OT Cybersecurity
Cyber threats to the power sector - from BlackEnergy to the attack on Polish renewable farms
How attackers have targeted power grids since 2015, how they got in and how to protect substations, RTUs and remote access. Obligations under NIS2.
Józef SulwińskiPublished Updated 12 min read

Contents
An operator of a wind farm or a distribution company runs dozens of unstaffed substations that it manages remotely. One password used at every site and a VPN without a second login factor are enough for an outsider to destroy controllers at dozens of substations in a single day. Every destroyed device then has to be restored on site, at a substation that someone has to drive to.
The reports of CISA, CERT Polska and ESET show that:
- in 2015 in Ukraine, attackers opened breakers over VPN with real credentials, and about 225,000 customers lost power,
- in 2025 in Poland, an attacker entered the grid connection substations of renewable farms through VPN without multi-factor authentication (MFA) and used factory accounts on the controllers,
- CISA recommends enabling firmware verification on OT devices, because devices without it can be permanently damaged.
Ten years of attacks on power grids
| Year | Incident | What the attackers did | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Three Ukrainian distribution companies (BlackEnergy) | According to CISA, several people remotely opened breakers over VPN. The attackers corrupted the firmware of serial-to-Ethernet devices at substations and scheduled disconnects of server uninterruptible power supplies (UPS). | About 225,000 customers lost power according to CISA, and around 230,000 people according to ESET. |
| 2016 | A substation in Kyiv (Industroyer) | According to ESET, the malware controlled breakers through IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850 and OPC DA. A separate module exploited vulnerability CVE-2015-5374 to make protection relays unresponsive. | Part of Kyiv was without power for an hour. |
| 2022 | A Ukrainian energy provider (Industroyer2) | According to ESET, the attackers prepared an attack on high-voltage substations over IEC 60870-5-104 for 8 April, together with data-wiping programs known as wipers. | ESET describes its work with the Ukrainian CERT-UA to protect this network, with no information about a supply interruption. |
| 2024 | The municipal heating company in Lviv (FrostyGoop) | According to Dragos, the attackers possibly entered through an internet-facing router and sent Modbus TCP commands to the heating controllers. | Customers were without heating for two days. |
| 2024 | Volt Typhoon in US infrastructure networks (Volt Typhoon) | According to CISA, the group entered through edge devices, collected diagrams and documentation of OT equipment and prepared to move from IT networks to OT. | CISA describes access maintained in some networks for at least five years. |
| 2025 | More than 30 Polish renewable farms (attack on Polish energy) | According to CERT Polska, the attacker uploaded corrupted firmware to the RTUs, deleted files on protection relays and reset serial device servers to factory settings. | The farms lost communication with the distribution system operators and remote control. Electricity generation continued. |
An RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) is a telecontrol device that reports the state of a substation to the control centre and executes its commands. A protection relay (IED) detects faults and disconnects the damaged part of the grid.
How the attackers got in and what they destroyed
Three paths recur in the attacks described: remote access, real or factory passwords and devices that accept commands without verification. Safeguards should be designed to close each of these paths separately.
- Remote access. In 2015 the attackers used VPN and existing administration tools. In 2025, at every Polish grid connection substation, the VPN interface of the firewall was reachable from the internet and allowed logins without MFA.
- Credentials. According to CERT Polska, the industry often uses the same accounts and passwords across many sites. In Poland, the RTUs, protection relays, HMI computers and serial device servers had factory accounts.
- Devices without verification. Newer firmware versions of the RTUs in Poland allowed verification of the uploaded file’s signature once this feature was switched on manually. None of the devices that supported it had it enabled.
- Hindering recovery. In 2015 the attackers erased files and corrupted the boot sector of disks and serial-to-Ethernet devices. In 2025 they reset firewalls to factory settings and changed the password and IP address of the serial device servers.
CERT Polska notes that distribution system operators in Poland usually require communication with their SCADA system to pass over serial links using DNP3 or IEC 101. According to CERT Polska, this approach reduces the risk that a compromised substation is used to attack the operator’s network.
Who is behind the attacks
Attribution should be given with the level of confidence stated by the source. Why: sources differ in their assessment of the same attacks, and safeguards depend on the attacker’s methods more than on its name.
- ESET attributes the 2015 attack to the Sandworm group in a 2026 article, without a level of confidence, and Industroyer2 to the same group with high confidence.
- CISA attributes Volt Typhoon to PRC state-sponsored actors.
- Dragos does not attribute the Lviv attack to any group or state.
- ESET attributes the attack in Poland to the Sandworm group with medium confidence. CERT Polska found that the attacker’s infrastructure largely overlaps with that of the Static Tundra cluster, also known as Berserk Bear and Dragonfly. CERT Polska rates the similarity of the DynoWiper program to Sandworm tools as too low and does not determine whether that group took part. CISA names no actor.
How to protect substations and remote access
Principle 1. VPN interfaces without MFA and management interfaces of OT devices should be removed from the internet.
CISA recommends disconnecting OT devices from the public internet and running remote access over VPN with phishing-resistant MFA, that is without codes copied by hand. Why: in Poland, an open VPN without MFA was the way into every attacked substation. The principles are described in the article on remote access to ICS.
Principle 2. Every site should have its own accounts and passwords.
A vendor’s service account should be assigned to a person and to a site. One password should not be used at all substations. Why: a compromised account used at many sites opens all of them to the attacker at once.
Principle 3. Factory passwords should be changed, and accounts and services that nobody uses should be disabled.
This applies to RTUs, protection relays, HMI computers and serial device servers. The FTP service on protection relays should be disabled if operation does not require it. Why: according to CERT Polska, a deployment following the manufacturer’s recommendations would have disabled the factory FTP account on the attacked relays.
The obligation to change passwords at every deployment should be written into contracts with integrators and OT suppliers, as CISA recommends.
Principle 4. Edge devices should be updated, and devices without vendor support should be replaced.
An edge device is a firewall, router or VPN gateway where the substation network meets the internet or the operator’s network. Why: according to Dragos, CISA and CERT Polska, edge devices were the probable or confirmed entry point in Lviv, in the Volt Typhoon attacks and in Poland.
Principle 5. Firmware verification should be enabled on controllers that support it.
Verification checks the digital signature of a file before it is uploaded to the device. If an update to a version with verification is not possible at once, the incident response plan must account for devices that have stopped working. Why: according to CISA, OT devices without firmware verification can be permanently damaged.
Principle 6. The network should be divided into zones and conduits, and the OT network should be separated from IT by a DMZ.
A zone is a group of assets with common security requirements, and a conduit is a controlled connection between zones. According to IEC 62443-3-2, the organisation groups assets into zones based on a risk assessment, and the target security level of a zone (SL-T) follows from that assessment. IEC 62443-3-3 gives a DMZ as an example of zone boundary protection. Why: in Lviv, the router and the controllers sat in a poorly segmented network. Zone design is described in the article on OT network segmentation.
Administrative access to firewalls on zone boundaries should be protected as strictly as access to controllers. Why: in Poland, an attacker with firewall administrator privileges could bypass the subnet separation.
Principle 7. Connections into the OT network should be monitored, and controller logic should be compared with a baseline.
CISA recommends monitoring all connections into OT networks, detecting attempts to change controllers and checking controller logic against an approved version. Monitoring should recognise power-sector protocol commands, for example opening a breaker. Why: Industroyer issued commands over the same protocols as the SCADA system.
Workstations and servers at OT sites should run an endpoint detection system (EDR). Why: at the Polish CHP plant, EDR stopped the data-wiping program on more than 100 computers where it had already started.
Principle 8. OT network documentation should be protected.
Network diagrams, address lists and device documentation should be stored with restricted access, and downloads should be logged. Why: according to CISA, Volt Typhoon collected diagrams and documentation of OT equipment that make a later attack easier.
Principle 9. Manual operation and substation recovery should be prepared.
Backups of the configuration and firmware of RTUs, protection relays, firewalls and serial device servers should be kept outside the OT network. The plan should include spare devices, a contact for the manufacturer’s service and the order in which substations are restored. CISA recommends regularly testing manual operation and recovery plans. Why: in 2015 and 2025 the attackers deliberately destroyed the devices needed to restore operation.
Principle 10. Events with an unclear cause should also be reported to the CSIRT.
The report goes to the competent CSIRT, the incident response team. CERT Polska recommends comparing logs with the indicators from its report and reporting an incident when they are found. Why: a CSIRT sees events at many companies and can recognise an attack that a single site takes for a failure.
Obligations under NIS2
An energy company in a sector covered by NIS2 must manage risks to its IT and OT systems and report significant incidents within short deadlines. Under NIS2, large entities in the sectors of Annex I, including electricity, are essential entities, and medium-sized ones are important entities. Entities in the sectors of Annex II are also important entities.
- The entity must have, among other things, incident handling procedures, business continuity plans, supply chain security rules and procedures to assess the effectiveness of security measures.
- The entity uses MFA where appropriate.
- After a significant incident, the entity sends an early warning within 24 hours, a notification within 72 hours and a final report no later than one month after the notification.
Each Member State transposes NIS2 into its own law. In Poland, the amended national cybersecurity law that transposes NIS2 has applied since 3 April 2026. In Germany, the act transposing NIS2 (NIS2UmsuCG) was promulgated on 5 December 2025. A company follows the registration and reporting rules of the country where it operates.
Checklist
- No VPN interface or OT device management interface is reachable from the internet without MFA.
- Every site has its own accounts and passwords, and vendor accounts are assigned to people.
- Factory passwords on RTUs, protection relays, HMIs and serial device servers have been changed.
- Unused accounts and factory services, for example FTP, are disabled.
- Contracts with integrators require passwords to be changed at every deployment.
- Edge devices run current firmware, and devices without support have been replaced.
- Firmware verification is enabled on controllers that support it.
- The network is divided into zones based on a risk assessment, and a DMZ separates the OT network from IT.
- Monitoring covers connections into the OT network, power-sector protocol commands and changes to controllers.
- OT network documentation has restricted access and a download log.
- Backups of device configuration and firmware are kept outside the OT network, and substation recovery has been practised.
- The incident reporting procedure meets the deadlines of 24 hours, 72 hours and one month.
Where we help
During an OT security assessment, we check at substations and in the control centre which of the paths described are open: VPN without MFA, factory passwords, zone separation and device backups. Penetration testing shows whether the RTUs can be reached from the internet or from the corporate network. The result is a list of gaps with remediation priorities, and you are welcome to reach us through the contact form.
Legal and technical basis
| Topic | Where it is |
|---|---|
| The 2015 attack | CISA, IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01 |
| Industroyer and Industroyer2 | ESET, 12.06.2017 and 12.04.2022 |
| FrostyGoop | Dragos, FrostyGoop post |
| Volt Typhoon, principles 7 and 8 | CISA, AA24-038A |
| The attack in Poland, substation design, attribution, principles 2, 3 and 10 | CERT Polska, report of 30.01.2026; ESET, 23.01.2026 |
| Principles 3, 4 and 5 | CISA, alert of 10.02.2026 |
| Principles 1, 6 and 9 | CISA, FBI, EPA, DOE, Primary Mitigations (05.2025) |
| Principle 6, zones based on risk assessment, SL-T, DMZ | IEC 62443-3-2:2020, ZCR 3.1 and ZCR 5.6; IEC 62443-3-3, SR 5.2 |
| Essential and important entities | NIS2, Article 3(1)(a) and Article 3(2), Annex I |
| Risk-management measures, MFA | NIS2, Article 21(2) |
| Reporting deadlines | NIS2, Article 23(4) |
| Transposition in Member States | Poland: amended national cybersecurity law, in force from 3.04.2026; Germany: NIS2UmsuCG, BGBl. I No. 301 of 5.12.2025 |
Related articles
- Attack on Polish energy in December 2025 - the course of the incident according to the CERT Polska report
- Russia’s war on Ukraine and OT systems in Europe - attacks on control systems since 2015 and attributions
- Remote access to ICS - principles of secure remote access to OT
- OT network segmentation - dividing the network into zones and conduits
Sources
- CISA - Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) - CISA (accessed: )
- ESET - Industroyer: Biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet (12.06.2017) - ESET (accessed: )
- ESET - Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded (12.04.2022) - ESET (accessed: )
- Dragos - Protect Against FrostyGoop ICS Malware Targeting Operational Technology - Dragos (accessed: )
- CISA AA24-038A - PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (7.02.2024) - CISA (accessed: )
- CERT Polska - Energy sector incident report, 29 December 2025 (30.01.2026) - CERT Polska (accessed: )
- CERT Polska - Energy Sector Incident Report, 29 December 2025 (PDF) - CERT Polska (accessed: )
- CISA - Poland Energy Sector Cyber Incident Highlights OT and ICS Security Gaps (10.02.2026) - CISA (accessed: )
- ESET Research - Sandworm behind cyberattack on Poland's power grid in late 2025 (23.01.2026) - ESET (accessed: )
- CISA, FBI, EPA, DOE - Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology (6.05.2025) - CISA (accessed: )
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), EUR-Lex - EUR-Lex (accessed: )
- Polish Ministry of Digital Affairs - the amended cybersecurity law applies from 3 April 2026 (2.04.2026) - Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji (accessed: )
- Polish Ministry of Digital Affairs - who the amended cybersecurity law covers - Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji (accessed: )
- Federal Law Gazette - NIS2 Implementation Act of 2 December 2025 (BGBl. I No. 301, 5.12.2025) - Bundesgesetzblatt (accessed: )
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