OT Cybersecurity
USB Removable Media Security in ICS Networks - Threats and Controls
USB threats in OT environments - malware, sabotage, data exfiltration. IEC 62443 controls, security kiosk, and policies.
Michał Stępień
Józef SulwińskiPublished Updated 12 min read

Contents
In a network isolated from the internet, files still reach the systems on removable media. The media bypass firewalls and segmentation, because an operator plugs them straight into a workstation. The Honeywell report from April 2024 and the NIST SP 1334 guidelines from September 2025 show that:
- 51% of detected malware was designed to spread via USB media, compared with 9% in the 2019 report;
- 82% of detected malware can disrupt industrial processes;
- NIST divides media controls into four groups: procedural, physical, technical, and transport and sanitization.
An example is the incident of December 2017 (Operation Copperfield). A night shift worker at a critical infrastructure operator in the Middle East plugged a USB drive with the movie “La La Land” into a shared workstation. The drive carried a remote access trojan (RAT) based on H-Worm. The workstation’s protection software stopped it before it caused any damage. According to the company Nyotron, the main goal of the campaign was to steal data for reconnaissance of critical infrastructure.
Removable media have been used to attack IT and OT systems since Stuxnet, discovered in 2010, and since Agent.BTZ in US Department of Defense networks.
USB in an isolated OT network
Many OT networks (operational technology, meaning the systems that control industrial processes) are isolated from the internet. This isolation means that firmware updates, configuration files, diagnostic logs, and service software reach the OT network on removable media.
Employees and external contractors regularly bring to OT networks:
- USB drives with software updates for PLCs (programmable logic controllers) and SCADA supervisory systems;
- service laptops with diagnostic tools;
- external drives with configuration backups;
- media with technical documentation and diagrams.
Each of these media could previously have been in an office network, a home network, or another customer’s infrastructure. An infected medium carries malware into the isolated network and bypasses firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and network segmentation on the way.
Scale of the problem in data from industrial plants
For several years, Honeywell has published reports on USB-borne threats in industrial environments. The reports rely on data from its Secure Media Exchange (SMX) system, which scans removable media at plants worldwide.
A few numbers
| Value | What it means | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 51% | Half of the detected malware (51%) was designed to spread over USB, against 9% in the 2019 report. | Honeywell, USB Threat Report 2024 |
| 82% | Of the detected malware, 82% can disrupt industrial processes. | Honeywell, USB Threat Report 2024 |
| 1 in 4 | One in four incidents handled by the Honeywell response team involved a USB event. | Honeywell, Cyber Threat Report 2025 |
| 31M | The SMX system checked more than 31 million files in Q4 2024 and Q1 2025. | Honeywell, Cyber Threat Report 2025 |
The Honeywell report from April 2024 shows that 51% of detected malware was designed to spread via USB media. This is a sixfold increase compared with 9% in the 2019 report. Of the detected malware, 82% can disrupt industrial processes: the operator loses visibility of the process (loss of view) or control over it (loss of control).
In Q4 2024 and Q1 2025, the SMX system checked over 31 million files and blocked nearly 5,000 of them. In Q1 2025, it detected 1,826 unique USB threats, including 124 never-before-seen variants. One in four incidents handled by the Honeywell incident response team involved a USB plug-and-play event.
Three attack scenarios via removable media
Scenario 1: Infected media from the office or home network
An employee copies a presentation from a work laptop to a USB drive and uses the same drive at home on a personal computer. The drive gets infected. The next day, the employee brings it to the plant and plugs it into an engineering workstation on the OT network. The malware moves into the isolated network.
Stuxnet spread in a similar way, among other things via infected USB media and Step 7 project files. Simply viewing the media contents in Windows Explorer was enough to trigger code exploiting a .LNK file handling vulnerability.
Scenario 2: A service laptop of an external contractor
An automation system integrator arrives with a laptop that holds service software, configuration files, and diagnostic tools. The same laptop was used at other customers and connected to various networks. If it is infected, it carries malware into every subsequent installation it connects to.
Scenario 3: Tampered project files or updates
Attackers modify PLC project files or firmware update packages and embed malicious code in them. When a technician uploads such a file to a controller, the malware gains direct access to the process control layer.
WARNING
Attacks via the USB port also use keyboards with reprogrammed firmware (BadUSB) and external hard drives. Every device connected through a USB port is a potential attack vector.
Normative requirements
IEC 62443
IEC 62443 describes controls for removable media in several parts. Which of them apply in a given zone depends on the target security level (SL-T) determined in the risk assessment under IEC 62443-3-2.
| Control | Description | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| Blocking portable devices | The control system can block the use of removable media and other portable devices. | IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.3 a) |
| Authorization and transfer restriction | The control system can admit a portable device only after context-specific authorization and restrict code and data transfer. Enhancement RE(1) allows checking that the device meets the requirements of the zone. | IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.3 b), c), RE(1) |
| Protection against malicious code | The control system can protect itself against malicious code carried, among other ways, on removable media (USB), and can detect and report it. | IEC 62443-3-3 SR 3.2 |
| Mobile code restriction | The control system can restrict the execution and transfer of mobile code. | IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.4 |
| Least privilege | The control system enforces the permissions assigned to users, including for operations on media. | IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.1 |
| Event logging | The control system records the security events needed for audit. | IEC 62443-3-3 SR 2.8 |
| Integrator media | The integrator has a process that ensures the components and media it supplies to the installation are free of known malware before use, and that service media are used only for that installation. | IEC 62443-2-4 SP.10.05 (BR, RE(1), RE(2)) |
These controls are implemented for each zone and each conduit separately. Segmentation is described in the article on Defense in Depth in DCS systems.
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 and NIST SP 1334
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 (Guide to Operational Technology Security, September 2023) contains a control overlay (OT overlay) on SP 800-53 Rev. 5. The overlay indicates which controls, including those for removable media, apply in OT environments.
In September 2025, NIST additionally published SP 1334 “Reducing the Cybersecurity Risks of Portable Storage Media in OT Environments”, devoted solely to the security of portable media. NIST divides the controls into four groups:
- Procedural controls. The organization approves each medium, buys media with hardware encryption, and trains staff in the procedures.
- Physical controls. The organization stores, labels, and inventories media securely.
- Technical controls. The system scans media for malware, blocks ports, and encrypts data on the medium with a FIPS-certified algorithm (a NIST standard).
- Transport and sanitization. The organization verifies file integrity with a hash or checksum and securely erases data from media.
TIP
When files are handed over between an integrator and the installation operator, the hash or checksum must be verified. This confirms that the file was not modified in transit.
Practical USB security controls
Security kiosk (scanning kiosk)
A security kiosk is a physical station where removable media are scanned before they are admitted to the OT network. Every medium must pass the scan before it is used in the production zone.
Solutions of this class consist of four elements:
- a physical kiosk that scans media;
- a threat detection engine;
- a threat management portal for the whole organization;
- an agent on endpoints that enforces policies.
Checklist: implementing USB controls in an OT environment
- Inventory all USB ports on the OT network (more on asset inventory), because a port nobody knows about cannot be secured.
- Allow only registered USB media, because an unknown medium may contain malware.
- Install a security kiosk that scans media before they enter the OT zone, because scanning detects known malware before it reaches the OT network.
- Physically block unused USB ports (plugs, locks, or disabling in the BIOS, the motherboard firmware), because a blocked port accepts no device.
- Mark media with a color code and use separate media for the OT, office, and private networks, because a medium from the office network may have been infected.
- Apply hardware encryption to all media approved for use in OT, because encryption protects the data on a lost medium.
- Require external contractors to scan laptops and media before entering the plant, because a laptop used at many customers can carry an infection.
- Implement network quarantine for connections of external service provider devices, because the state of a contractor’s device is unknown before it connects.
- Log and audit all USB media connection operations on the OT network, because the record makes it possible to find the source of an infection.
- Train employees and contractors regularly in USB attack scenarios, because an employee who knows the scenarios recognizes them at the workstation.
Comparison of protection methods
| Method | Effectiveness (authors’ assessment) | Implementation cost | Impact on operations | Application |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physical port blocking | High | Low | High (hinders legitimate use) | Workstations that do not need USB |
| Allow list of media | High | Medium | Medium | All workstations with USB |
| Scanning kiosk | Very high | High | Low (checkpoint) | Entrances to OT zones |
| Media encryption | Medium (encryption protects the data on the medium and does not stop malware) | Medium | Low | Media with sensitive data |
| Disabling USB in the BIOS | Very high | Low | Very high | Systems that do not require USB |
| Agent on the workstation | High | High | Low | OT workstations |
USB attack cases against OT infrastructure
| Year | Incident | USB vector | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | Agent.BTZ | An infected flash drive inserted into a military laptop at a base in the Middle East | The code reached the classified and unclassified networks of US Central Command. |
| 2010 | Stuxnet | USB media and Step 7 project files | According to an ISIS estimate, Iran replaced about 1,000 centrifuges at Natanz in 2009-2010, which Stuxnet could have caused. |
| 2017 | Operation Copperfield | A USB drive with the movie “La La Land” | A remote access trojan was stopped on a shared workstation of a critical infrastructure operator in the Middle East before it caused any damage. |
| 2024-2025 | Detections of the Ramnit worm | USB media in industrial plants | According to Honeywell, Ramnit accounted for 37% of the files blocked by its media scanning system. |
Removable media security policy
An organization needs a media policy supported by technical controls. The policy consists of rules for employees and for external contractors.
For employees:
- An employee does not connect private USB media to the OT network, because a medium used at home may have been infected.
- An employee scans every medium before use, because an infection is not visible to the naked eye.
- Media intended solely for the OT network carry a unique marking, because then a medium from another network is immediately visible.
- An employee reports every connection of an unknown device, because the report allows the workstation to be checked before the infection spreads.
For external contractors:
- A contractor exchanges data only through approved control mechanisms, because any other channel bypasses scanning.
- A contractor scans laptops and media with antivirus software before entering the plant, because a laptop used at many customers can carry an infection.
- A contractor encrypts the full disks of portable computers used for service purposes, because a lost service laptop holds installation configurations.
- Contractor devices connect to the network through network quarantine, because the state of such a device is unknown before it connects.
NOTE
USB controls must be linked to a broader OT security program. USB port inventory is part of ICS asset inventory, and media control rules must be consistent with OT network segmentation and the zones and conduits model.
Where we help
We help industrial organizations assess the risk of removable media during an OT security assessment, design USB security policies compliant with IEC 62443 during an IEC 62443 audit, and implement technical solutions, from scanning kiosks to media allow lists and port monitoring. You can reach us through the contact form.
Sources
- Honeywell GARD USB Threat Report 2024 - landing page of the Honeywell report from April 2024 (report content behind a form) (accessed: )
- Honeywell on cybersecurity in 2024 - USB devices continue to pose major threat - Security On Screen - 51% of malware designed for USB, up from 9% in the 2019 report (accessed: )
- Honeywell's 2024 USB Threat Report reveals significant rise in malware frequency - Industrial Cyber - 82% of detected malware able to cause loss of view or loss of control (accessed: )
- Honeywell 2025 Cyber Threat Report - 1,826 unique USB threats and 124 new variants in Q1 2025; Ramnit 37% of blocked files (accessed: )
- Ramnit Malware Infections Spike in OT as Evidence Suggests ICS Shift - SecurityWeek - over 31 million files checked and nearly 5,000 blocked in Q4 2024 and Q1 2025 (accessed: )
- Honeywell 2025 Cyber Threat Report (Help Net Security) - Help Net Security - one in four incidents handled by Honeywell's response team involved USB (accessed: )
- NIST SP 1334: Reducing the Cybersecurity Risks of Portable Storage Media in OT Environments - NIST - NIST guidelines from September 2025 for portable storage media in OT (accessed: )
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security - NIST guide to OT security
- IEC 62443 Compliance and Removable Media (Honeywell) - IEC 62443 requirements for removable media
- Nyotron - Operation Copperfield - details of the Operation Copperfield attack
- Another Cyberattack Spotted Targeting Mideast Critical Infrastructure Organizations - Dark Reading - Copperfield stopped on a shared workstation, USB drive with a movie, link to H-Worm (accessed: )
- Defending a New Domain (W. Lynn, Foreign Affairs, 2010) - 2008 incident - an infected flash drive inserted into a military laptop at a base in the Middle East (accessed: )
- Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant? - ISIS - replacement of about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges, Stuxnet as a possible cause (accessed: )
- NIST Publishes Guide for Protecting ICS Against USB-Borne Threats (SecurityWeek) - overview of NIST SP 1334
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