OT Cybersecurity
Social engineering and phishing in OT - how a message reaches the control system and how to stop it
How phishing and social engineering reach OT networks: attack paths, incidents at a steel mill, KHNP, Target and Colonial Pipeline, and the controls, procedures and training that close them.
Józef SulwińskiPublished Updated 17 min read

Contents
A message that poses as a PLC manufacturer or a familiar service technician can give an attacker an account that leads to the control network. The employee who opens the attachment usually does not know that their computer has a path to OT. The company often finds out only when the process starts behaving differently.
Reports from Verizon, Dragos and the BSI show that:
- phishing was the first step in 16% of breaches, and conversations built on a false pretext (pretexting) in another 6%,
- groups that target industry pose as recruiters and run multi-week campaigns aimed at ICS vendors,
- at a German steel mill, targeted phishing ended in failures after which a blast furnace could not be shut down in a controlled way.
Why OT personnel are a target
Attackers pick people who have access to control systems or know the way to them. According to Dragos, most OT incidents begin in systems between the enterprise and operational networks: remote access, identity systems and edge devices. An engineer’s or technician’s account leads exactly to those systems.
Mail from vendors is trusted. Automation engineers regularly receive messages from PLC manufacturers, integrators and SCADA software vendors. A message about an urgent PLC firmware update looks like ordinary service correspondence.
Vendors have their own accounts. Service technicians, integrators and parts suppliers connect to the customer’s systems. Whoever takes over a vendor account benefits from the trust the operator has given that company.
Personnel work far from the security team. Operators and maintenance staff work in production halls and control rooms, often in shifts. If the site has no simple reporting channel, a suspicious message stays in the inbox with no response.
Social engineering paths into OT
| Path | Who it affects | How it works | Case from the sources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Targeted email with an attachment | Automation engineers, managers and office staff at the site | The attacker sends a message tailored to the victim, with an attachment or link that installs malware. | Steel mill in Germany (described by the BSI in 2014), KHNP (2014), the Dragonfly campaign (2013). |
| Compromised vendor account | Technical service providers with access to the customer’s network | The attacker infects the vendor’s computer, steals its credentials and enters the customer’s network. | Target (2013), through an HVAC service company. |
| Infected industry website (watering hole) | Engineers looking for documentation and software | The attacker breaks into websites the victims visit and infects visitors’ computers. | Dragonfly infected energy-sector websites (2013). |
| Tampered installer on a vendor website | Engineering workstations and servers where vendor software is installed | The attacker inserts malicious code into a package the vendor offers for download. | Dragonfly tampered with the packages of three ICS equipment vendors. |
| Fake job offer | Engineers and specialists in industrial sectors | The attacker creates a recruiter profile on a professional networking site and sends the victim documents with malicious code. | PYROXENE posed as aerospace recruiters (2025). |
| Call to the help desk | IT help desk and staff who reset passwords | The attacker calls as a locked-out employee and asks for a password or second-factor reset. | Unit 42 describes such cases in its 2024-2025 caseload. |
| Fake change of payment details (BEC) | Purchasing and accounting | The attacker poses as a supplier and asks for payment to a new bank account. | FBI IC3 recorded USD 3.05 billion in BEC losses in complaints for 2025. |
| Removable media handed over by an outsider | Operators and service technicians | Someone brings a USB stick with supposed documentation or a project backup. | The sources of this article describe no confirmed case in OT. |
| Site entry under the pretext of service | Site security and operators | A person claims to be a service technician and asks to be let in or for access to a workstation. | The sources of this article describe no confirmed case in OT. |
WARNING
In its review of 2025, Dragos describes a campaign by the KAMACITE group aimed at more than 25 Ukrainian ICS vendors and attendees of the GIE conference. Over several weeks the attackers built relationships with the victims and wrote in their language, using industry terminology. The group hands the access it gains to the ELECTRUM group, which carries out destructive attacks.
From the message to the PLC
An attack passes through several stages, and each one is a chance to stop it. The stage model is described in the article on the Cyber Kill Chain.
| Stage | What the attacker does | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | Collects names, roles and system names from the company website, job ads, presentations and tender documents. | Review what the company publishes about its OT systems and remove unnecessary technical detail. |
| Preparing the lure | Writes a message that fits the victim’s work, for example about a PLC patch or a service inspection report. | Teach personnel what lures look like in their own work. |
| Delivery | Sends an email, makes a call, places a file on an industry website or hands over a USB stick. | Filter email and restrict removable media. |
| Execution and access | The victim opens the attachment or enters credentials, and the attacker takes over the computer or account. | Require phishing-resistant MFA and report suspicious messages quickly. |
| Moving from IT to OT | Uses a jump server, a vendor VPN or a flat network. | Divide the network into zones and control every connection between IT and OT. |
| Impact | Steals data, destroys computers or changes how the plant runs. | Keep an incident response plan and be able to run the process manually. |
Documented cases
Steel mill in Germany, described by the BSI in 2014
The BSI described the attack in its report on the state of IT security in Germany for 2014. The attackers gained access to the mill’s office network through spear phishing and sophisticated social engineering. From there they worked their way step by step into the production networks. Failures of individual control components or whole plants then began to pile up. A blast furnace could not be shut down in a controlled way, and the plant suffered massive damage.
TIP
Separate the office network from the production network so that a compromised office computer gives no path to control. Why: in this attack a message to an office employee was the first step towards the furnace failure.
KHNP, South Korea, 2014
In December 2014, employees of the nuclear plant operator KHNP received messages with an attachment in HWP format, a word processor popular in Korea. According to Trend Micro the attachment was labelled “control program”, and opening it started data theft and disk destruction. The attackers published employee data, training material and blueprints. They demanded that several plants be shut down.
In March 2015, investigators stated that the attackers had sent about 6,000 messages to 3,571 current and former employees. They attributed the attack to North Korean hackers. KHNP stated that the reactor control system was separated from external networks and that the leaked material was not classified.
TIP
Block attachment types the company does not need for its work at the email gateway. Why: the KHNP campaign relied on one file type that employees knew and opened without hesitation.
Target, 2013 - entry through a vendor account
Target is a retail chain, and the stolen data were payment card numbers. The case still shows a path that applies to industrial sites as well: the account of a technical service provider. According to Krebs, staff at an HVAC service company received a malware-laced email at least two months before the theft. The malware stole the company’s credentials for Target’s network.
The vendor used a free anti-malware scanner without real-time protection. Its connection to the customer’s network served for electronic billing, contract submission and project management. The attackers entered the network on 15 November 2013, and data on about 40 million cards leaked between 27 November and 15 December. Krebs notes that it is unclear why the vendor access was not cordoned off from the payment system network.
TIP
Give each vendor access only to the systems it needs for its work. Why: an account meant for billing was enough for the attackers to enter the customer’s network.
Colonial Pipeline, 2021 - the password to an unused VPN account
The attack on Colonial Pipeline began with a password that the attackers obtained in a way that has not been established. The company’s CEO testified before the US Senate on 8 June 2021 that the attackers came in through an unused VPN profile. The profile had no multi-factor authentication, although the password was complex. The company shut down the pipeline, and on the day of the testimony it was still restoring seven financial systems. It paid a ransom of USD 4.4 million in bitcoin. Details are in the article on Colonial Pipeline.
TIP
Remove unused remote access accounts and require MFA on all remaining ones. Why: the password to an account nobody watched was enough to stop a pipeline.
Technical controls
Technical controls stop most messages before they reach a person and limit the damage of those that get through.
- Enable SPF and DKIM and set DMARC to reject for all company domains. Why: receiving servers then reject messages that fake a sender from the company’s domain.
- Block unnecessary attachment types at the email gateway and check the rest in an isolated environment before delivery. Why: a single malicious attachment was enough at the steel mill and at KHNP.
- Require phishing-resistant MFA for every remote access to OT. CISA names two such methods: FIDO2/WebAuthn and MFA based on public key infrastructure (PKI), for example smart cards. Why: a victim can type an SMS code or one-time password into a fake page.
- Divide the network into zones and conduits based on a risk assessment, and route traffic between IT and OT through an intermediate zone (DMZ). Why: from a compromised office computer the attacker then reaches at most an intermediary server. Details are in the article on OT network segmentation.
- Disable dormant vendor accounts and give each vendor access only to the devices within its scope of work. Why: the Colonial Pipeline account and the Target vendor account gave the attackers more than their owners’ work required.
- Download software for engineering workstations only from the manufacturer’s website and check checksums or digital signatures. Why: Dragonfly tampered with packages on vendor websites, so the website address alone does not guarantee that the file is genuine.
- Restrict the use of removable media in OT zones and scan media on a dedicated station. The rules are described in the article on USB security in ICS networks. Why: media carried into a zone bypass all network controls.
Procedures
A procedure stops an attack when the message looks credible and technology does not reject it.
- Confirm every change of a supplier’s bank details by phone, using the number from the contract or from earlier correspondence. Why: if the message is fake, the number given in it belongs to the attacker.
- Require approval by a second person for payments above a set threshold and for urgent purchases of OT parts. Why: the attacker counts on one person being in a hurry.
- Make the help desk reset a password or second factor only after confirming the caller’s identity through another channel. Why: according to Unit 42, attackers call the help desk precisely to bypass MFA.
- Verify a service technician’s identity before letting them on site and before opening a remote session, and record each visit in a log. Why: a familiar logo on clothing or a familiar voice on the phone does not confirm identity.
- Set up one simple channel for reporting suspicious messages and reply to every person who reports. Why: a fast report allows the message to be removed from other inboxes before someone opens it.
- Accept reports without penalties, also when the message turned out to be genuine or the employee had already clicked. Why: penalties teach people to hide clicks, and a hidden click gives the attacker time.
Training and simulations
Training clearly increases reporting. According to the Verizon DBIR 2025, users trained in the last 30 days reported simulated phishing in about 21% of cases, and users without such training in about 5%. According to the DBIR 2026, the median click rate is 1.4% in email simulations and close to 2% in phone simulations.
NIST SP 800-82 recommends that all personnel with OT responsibilities receive training that can be tailored to their role. The training covers social engineering techniques, recognizing anomalous system behavior, password rules and incident reporting. The 2009 edition of IEC 62443-2-1 provides for initial and periodic training of employees, contract employees and third-party contractors. IEC 62443-2-4 obliges the service provider to assign to the work only staff who know the asset owner’s requirements.
- Prepare scenarios from the site’s own work: a PLC patch, a new version of documentation, a service inspection report, a change of a supplier’s bank account. Why: an office lure does not teach an engineer to recognize a lure from their own work.
- Tailor simulations to roles: different ones for engineers, maintenance, purchasing and the help desk. Why: each role receives different genuine messages.
- Practice phone calls and text messages as well. Why: according to the DBIR 2026, people click more often in phone-centric simulations than in email ones.
- Offer training in a format that shift personnel can use, and include contractors with OT access. Why: a contractor has the same permissions in the system as an employee.
- Run training at least once a year and record who has completed it. Why: without a record nobody can show who with OT access has not been trained.
Program measures
NIST SP 800-55 divides measures into implementation, effectiveness, efficiency and impact measures. Four measures are enough to start a program against social engineering.
| Measure | How to calculate it | Type of measure |
|---|---|---|
| Training coverage | The number of people with OT access, including contractors, trained in the last 12 months, divided by the number of all people with such access. | Implementation measure. |
| Report rate | The number of recipients who reported a simulated message, divided by the number of recipients it reached. | Effectiveness measure. |
| Click rate | The number of recipients who clicked the link, opened the attachment or entered data, divided by the number of recipients the message reached. | Effectiveness measure. |
| Time to first report | The time from sending the simulated message to the first report. | Efficiency measure. |
Set target values based on the first measurement in your own company. Why: the result depends on how hard the simulation is, so another company’s threshold says little about your own program.
Responding to a successful phish
NIST SP 800-82 points out that cutting connections or stopping the process during an incident affects production. The impact of such a decision has to be understood and communicated to the team during the response.
- Disconnect the victim’s computer in the office network, and agree any disconnection of links to OT with the person responsible for the process. Why: a sudden cut of the conduit to OT can stop the plant or leave the operator without a view.
- Check in the logs of jump servers, VPN and firewalls between the IT and OT zones whether the attacker got further.
- Change the victim’s passwords and revoke their sessions and second factors, including in remote access systems.
- Preserve email, VPN and firewall logs before they are overwritten.
- Inform the OT team so that it watches for unusual connections at the IT/OT boundary.
- Establish which layer failed: the mail filter, a procedure or training, and fix that layer.
- Add the course of the incident to the scenarios of the next simulations.
Protection against an outcome that often follows a successful phish is described in the article on ransomware prevention. A wider picture of staff errors and misuse is given in the article on the human factor in OT security.
Checklist
- It is known through which channels OT personnel and contractors receive messages: email, phone, messaging apps and professional networking sites.
- Company domains have SPF, DKIM and DMARC set to reject.
- The email gateway blocks unnecessary attachment types and checks the rest before delivery.
- Every remote access to OT requires phishing-resistant MFA.
- Dormant vendor accounts are disabled, and the remaining ones have an expiry date and access only to the devices they need.
- The network is divided into zones, and traffic between IT and OT passes through an intermediate zone.
- Changes to suppliers’ bank details are confirmed by phone using a known number.
- The help desk resets passwords and MFA only after confirming identity through another channel.
- Personnel have one reporting channel and receive a reply to every report.
- Training covers everyone with OT access, including contractors, at least once a year.
- Simulations use scenarios from the site’s own work and include phone calls.
- The program measures training coverage, report rate, click rate and time to first report.
- The response plan states who decides about cutting connections to OT.
Where we help
We run OT security training and phishing simulations in which we primarily measure the rate and speed of reports. During red team campaigns we check whether an attack that starts with a message to an employee reaches the edge of the OT network and whether the team detects it. We stop before any action in the control system. We assess network separation and vendor access during an OT security assessment. Feel free to contact us.
Technical basis
| Topic | Where it is |
|---|---|
| Share of phishing and pretexting in breaches, median click rate | Verizon DBIR 2026, sections on initial access vectors and on social engineering |
| Reporting after training in the last 30 days | Verizon DBIR 2025, section on social engineering |
| BEC losses in 2025 | FBI IC3, Internet Crime Report 2025 |
| Help desk calls and MFA bypass | Unit 42, Global Incident Response Report 2025: Social Engineering Edition |
| Attack on the steel mill | BSI, Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014, chapter 3.3.1 |
| Role-based training of OT personnel | NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, section 6.2.2 |
| MFA for remote access to OT | NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, section 6.2.10; CISA Primary Mitigations (2025) |
| Impact of cutting connections during an incident | NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, section 6.4.4 |
| Phishing-resistant MFA | CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA |
| SPF, DKIM and DMARC, MFA, annual training | CISA CPG 2.0, goals 3.L, 3.F and 3.J |
| DMZ between IT and OT, disabling dormant accounts | CISA Primary Mitigations (2025) |
| Zones and conduits | IEC 62443-3-2, ZCR 3; IEC 62443-3-3, SR 5.1 |
| Training of staff and contractors | IEC 62443-2-1:2009, element 4.3.2.4 |
| Service provider personnel informed of requirements | IEC 62443-2-4:2023, SP.01.01 |
| Types of measures | NIST SP 800-55 Vol. 1 (2024), section 3.3 |
Related articles
- Seven paths from the internet into the OT network - phishing as one of the paths into OT alongside the others
- Secure remote access to ICS systems - controlling vendor and technician access
- Dragonfly - the campaign against the energy sector and the tampered vendor packages
- Password security - password rules for accounts with OT access
Sources
- Verizon - 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (accessed: )
- Verizon - 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report (accessed: )
- FBI IC3 - Internet Crime Report 2025 (accessed: )
- Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 - 2025 Global Incident Response Report: Social Engineering Edition (accessed: )
- Dragos - OT Threat Landscape 2026 (accessed: )
- Dragos - 2026 OT Cybersecurity Year in Review, Executive Briefing (accessed: )
- Dragos - PYROXENE (accessed: )
- BSI - Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (accessed: )
- Trend Micro - Korean Nuclear Plant Faces Data Leak and Destruction (22.12.2014) (accessed: )
- AFP (phys.org) - S. Korea accuses North of cyber attacks on nuclear operator (17.03.2015) (accessed: )
- Krebs on Security - Email Attack on Vendor Set Up Breach at Target (accessed: )
- Krebs on Security - Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company (accessed: )
- Cybersecurity Dive - Colonial Pipeline CEO testimony (8.06.2021) (accessed: )
- Symantec - Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers (v1.21, 7.07.2014) (accessed: )
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 - Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (accessed: )
- CISA - Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology (6.05.2025) (accessed: )
- CISA - Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (accessed: )
- CISA - Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA (fact sheet) (accessed: )
- IEC 62443-2-1:2024 - Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners (accessed: )
- NIST SP 800-55 Vol. 1 - Measurement Guide for Information Security (Dec 2024) (accessed: )
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