Skip to content

Cybersecurity

Mirai Botnet - how cameras and routers with factory passwords become DDoS tools

How Mirai took over cameras, recorders and routers through Telnet and default passwords, what its 2023-2025 variants changed, and which steps close this path.

Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published Updated 13 min read

botnetMiraiDDoSIoTnetwork securitymalware
Mirai Botnet - how cameras and routers with factory passwords become DDoS tools
Contents
  1. How Mirai took over devices
  2. Attacks in 2016
  3. Public code and the authors
  4. Variants from 2023-2025
  5. The 2024 record and new records
  6. Mirai and industrial networks
  7. How to close the path Mirai uses
  8. Checklist
  9. A few numbers
  10. Where we help
  11. Technical and legal basis
  12. Related articles
  13. Sources

A camera, video recorder or router with a factory password and open Telnet can be taken over without any software flaw. The hijacked device then attacks other people’s services on the orders of a foreign server. The code of the Mirai botnet, which built a network of hundreds of thousands of such devices, has been public since 2016.

A study presented at USENIX Security, statements from the US Department of Justice and Cloudflare reports show that:

  • Mirai logged in over Telnet, trying login and password pairs from a list of 62 factory credentials,
  • at its peak, at the end of November 2016, the botnet counted about 600,000 infected devices, mainly IP cameras, video recorders and home routers,
  • Mirai variants are still active, and one of them launched a 5.6 Tbps attack from over 13,000 devices in October 2024.

How Mirai took over devices

A device that accepts Telnet logins with its factory password loses to the simplest automated tool. The researchers described how Mirai works based on the released code. Telnet is a protocol for remote login to a device’s command line.

  1. The bot sends TCP SYN packets to random IPv4 addresses on Telnet ports 23 and 2323. It skips address ranges from a built-in exclusion list.
  2. When a port answers, the bot tries to log in with 10 login and password pairs chosen at random from the list of 62.
  3. After the first successful login the bot sends the victim’s address and the working password to a report server.
  4. A separate loader program logs in to the device, identifies its architecture and downloads the matching version of the malware.
  5. The malware deletes its file and hides its process name. It also kills processes on ports 22 and 23 and the processes of competing botnets.
  6. The bot waits for commands from the command and control (C2) server and attacks the chosen target when ordered.

The program runs only in memory, so the infection does not survive a reboot. After a reboot the device still has the same password, and the bot can take it over again. According to the researchers, 11,000 devices were infected in the first 10 minutes after the botnet started, and 64,500 after 20 hours.

Mirai was used for DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, which flood a target with traffic from many devices at once. From 27 September 2016 to 28 February 2017 the researchers counted 15,194 attacks (after removing repeated commands).

Attack type Number of attacks How it works
HTTP flood 2,736 Bots send masses of requests to a web application and exhaust its resources.
UDP-PLAIN flood and UDP flood 4,982 Bots fill the target’s link with UDP packets.
ACK flood and SYN flood 4,108 Bots exhaust the TCP connection tables of servers and network devices.
GRE-IP flood 994 Bots flood the target with GRE tunnel packets.

Attacks in 2016

The victim of the botnet is usually someone other than the camera owner, and the effects also hit companies that were not the target. The attack on DNS provider Dyn disrupted many of its customers’ services, although according to the researchers the attacker was probably aiming at gaming infrastructure.

Date Target What is known
21.09.2016 KrebsOnSecurity blog The researchers measured a 623 Gbps attack, the largest in the site’s history. Over 96% of the attacking addresses matched scanning Mirai bots.
September 2016 Hosting provider OVH The researchers list OVH among the first high-profile Mirai victims.
21.10.2016 DNS provider Dyn Dyn described two attack waves and estimated up to 100,000 malicious endpoints. It could not verify reports of 1.2 Tbps.

The attack on Dyn disrupted name resolution for its customers, including Amazon, GitHub, Netflix, PayPal, Reddit and Twitter. According to the researchers, some attack commands also targeted the PlayStation network name servers that Dyn hosted.

Public code and the authors

The author released the Mirai code on 30 September 2016 on the Hackforums forum, under the name “Anna-senpai”. According to KrebsOnSecurity, the stated reason was that too many people were now looking at IoT devices. The attack on Dyn came three weeks later.

The US Department of Justice stated that Paras Jha posted the code. He, Josiah White and Dalton Norman pleaded guilty on 8 December 2017. On 18 September 2018 a court in Alaska sentenced them to five years of probation and 2,500 hours of community service. The court also ordered USD 127,000 in restitution and continued cooperation with the FBI.

Public code meant that anyone could build a botnet. From November 2016 to February 2017 the researchers recorded 48 new sets of logins and passwords. At the end of November 2016 variants also began scanning ports 7547 and 5555, used by CWMP, a protocol that operators use to manage routers remotely.

Variants from 2023-2025

Newer variants combine the password list with exploits, which are programs that use software flaws. Some of these flaws only work after login, so a factory password still opens the way.

Variant What it exploits Scale according to the source
InfectedSlurs (Akamai, November 2023) The botnet used a previously unknown flaw in network video recorders (NVRs), and the exploit logged in with default credentials from the vendor manual. A second flaw affected routers. Akamai did not give a number of infected devices.
GorillaBot (NSFOCUS, September 2024) The botnet was built from modified Mirai code and has more attack types than the original. From 4 to 27 September 2024 it issued over 300,000 attack commands against over 20,000 targets in 113 countries.
Gayfemboy (XLab, 2024) The botnet uses over 20 vulnerabilities and weak Telnet passwords. From 9 November 2024 it exploited flaw CVE-2024-12856 in Four-Faith industrial routers. XLab counted over 15,000 active nodes per day.
Murdoc_Botnet (Qualys, January 2025) The botnet attacks AVTECH cameras through CVE-2024-7029 and Huawei HG532 routers through CVE-2017-17215. Qualys found about 1,300 active IP addresses.
Eleven11bot (2025) According to GreyNoise it is probably a Mirai variant with one exploit for devices with HiSilicon chips. Nokia Deepfield estimated over 30,000 devices, other reports spoke of 86,400, and GreyNoise called the 86,400 figure wrong and counted fewer than 5,000.

Flaw CVE-2024-12856 allows the router’s system commands to be run after login. NVD adds that the firmware has default credentials, and if nobody changes them the flaw works without authentication. Flaw CVE-2017-17215, which Murdoc_Botnet used, has a 2017 number.

The 2024 record and new records

More than 13,000 devices were enough for an attack that Cloudflare called the largest reported up to that time. Cloudflare reported that on 29 October 2024 a Mirai variant attacked its customer, an Asian internet service provider. The UDP attack reached 5.6 Tbps, lasted 80 seconds and came from over 13,000 IoT devices.

The record did not last long. In the third quarter of 2025 Cloudflare recorded a 29.7 Tbps attack by the Aisuru botnet, which by its estimate had 1 to 4 million infected hosts. In its February 2026 report it described a 31.4 Tbps attack by the Aisuru-Kimwolf botnet, made up mainly of Android TVs.

Cloudflare does not call the Aisuru botnet a Mirai variant. According to the same report, Mirai variants launch almost 2 in 100 network-layer DDoS attacks.

Mirai and industrial networks

Botnets of the Mirai family look for devices, not industries. An industrial router or a camera recorder at the edge of a plant network is the same target for them as a home router. XLab describes Gayfemboy as a campaign against internet-facing devices and does not name a targeted sector.

Factory passwords also open the way in attacks on control systems. According to CISA, in the attack on the Polish energy sector in December 2025 the attackers entered through vulnerable edge devices. Default credentials then let them reach operator panels (HMI) and remote terminal units (RTU). CISA did not name the attacker.

How to close the path Mirai uses

The steps apply to every device connected to the internet: cameras, recorders, routers, cellular gateways and network printers.

  1. List all IoT devices and edge devices that can be reached from the internet. The list contains the model, firmware version, owner and open services. Why: a password cannot be changed on a device nobody knows about.
  2. Change the factory password on every device before connecting it to the network. The password is unique to the device and stored in a password vault. Why: the first version of Mirai knew only 62 pairs, and CISA recommends changing default passwords immediately.
  3. Do not leave Telnet or other remote login services enabled when nobody uses them. Block ports 23 and 2323 at the network edge. Why: Telnet with a factory password was the only way in for the first version of Mirai.
  4. Limit device management to the local network or to the addresses of a specific provider. This also applies to remote management by the operator on ports 7547 and 5555. Why: the Mirai researchers recommend that devices accept management connections only from such addresses.
  5. Install firmware updates and replace devices for which the vendor no longer issues patches. Why: Murdoc_Botnet used a 2017 flaw in 2025, and CISA treats end-of-support edge devices as high risk.
  6. Place cameras and other IoT devices in a separate network segment. The segment has no access to the OT network or to critical systems. Why: a hijacked device then cannot be used to go deeper. Segment design is covered in the article on OT network segmentation.
  7. Monitor outbound traffic from IoT devices. An alarm is raised when a camera or recorder connects to many random addresses on ports 23 and 2323. Why: an infected bot scans the internet for new victims by itself.
  8. After detecting an infection, disconnect the device from the network, then change the password, reboot it and update it. Why: a reboot removes the program from memory, but only a new password and patches protect against a new takeover.

Purchase requirements

Write into the order that the device has a unique password or forces the user to set one at first start. Remote services are disabled by default, and the vendor states until when it issues security patches. Why: laws in the EU and the United Kingdom introduce the same requirements.

Under the CRA (Cyber Resilience Act, the EU regulation on cyber resilience), from 11 December 2027 the manufacturer must supply products with a secure by default configuration. The product must protect against unauthorised access and limit its attack surface, including external interfaces. The manufacturer is also obliged to state the end date of the support period.

In the United Kingdom, since 29 April 2024 consumer connectable products must have a password unique to each unit or set by the user. The password must not be based on a counter or on public information. It must not be derived from a product identifier such as a serial number either, unless this is done with encryption or keyed hashing that is accepted as good industry practice.

Checklist

  • The list of IoT devices and edge devices reachable from the internet is up to date.
  • No device has a factory password, and each has a unique password.
  • Telnet is disabled, and ports 23 and 2323 are blocked at the network edge.
  • Devices can be managed only from the local network or from the provider’s addresses.
  • Device firmware is current, and devices without vendor support have been replaced.
  • IoT devices run in a separate segment without access to the OT network.
  • Monitoring raises an alarm when an IoT device scans Telnet ports on the internet.
  • Orders for new devices contain requirements on passwords, default services and the support period.

A few numbers

Number What it means Source
62 This many login and password pairs were known to the first version of Mirai. USENIX Security 2017
600,000 This many infected devices made up the botnet at its peak, at the end of November 2016. USENIX Security 2017
5.6 Tbps This was the size of a Mirai variant attack from over 13,000 devices in October 2024. Cloudflare, 2025
2 in 100 This share of network-layer DDoS attacks comes from Mirai variants according to the report for the third quarter of 2025. Cloudflare, 2025

Where we help

During penetration testing we check from the internet and from the internal network which devices accept Telnet logins or factory passwords. The result is a list of devices with remediation priorities. In industrial networks we check the same during an OT security assessment, and you can reach us through the contact form.

Step / topic Where it is
How Mirai works, ports, list of 62 credentials, reboot Antonakakis et al., USENIX Security 2017, section 2
Number of infections, attack types, attacks on KrebsOnSecurity and Dyn Antonakakis et al., sections 4.2, 6.1 and 6.3; Dyn, statement of 26.10.2016
Recommendations for IoT devices Antonakakis et al., section 7
Sentences for the authors US DoJ, releases of 13.12.2017 and 18.09.2018
Variants 2023-2025 Akamai SIRT (11.2023), NSFOCUS (09.2024), XLab, Qualys (01.2025), GreyNoise (03.2025), NVD CVE-2024-12856
DDoS records Cloudflare, reports for Q4 2024, Q3 2025 and Q4 2025
Changing default passwords, end-of-support devices CISA, alert of 10.02.2026
Secure by default configuration, updates, protection from unauthorised access, attack surface CRA, Annex I Part I point 2(b), (c), (d) and (j)
Information on the end of the support period CRA, Annex II point 7
Date of application of the CRA CRA, Article 71(2)
Unique passwords in consumer products United Kingdom, PSTI Regulations 2023, Schedule 1 paragraph 1

Sources

  1. Antonakakis et al. - Understanding the Mirai Botnet (USENIX Security 2017) - USENIX (accessed: )
  2. Dyn - Dyn Analysis Summary Of Friday October 21 Attack (26.10.2016, Internet Archive copy) - Dyn (accessed: )
  3. KrebsOnSecurity - Source Code for IoT Botnet Mirai Released (1.10.2016) - KrebsOnSecurity (accessed: )
  4. US DoJ - guilty pleas in three computer crime cases involving significant DDoS attacks (13.12.2017) - U.S. Department of Justice (accessed: )
  5. US DoJ, District of Alaska - sentences for the Mirai authors (18.09.2018) - U.S. Department of Justice (accessed: )
  6. Akamai SIRT - InfectedSlurs Botnet Spreads Mirai via Zero-Days (21.11.2023) - Akamai (accessed: )
  7. NSFOCUS - Over 300,000! GorillaBot: The New King of DDoS Attacks (29.09.2024) - NSFOCUS (accessed: )
  8. QiAnXin XLab - Gayfemboy: botnet exploiting a flaw in Four-Faith routers - QiAnXin XLab (accessed: )
  9. NVD - CVE-2024-12856 - NIST (accessed: )
  10. Qualys - Mass Campaign of Murdoc Botnet Mirai (22.01.2025) - Qualys (accessed: )
  11. GreyNoise - New DDoS Botnet Discovered (Eleven11bot), with the update of 5.03.2025 - GreyNoise (accessed: )
  12. Cloudflare - DDoS threat report for 2024 Q4 (21.01.2025) - Cloudflare (accessed: )
  13. Cloudflare - DDoS threat report for 2025 Q3 (3.12.2025) - Cloudflare (accessed: )
  14. Cloudflare - DDoS threat report for 2025 Q4 (5.02.2026) - Cloudflare (accessed: )
  15. CISA - Poland Energy Sector Cyber Incident Highlights OT and ICS Security Gaps (10.02.2026) - CISA (accessed: )
  16. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act) - EUR-Lex (accessed: )
  17. GOV.UK - The UK Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Product Security) regime - UK Government (accessed: )

Need help in this area?

Our experts will help you assess the risk and plan next steps.

Talk to an expert

We'll discuss scope, methodology, and timeline.

Book a call