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LockBit - the ransomware that became a corporation
LockBit - one of the most active ransomware groups in the world. RaaS model, 25-33% of attacks in 2023, Operation Cronos and the unmasking of LockBitSupp. Analysis of a cybercriminal empire.
Józef SulwińskiPublished 7 min read

Contents
Imagine a company that recruits business partners, runs a bug bounty program, maintains its own PR department and generates hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue each year. It sounds like a Silicon Valley startup. Except this company encrypts data belonging to hospitals, banks and seaports, and its “clients” are extortion victims. This is LockBit - a ransomware group that spent four years building one of the most profitable cybercriminal empires in history. Before law enforcement from ten countries joined forces to tear it down.
From forum to empire - the birth of LockBit
The story begins in January 2020, when a piece of software called LockBit appears on a Russian-language cybercriminal forum. Previously it operated under the prosaic name “ABCD” - after the extension it appended to encrypted files. The new brand was no accident. Behind it lay ambition: to build ransomware that would be faster, better and more reliable than the competition.
The business model? Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS). LockBit’s creators supply the tool - encryption software, cryptocurrency payment infrastructure and a site for publishing stolen data. Partners, known as affiliates, handle the hardest part: breaking into a victim’s network, lateral movement and data exfiltration. For every ransom paid, the affiliate keeps 80% while LockBit’s creators collect a 20% commission. A clean, scalable franchise model - except instead of fast-food restaurants, it sells digital extortion.
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What exactly is ransomware and how can you defend against it? Read our comprehensive ransomware guide, where we cover how it works, attack vectors and defence strategies.
Three versions, one corporate DNA
LockBit evolved like a commercial product - with successive releases, changelogs and even beta tests.
LockBit 1.0 (2020) - the first version of the ransomware-as-a-service programme, then still known as ABCD.
LockBit 2.0 (June 2021) - the release arrives at the perfect moment. DarkSide (the group behind the Colonial Pipeline attack) and Avaddon end their operations in May and June 2021. The new version offers one of the fastest encryption engines on the market and extends operations to Linux servers and VMware ESXi.
LockBit 3.0 (2022; public launch with the bug bounty program: June) - this is the moment where cybercrime meets corporate marketing. The creators introduce a bug bounty program - offering between $1,000 and one million dollars for bugs found in their own software. They invite security researchers to test their tools. They publish rules that affiliates must follow: no attacking hospitals (a rule broken repeatedly), no attacking CIS countries. This is no longer a hacker group. It is a corporation with terms of service.
25-33% market share - a year of dominance
2023 marked the peak of LockBit’s power. According to Trend Micro, the group was responsible for 25-33% of all ransomware attacks worldwide, and for 26% of victims posted on leak sites in the first half of the year. For comparison, the next groups, BlackCat and Clop, had about 10% each. The list of victims reads like the Fortune 500 index.
| Date | Victim | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| January 2023 | Royal Mail (United Kingdom) | International mail shipments halted for weeks |
| July 2023 | Port of Nagoya (Japan) | Container operations shut down at the port handling 10% of Japan’s trade |
| October-November 2023 | Boeing | Over 43 GB of internal data leaked (10 November) after Boeing refused to pay the ransom |
| November 2023 | ICBC Financial Services (US unit of ICBC) | Disruption to US Treasury bond settlement - the world’s largest bank resorted to settling transactions via USB drives |
According to a CISA report, from January 2020 LockBit affiliates attacked organisations across critical infrastructure sectors: energy, transport, industrial manufacturing, financial services, healthcare and public administration. According to the US Department of Justice, the total number of victims exceeded 2,500 entities in at least 120 countries.
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LockBit was responsible for 28% of ransomware attacks on organisations linked to industrial infrastructure in 2022 (Dragos data). Even when an attack does not target OT systems directly, compromising the IT network can cascade into operational processes - from production lines to SCADA systems.
Operation Cronos - hunting the king
On 20 February 2024, the world learns the empire has a crack. The UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) announces the success of Operation Cronos - a coordinated law enforcement action involving ten countries, including the FBI, Europol, and police from France, Germany, Japan, Australia and Canada.
What exactly was seized?
- 34 servers across multiple countries, forming the backbone of LockBit’s infrastructure
- Source code of the ransomware platform
- Over 1,000 decryption keys, enabling victims to recover their data
- 14,000 accounts linked to the group’s operations
- 200 frozen cryptocurrency wallets
- Identification of 194 affiliates and the arrest of two people linked to the group in Poland and Ukraine
But the most interesting element of Operation Cronos was not technical - it was psychological. Instead of simply shutting down LockBit’s Tor site, law enforcement took it over and began publishing on it. Press releases. Arrest announcements. A countdown to the leader’s identity reveal. They used the intimidation tactics that LockBit had deployed against its victims - only with the roles reversed. Cybercriminals, accustomed to anonymity, saw someone playing their own game for the first time.
The face behind the mask - who is LockBitSupp?
On 7 May 2024, the US Department of Justice reveals what LockBitSupp - the group’s anonymous administrator - believed was impossible to discover. The man who had offered a $10 million reward for anyone who could unmask him turns out to be Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev, a 31-year-old Russian national from Voronezh.
The indictment contains 26 charges. Prosecutors claim that Khoroshev earned at least $100 million from his 20-percent share of the ransoms paid by victims. The US, the UK and Australia impose sanctions - asset freezes and a travel ban. The State Department offers $10 million for information leading to his arrest.
Khoroshev, of course, resides in Russia - a country that does not extradite its citizens. But revealing his identity destroys what is most valuable in the cybercriminal world: trust. An anonymous leader who promised partners security turned out to have been identified and tracked all along. Affiliates begin looking for alternatives.
Did LockBit really fall?
History counsels caution. After Operation Cronos, LockBit attempted a comeback - launching new servers, publishing threats, claiming the FBI had seized only part of its infrastructure. But the data speaks for itself: in 2024, according to Searchlight Cyber, RansomHub overtook LockBit in the number of victims, and LockBit’s victim count fell below half of its 2023 level. The fragmentation that followed LockBit’s collapse reshaped the threat landscape.
And then, on 7 May 2025, the second blow landed. Someone - not law enforcement but an unknown hacker - broke into LockBit’s internal infrastructure and published a database containing thousands of negotiation messages, Bitcoin wallet addresses, affiliate credentials and operational details. A message appeared on the compromised panels that closed the circle: the cybercriminals had been hacked.
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The fall of LockBit does not mark the end of the ransomware threat. Affiliates migrate to other platforms, and the RaaS model remains available to new groups. The key to defence is a layered strategy: network segmentation, offline backups, network behaviour monitoring and regular incident response exercises.
Lessons for organisations
The LockBit story shows that ransomware has moved beyond lone hackers. It is an industry with division of labour, a supply chain and a subscription model. Defending against such a threat requires a systemic approach, not a point solution.
Three things every organisation should take from this story:
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The RaaS model lowers the barrier to entry. You do not need to be an expert to carry out a ransomware attack - renting the tool is enough. This means more attacks, on more targets, by less skilled adversaries.
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Critical infrastructure is a target. Ports, banks, hospitals, manufacturers - LockBit did not choose victims by industry but by ability to pay. Organisations in the OT sector must treat ransomware as a real operational threat.
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Law enforcement works - but slowly. Operation Cronos took months. During that time, hundreds of organisations were attacked. You cannot rely solely on police action - defence starts inside the organisation.
Sources
- Understanding Ransomware Threat Actors: LockBit (AA23-165A) - CISA (accessed: )
- United States Sanctions Senior Leader of the LockBit Ransomware Group - U.S. Department of the Treasury (accessed: )
- LockBit leader unmasked and sanctioned - National Crime Agency (accessed: )
- The NCA announces the disruption of LockBit with Operation Cronos - National Crime Agency (accessed: )
- Feds Seize LockBit Ransomware Websites, Offer Decryption Tools, Troll Affiliates - Krebs on Security (accessed: )
- Operation Cronos: LockBit Takedown - Infosecurity Magazine (accessed: )
- LockBit, BlackCat, and Clop Prevail as Top RaaS Groups: Ransomware in 1H 2023 - Trend Micro (accessed: )
- Operation Cronos' Impact on LockBit - Trend Micro (accessed: )
- LockBit Ransomware Continued to Impact Operational Technology in 2022 - Dragos (accessed: )
- Same Game, New Players: Ransomware in 2025 - Searchlight Cyber (accessed: )
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