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Industroyer2 - the unfinished attack on Ukraine's power grid

Industroyer2 (2022) - Sandworm malware targeting IEC 104, attempted attack on Ukrenergo neutralized by CERT-UA and ESET.

Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published 8 min read

Industroyer2SandwormIEC 104Ukrainepower gridOT malware
Industroyer2 - the unfinished attack on Ukraine's power grid
Contents
  1. Sandworm returns to Ukraine
  2. Attack timeline
  3. Anatomy of Industroyer2 - simplicity as a deliberate choice
  4. Five wipers - destroying evidence and infrastructure
  5. MITRE ATT&CK - technique mapping (S1072)
  6. Why the attack failed
  7. How to protect yourself
  8. Summary
  9. Sources

April 8, 2022, 16:10 UTC. Somewhere inside a Ukrainian high-voltage substation operated by Ukrenergo - the national transmission system operator - a Windows scheduled task attempts to launch a file named 108_100.exe. A small program, just 37 kilobytes. Had it worked as its creators intended, it would have sent a sequence of commands over the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol to substation automation devices, opening circuit breakers at the high-voltage substation. It is the sixth week of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Missiles are striking energy infrastructure. But this attack is meant to come from cyberspace.

The file never executes. CERT-UA analysts and ESET researchers detected it earlier. Industroyer2 - the successor to the first-ever malware designed to attack power grids - is neutralized before it can issue a single command.

Sandworm returns to Ukraine

The Sandworm group (also known as Unit 74455 GRU, Voodoo Bear, IRIDIUM) is not an anonymous hacker collective. It is a unit of Russian military intelligence, six of whose officers were indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2020. Their track record includes some of the most serious cyberattacks in history - from BlackEnergy in 2015, through NotPetya (USD 10 billion in global damages), to the sabotage of the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang.

In the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Sandworm received a new mission - to repeat the success of December 2016, when Industroyer cut off one-fifth of Kyiv from power. This time the target was more ambitious: a high-voltage transmission substation, not a distribution substation. Striking the transmission grid could have cut power to entire regions.

Attack timeline

Date Event
February 2022 Sandworm gains access to Ukrenergo’s IT network (exact initial vector undisclosed)
March 2022 Lateral movement across the network - attackers map the OT architecture and compromise the domain controller
March 23, 2022 Industroyer2 binary (108_100.exe) compiled with hardcoded IP addresses of substation devices
Early April Deployment of CaddyWiper, ORCSHRED, SOLOSHRED, and AWFULSHRED wipers on Windows, Linux, and Solaris systems
April 8, 14:58 UTC Scheduled execution of AWFULSHRED wiper on Linux systems (cron job)
April 8, 16:10 UTC Scheduled execution of Industroyer2 - detected and blocked by CERT-UA/ESET
April 12, 2022 ESET publishes technical analysis; CERT-UA issues alert UA-2022-002

Anatomy of Industroyer2 - simplicity as a deliberate choice

The original Industroyer from 2016 was an elaborate framework with four modules attacking different industrial protocols: IEC 104, IEC 101, IEC 61850, and OPC DA. It communicated with a C2 server through the Tor network. It was a universal tool - capable of attacking virtually any power substation in Europe.

Industroyer2 went in the opposite direction. It contained only the IEC 60870-5-104 module - the same protocol that had been the most effective component of the original. The configuration was hardcoded into the binary: RTU IP addresses, ASDU (Application Service Data Unit) numbers, IOA (Information Object Address) ranges, and the command sequences to send. There was no C2 server, no encrypted return communication, no dynamic configuration.

This was not a step backward. It was an operational choice. Sandworm needed a tool that would work against one specific target - a high-voltage substation serving a particular region. By compiling malware with hardcoded parameters, they eliminated the risk of C2 communication being detected and minimized their network footprint. Each deployment required a separate compilation, but in wartime conditions, effectiveness mattered more than versatility.

The attack mechanism was straightforward: Industroyer2 connected to RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) at the specified addresses and sent valid IEC 104 commands - instructions to open circuit breakers. From the perspective of substation devices, these commands were indistinguishable from legitimate operator commands. The IEC 104 protocol does not provide sender authentication - any host with network access can send control commands.

Five wipers - destroying evidence and infrastructure

Industroyer2 did not act alone. Sandworm deployed five destructive programs in parallel, spanning three operating systems:

CaddyWiper (Windows) - recursively overwrote files with zeros, starting from the C:\Users directory, then moving through drives D-Z. Finally, it zeroed the MBR of the first ten physical disks. Launched via GPO (Group Policy Object) from the domain controller.

ORCSHRED (Linux) - a worm component spreading across Linux systems in the OT network. Its purpose was to deliver and execute AWFULSHRED on every reachable host.

SOLOSHRED (Solaris) - a wiper dedicated to Solaris systems, still present in many energy installations as platforms for legacy SCADA systems.

AWFULSHRED (Linux) - a Bash script destroying data, scheduled for execution by ORCSHRED as a cron job on April 8 at 14:58 UTC - more than an hour before the planned launch of Industroyer2.

The sequence was deliberate: first, wipers destroy IT systems and workstations in the OT network, hampering defender response. Then Industroyer2 sends control commands to substation devices, causing the power outage. After the attack, the lack of functional systems prevents rapid restoration of SCADA control.

MITRE ATT&CK - technique mapping (S1072)

Industroyer2 is cataloged in the MITRE ATT&CK database as S1072. Key ICS techniques are listed below:

Technique ID Description in the context of Industroyer2
Unauthorized Command Message T0855 Sending IEC 104 commands (opening circuit breakers) without operator authorization
Remote Services T0886 Using remote services to move between IT and OT segments
Manipulation of Control T0831 Changing circuit breaker states at the high-voltage substation
Data Destruction T0809 CaddyWiper, ORCSHRED, SOLOSHRED, AWFULSHRED - data destruction on Windows, Linux, Solaris
Scheduled Task/Job T0803 Malware execution via Windows scheduled task (16:10 UTC) and cron (14:58 UTC)

More on the MITRE ATT&CK framework and its application in OT threat analysis - in our MITRE ATT&CK guide.

Why the attack failed

The defenders’ success resulted from several factors. CERT-UA had been operating at heightened readiness since the start of the invasion, monitoring critical infrastructure for signs of compromise. Cooperation with ESET - which had been studying Sandworm activity in Ukraine for years - enabled rapid identification of the malware. The key was detecting Industroyer2 before its scheduled execution, which made it possible to neutralize it without having to respond to an active incident.

It is worth noting: the attack was not stopped by technological safeguards built into the IEC 104 protocol (which do not exist) or by OT network isolation (which had been breached). The human factor made the difference - the competence of the response teams and their ability to collaborate under pressure.

How to protect yourself

1. OT network segmentation and monitoring

Industroyer2 was able to communicate with RTUs because the attackers gained access to the OT network segment. Proper OT network segmentation with dedicated zones and conduits - following the defense-in-depth model - makes lateral movement more difficult.

TIP

Deploy an IDS dedicated to industrial protocols that monitors IEC 104 traffic for control commands sent from unauthorized hosts. Every breaker open/close command from an unknown IP address should trigger an alert.

2. Domain controller protection

Sandworm used a compromised domain controller to distribute CaddyWiper via GPO. A domain controller with access to the OT network is one of the most valuable targets for an attacker.

TIP

Use dedicated domain controllers for the OT environment, separated from the corporate domain. Monitor the creation of new GPOs and scheduled tasks - this is a typical wiper distribution mechanism.

3. Operating system diversity is not a defense

Deploying wipers across three platforms (Windows, Linux, Solaris) shows that Sandworm prepared for the heterogeneous environment typical of the energy sector. Securing Windows alone is not enough - all systems must be covered by monitoring.

TIP

Ensure threat detection capability across all platforms present in the OT environment. Regularly audit cron jobs on Linux/Solaris systems for unauthorized entries.

4. Manual procedures and team readiness

Ukrainian operators have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to restore power in manual mode. This capability - switching to local control without the SCADA system - is critical when digital systems have been destroyed by wipers.

TIP

Regularly test manual restoration procedures. Conduct incident response exercises covering scenarios of simultaneous attacks on IT and OT systems.

Summary

Industroyer2 confirmed what analysts had long suspected - the Industroyer codebase is actively developed by Sandworm and represents an ongoing threat to the energy sector. Simplifying the architecture - from four protocols to one - was not a sign of weakness but a pragmatic adaptation to operational conditions. In wartime, precision matters more than versatility.

At the same time, the Industroyer2 case carries a positive message: well-prepared defense teams, supported by private-sector experts, can detect and neutralize even advanced attacks on critical infrastructure. The preconditions, however, are constant vigilance, appropriate monitoring tools, and well-practiced response procedures.

Sources

  1. MITRE ATT&CK - Industroyer2 S1072
  2. MITRE ATT&CK - Industroyer S0604
  3. ESET - Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded (2022)
  4. Claroty Team82 - Industroyer2 Variant Analysis
  5. Securonix - Industroyer2/CaddyWiper Detailed Analysis
  6. CISA - CrashOverride Malware Alert
  7. SecurityWeek - Energy Provider in Ukraine Targeted With Industroyer2

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