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BMS as a possible route into industrial networks - incidents, scenarios and a checklist

Building management systems (BMS) and their vendors' access as a possible route into industrial networks: incidents, attack scenarios and an ICS protection checklist.

Łukasz DudkowskiŁukasz Dudkowski

Published Updated 10 min read

BMSICSsmart buildingnetwork segmentationattack vectorHVACIEC 62443
BMS as a possible route into industrial networks - incidents, scenarios and a checklist
Contents
  1. Why BMS and ICS run on the same infrastructure
  2. Five scenarios of an attack from BMS to ICS
  3. What is known about BMS exposure
  4. Incidents involving building automation and vendor access
  5. Checklist
  6. Defense in depth at the BMS-ICS boundary
  7. Legal basis
  8. Where we help
  9. Sources

At most plants, air conditioning, access control and CCTV are looked after by an outside vendor, and that vendor’s network connection rarely reaches an OT security audit. One stolen vendor password can then give an attacker a route into the network where production runs.

Publicly documented incidents show three such routes. The credentials of an HVAC service provider gave access to the network of a large retailer. Building automation in Germany was reachable from the internet. District heating controllers in Ukraine had an open Modbus TCP port. None of these incidents describes a move from building automation to control of an industrial process. Scenarios for such a move follow from an analysis of the network architecture.

BMS (Building Management System) is the system that runs a building. ICS (Industrial Control System) is the system that controls an industrial process. The security of the BMS itself is covered in the article on Smart Building cybersecurity.

Why BMS and ICS run on the same infrastructure

According to NIST guidance, a building automation system (BAS) is a type of operational technology (OT). It covers heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), fire systems, electrical systems, lighting, access control and physical security. In an industrial plant these systems support the technological process:

BMS function Effect on the ICS process
Temperature and humidity control Maintains the conditions that raw material storage and some technological processes depend on, for example in pharmaceuticals and food production.
Air handling (HVAC) Supplies clean zones and halls where air parameters affect product quality.
Physical access control (ACS) Protects rooms with OT infrastructure, for example in energy plants and refineries.
Video monitoring (CCTV) Allows supervision of production areas.
Fire detection and suppression systems Protect the continuity of production lines, data centers and chemical installations.

According to NIST, the failure of utilities that support OT, including air conditioning, can have a cascading effect on OT systems. Each of these functions can therefore create a point of contact with the industrial network, or with infrastructure that has access to it.

Five scenarios of an attack from BMS to ICS

The scenarios below follow from an analysis of the architecture. None of the incidents described in this article confirms a move from a BMS to control of a process.

1. The attacker moving from the building network to the OT network

If the building and industrial networks are not separated, an attacker who takes over a BMS controller or a building automation workstation can reach PLCs, SCADA systems and servers that archive process data. NIST guidance classes a BAS as OT and recommends tailoring controls to a system’s own risk assessment. For that reason the BMS network needs assessing on the same terms as the ICS network.

2. Manipulation of process data

If the BMS passes air temperature, cooling water flow or humidity to the ICS, manipulated readings can lead the control system to wrong decisions. The effect depends on the process, so the process owner should assess which BMS readings influence control.

3. Malware carried over shared resources

If BMS and ICS workstations use the same USB media, network shares or remote access tools, an infected BMS operator computer can carry malware to ICS engineering stations. The article on USB security in ICS networks covers the details.

4. Sabotage of environmental conditions

A change in temperature or humidity in a production hall can force a line to stop or lower the quality of products, even though the attacker never reached the ICS.

5. Bypassing physical security

Taking over access control, video monitoring or the intrusion alarm system can make physical access to rooms with OT infrastructure easier.

What is known about BMS exposure

  • A 2025 study by Claroty Team82 covered more than 467,000 BMS in 529 organizations. In 75% of the organizations, BMS had vulnerabilities from the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, and 51% had such BMS insecurely connected to the internet. The data comes from Claroty customers and does not describe the whole market.
  • Older installations of building automation protocols can run without encrypted communication. The device documentation should be checked for whether the protected variants, such as BACnet/SC and KNX Secure, are enabled.
  • In December 2024, IOActive assessed that within three years ransomware built specifically for BMS would become likely.

Incidents involving building automation and vendor access

Year Incident What happened Consequences
2013 Target (USA) The credentials of an HVAC service provider were stolen by malware delivered by email. The provider stated that its connection was used only for billing, contracts and project management. The sources do not describe any use of HVAC automation. Data of about 40 million payment cards was stolen. Costs net of insurance came to about 200 million USD before tax.
2021 A facility in Germany (KNXlock) Someone gained internet access to the building automation and locked the owners out by setting a new BCU key, the password that protects KNX devices. About 75% of components stopped working, including simple functions such as light and blind control. The facility ran in manual mode. The source does not mention a ransom demand.
2023 Johnson Controls Dark Angels ransomware hit a manufacturer of BMS and HVAC systems. The attackers stole data. Response and recovery costs came to about 27 million USD net of insurance. The source does not describe any effect on customer installations.
2024 FrostyGoop (Lviv, Ukraine) Malware sent Modbus TCP commands to district heating controllers whose port 502 was open to the internet. According to Dragos, entry was probably through a router vulnerability, and the network was not properly segmented. About 600 apartment buildings lost heating for almost two days. The event concerns municipal infrastructure, not a BMS.

The lesson for a BMS follows from the mechanism: vendor access without isolation, a system open to the internet and an open Modbus TCP port gave an attacker a route to the target network. This conclusion follows from an analysis of the architecture.

Checklist

The list describes steps taken by the OT network owner’s team together with the department that manages the building.

  • Inventory of contact points. The OT network owner draws up a list of all connections between the building and industrial networks, including shared workstations, USB media, network segments and file shares. The list shows paths that nobody planned.
  • Network separation. The BMS network should be separated from the ICS network by a firewall that blocks all traffic by default and passes only explicitly described flows. Where integration is necessary, data should pass through a server in a demilitarized zone (DMZ), because an attacker in the BMS network then has no direct route to the controllers.
  • Zones and conduits. Zones and conduits should be defined in the risk assessment, and the decision whether the BMS belongs to the assessed system should be taken on that basis. The article on OT network segmentation gives the details.
  • Remote access by vendors. BMS vendor access should be kept apart from ICS vendor access: separate accounts, separate access gateways and multi-factor authentication (MFA). A vendor with an account in one network should have no path into the other, because one stolen password would otherwise open both.
  • BMS penetration testing. The scope of building system tests should be extended with attempts to move into the industrial network, because only a test shows whether the separation works.
  • Risk assessment. The ICS risk assessment should list threats arising from the takeover of building systems as a separate item, because otherwise nobody is responsible for reducing them.
  • Business continuity plan. Scenarios for failure of air conditioning, power and access control, and their effect on production, should be described. The plan shows how long the process can last without building services.
  • Uniform rules for workstations. BMS workstations, servers and media should follow the same rules as the ICS environment: configuration hardening, monitoring and vulnerability management. The weakest component sets the level of protection of a shared network.
  • Traffic monitoring. Passive traffic monitoring should run at the boundary between the BMS and ICS networks, with particular attention to BACnet and Modbus, because an unusual flow is the first sign of an attempted move.

The rollout should start with the inventory. Simply drawing the connections on a diagram exposes shared switches, shared network shares and workstations with access to both networks.

Defense in depth at the BMS-ICS boundary

The defense in depth model describes four layers.

Layer 1: separation. Virtual networks (VLANs) and firewalls should be set up, and for critical processes physically separate infrastructure should be considered. Where BMS data has to reach the ICS, for example a temperature measurement for a clean zone, it should pass through an intermediary server in a DMZ (an intermediate zone between networks). According to NIST, a DMZ is one way to enforce a boundary, and a unidirectional gateway can be an alternative to a firewall.

Layer 2: access control. BMS and ICS engineers should have separate accounts and permissions. USB media should not be shared between systems, because a shared medium carries malware between networks without a firewall getting involved. Remote service access needs MFA, because a stolen vendor password alone is enough to get in.

Layer 3: monitoring and detection. Events from both domains should be collected in one system that correlates them (SIEM), with alerts on unusual flows between zones.

Layer 4: response. A procedure for isolating the BMS network after a takeover is detected should be written down, so that ICS operation is not stopped, together with a safe failure state for processes that depend on BMS data.

Step / topic Where it is
Building automation as a type of OT, tailoring recommendations on the basis of a risk assessment NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, 2.3.5
Effect of utility failures, including HVAC, on OT NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, 5.3.2
Segmentation, DMZ as an enforcement boundary, unidirectional gateways NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, 5.2.3.1
Grouping assets into zones and conduits based on risk IEC 62443-3-2, ZCR 3.1
Separating control system assets from business assets IEC 62443-3-2, ZCR 3.2
Separate zones for devices with access through external networks, including vendor remote access (recommendation) IEC 62443-3-2, ZCR 3.6
Target security level of a zone (SL-T) follows from the risk assessment IEC 62443-3-2, ZCR 5.6

Where we help

SEQRED helps OT teams check whether the building network has a route into the industrial network. The OT security assessment is an asset inventory and a review of the network and architecture. Penetration tests show what an attacker achieves through the weaknesses. A security architect helps design the division into zones and conduits according to IEC 62443-3-2, and an IEC 62443 audit establishes the security level at which zones and conduits operate.

Sources

  1. Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company - Krebs on Security (accessed: )
  2. Email Attack on Vendor Set Up Breach at Target - Krebs on Security (accessed: )
  3. Target Corporation, Form 10-K for fiscal year ended February 1, 2014 - SEC (accessed: )
  4. Target Corporation, Form 10-K for fiscal year ended January 30, 2016 - SEC (accessed: )
  5. Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3) - NIST (accessed: )
  6. State of CPS Security 2025: Building Management System Exposures - Claroty Team82 (accessed: )
  7. Building Management Systems: Latent Cybersecurity Risk - IOActive (accessed: )
  8. KNXlock - an attack campaign against KNX-based building automation systems - Limes Security (accessed: )
  9. Johnson Controls says ransomware attack cost $27 million, data stolen - BleepingComputer (accessed: )
  10. FROSTYGOOP - ICS Malware Targeting Operational Technology - Dragos (accessed: )
  11. FrostyGoop ICS Malware Left Ukrainian City's Residents Without Heating - SecurityWeek (accessed: )
  12. IEC 62443-3-2:2020 Security risk assessment for system design - IEC (accessed: )

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