT devices without firmware verification can be permanently damaged, and the plan must account for devices that have stopped working.
Step 9. Own logs should be compared with the indicators from the CERT Polska report, and incidents should be reported to the competent CSIRT.
Indicators of compromise (IoCs) are addresses, files and other traces left by the attacker. CERT Polska recommends checking logs for the indicators and techniques from the report and reporting an incident when they are found. Why: attackers reuse the same infrastructure in many attacks, so a trace from Poland may appear in another country.
Checklist
- No OT device, HMI panel or VNC service is reachable from the internet, and exposure is checked regularly from the outside.
- Every remote access requires phishing-resistant MFA and works only in an approved time window.
- Factory passwords have been changed, every site has its own passwords, and unused accounts and factory services are disabled.
- Contracts with integrators require passwords to be changed at every deployment.
- Edge devices run current firmware, and devices without vendor support have been replaced.
- The network is divided into zones based on a risk assessment, and a DMZ separates the OT network from IT.
- Remote accounts have view-only rights wherever changes are not needed.
- Monitoring detects unusual logins, changes to controller operating modes and setpoints outside the range.
- Backups of device logic, configuration and firmware are kept outside the OT network and checked by restoration.
- Firmware verification is enabled on controllers that support it.
- The team has a written procedure for manual operation and practises it.
- Hacktivist claims are checked against logs before the company announces an incident.
Where we help
During an OT security assessment, we check which of the paths described exist in a specific installation: panels and VPN reachable from the internet, factory passwords, zone separation and device backups. The result is a list of gaps with remediation priorities. OT network monitoring helps detect commands that change setpoints and controller operating modes. You are welcome to reach us through the contact form.
Technical basis
| Step / topic | Where it is |
|---|---|
| The 2015 attack, recommendations to limit remote access | CISA, IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01 |
| Industroyer and Industroyer2, attribution of Industroyer2 | ESET, 12.06.2017 and 12.04.2022 |
| FrostyGoop and the Lviv attack | Dragos, FrostyGoop post; TechCrunch, 23.07.2024 |
| The Bremanger attack | Reuters, 13.08.2025 |
| Hacktivists at HMI panels, steps 1, 6 and 7 | CISA, AA25-343A |
| Action against NoName057(16) | Eurojust, 16.07.2025 |
| The attack in Poland, attribution, step 9 | CERT Polska, report of 30.01.2026; ESET, 23.01.2026 |
| Steps 3, 4 and 8 | CISA, alert of 10.02.2026 |
| Steps 1, 2, 5 and 8 | CISA, FBI, EPA, DOE, Primary Mitigations (05.2025) |
| Step 5, zones based on risk assessment and SL-T | IEC 62443-3-2:2020, ZCR 3.1 and ZCR 5.6 |
Related articles
- Impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the cybercrime ecosystem - criminal groups, hacktivism and the state
- Attack on Polish energy in December 2025 - the course of the incident according to the CERT Polska report
- Cyber threats to the power sector - attacks on power grids and safeguards
- Remote access to ICS - principles of secure remote access to OT
Sources
- CISA - Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) - CISA (accessed: )
- ESET - Industroyer: Biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet (12.06.2017) - ESET (accessed: )
- ESET - Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded (12.04.2022) - ESET (accessed: )
- Dragos - Protect Against FrostyGoop ICS Malware Targeting Operational Technology - Dragos (accessed: )
- TechCrunch - Hackers shut down heating in Ukrainian city with malware, researchers say (23.07.2024) - TechCrunch (accessed: )
- Reuters (The Star) - Norway spy chief blames Russian hackers for dam sabotage in April (13.08.2025) - Reuters (accessed: )
- CISA AA25-343A - Pro-Russia Hacktivists Conduct Opportunistic Attacks Against US and Global Critical Infrastructure (9.12.2025, revised 18.12.2025) - CISA (accessed: )
- Eurojust - Hacktivist group responsible for cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in Europe taken down (16.07.2025) - Eurojust (accessed: )
- CERT Polska - Energy sector incident report, 29 December 2025 (30.01.2026) - CERT Polska (accessed: )
- CERT Polska - Energy Sector Incident Report, 29 December 2025 (PDF) - CERT Polska (accessed: )
- CISA - Poland Energy Sector Cyber Incident Highlights OT and ICS Security Gaps (10.02.2026) - CISA (accessed: )
- ESET Research - Sandworm behind cyberattack on Poland's power grid in late 2025 (23.01.2026) - ESET (accessed: )
- CISA, FBI, EPA, DOE - Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology (6.05.2025) - CISA (accessed: )
- Ukrainska Pravda - Cyberattacks on Ukraine increased by 70% in 2024 (9.01.2025) - Ukrainska Pravda (accessed: )
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