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Local administrator accounts in ICS - protection against pass-the-hash and credential theft

Protecting local administrator accounts in ICS: LAPS, pass-the-hash, default HMI and PLC passwords, Active Directory hardening in OT. Checklist and IEC 62443-3-3 basis.

Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published Updated 13 min read

ICSLAPSpass-the-hashActive DirectoryOTpasswordsHMIPLCIEC 62443hardening
Local administrator accounts in ICS - protection against pass-the-hash and credential theft
Contents
  1. Why local administrator accounts are a problem in OT
  2. Anatomy of the attack: from password to process
  3. Controls for ICS environments
  4. Checklist for securing local accounts in ICS
  5. Incident response
  6. Legal basis
  7. Where we help
  8. Sources

One stolen local administrator password can open many stations in an OT network if the same password works on each of them. Changing the password is hard, because a SCADA application can stop working and many OT systems have no way to recover a password.

NIST guidance, a CISA advisory and a public password list show that this problem affects real installations:

  • From 22 November 2023, actors affiliated with Iran’s IRGC gained access to Unitronics Vision controllers with a built-in HMI panel at US water facilities. According to CISA, they probably did so through internet-exposed devices that had a default password or no password.
  • NIST recommends changing default passwords on OT devices and notes that shared passwords limit the ability to establish who gained access.
  • The public list of default passwords for industrial devices in the SecLists collection has 107 entries for 36 vendors.

Abbreviations: HMI is an operator panel, and PLC is a programmable logic controller. LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) is a Microsoft mechanism that gives every machine a different local administrator password.

Why local administrator accounts are a problem in OT

Managing local accounts is harder in OT networks for four reasons.

Permissions required by applications. A SCADA application may require local administrator rights. This should be confirmed in the vendor documentation and the result recorded, because it decides whether the application’s service account can be restricted.

Shared accounts. Shift operators may log in at the same station with the same account. According to NIST, shared credentials make it impossible to say clearly which person, process or device accessed a resource.

Infrequent password changes. NIST notes that passwords in OT are sometimes shared and rarely changed. Before a password is changed on a production station, it should be checked which services use the account, because an application may stop working.

No domain. A station that belongs neither to Active Directory nor to Microsoft Entra ID cannot use the central password management of Windows LAPS.

Anatomy of the attack: from password to process

The course of an attack shows where it can be interrupted. The description follows MITRE ATT&CK techniques, not a single incident.

Phase 1: credential acquisition

An attacker who has reached one station in an OT network, for example through hijacked remote access, a phishing message or an infected USB drive, looks for local passwords:

  • The attacker extracts password hashes from the memory of the LSASS process, the Windows service that stores the credentials of logged-in users (MITRE ATT&CK, T1003.001).
  • The attacker uses the local Windows account database (SAM), which holds the credentials of local accounts.
  • The attacker tries the default passwords of devices. The SecLists collection has 107 entries with factory passwords for 36 vendors.

Phase 2: lateral movement

Lateral movement is the step from one station to the next. If the same local administrator password works on many stations, the attacker can use the pass-the-hash technique, which authenticates with a password hash instead of the password. Microsoft points out that identical local administrator passwords on many devices make such lateral movement possible. From each compromised station the attacker can extract further credentials.

When all HMI stations share one local administrator password, the compromise of one station opens every station in the operator layer (level 2 of the Purdue model).

Phase 3: privilege escalation and access to the process

From an HMI station or SCADA server the attacker can change process setpoints through the operator interface, upload modified logic to PLCs through the engineering software, switch off alarms or copy the process configuration.

Attack phase MITRE ATT&CK technique Control that breaks the chain
Credential acquisition T1003.001 (LSASS memory dump, Enterprise) and T1694.001 (default passwords, ICS) Unique local administrator passwords, changing default passwords and protecting domain credentials.
Lateral movement T0859 (Valid Accounts) Unique passwords on every station and network segmentation.
Privilege escalation T0890 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation) Least privilege and operating system updates.
Process manipulation T0836 (Modify Parameter) Monitoring of setpoint changes and validation of the logic on the controller.

Controls for ICS environments

1. Windows LAPS: automatic password changes

Windows LAPS gives every station a different, random local administrator password and changes it according to policy. The mechanism has been part of the system since the update of April 2023 for Windows 10 and 11 and Windows Server 2019 and 2022. It is built in from release in Windows 11 23H2 and Windows Server 2025. The older, separate LAPS package (MSI) is deprecated. Windows 10 reached end of support on 14 October 2025, and Windows LAPS runs on it only under the Extended Security Updates (ESU) program.

Windows LAPS works as follows:

  • The password is stored in the computer object in Active Directory or in Microsoft Entra ID.
  • In Active Directory the password can be encrypted before it is stored. Encryption is a configuration option, and the compatibility mode with legacy LAPS stores passwords in clear text.
  • Access control lists (ACLs) govern who may read the password.
  • Policy sets how often passwords change. Periodic change applies to automatically managed local account passwords. User account passwords should not be changed periodically without cause, because NIST forbids forcing periodic changes of user passwords.

Three limits need to be taken into account in OT:

  • Stations outside Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID do not support Windows LAPS. For them a privileged password management system or a custom script with a secure store should be used, because without rotation the local password stays fixed.
  • SCADA applications that use the local administrator account may stop working after a password change. They should be tested with the control system vendor.
  • LAPS passwords are available in Active Directory, so a compromise of Active Directory gives access to all of them. Active Directory therefore needs additional layers of defense.

Before rollout, all services and applications that use the local administrator account should be checked, because a password change can stop a service. Rollout should start with a small group of test stations, because the effect on applications then surfaces without risk to production.

2. Eliminating default passwords

NIST recommends changing default passwords on OT devices and notes that many OT systems have no password recovery mechanism, so the change has to be planned. On many controllers and panels the password can be changed only with an engineering tool and a device restart.

  1. The system owner draws up a list of devices with accounts that have default passwords: PLCs, HMI panels, industrial switches, RTUs and protocol gateways.
  2. Passwords of devices reachable from the IT network or the internet should be changed first, because they are the easiest target.
  3. The change should be made in a maintenance window together with the control system vendor, because a device restart can stop the process.
  4. New passwords should be stored in a password manager or a locked safe, because without a record a password can become unrecoverable.

3. Segmentation and control of lateral movement

Segmentation limits lateral movement even when an attacker obtains credentials. It should be set up in three places:

  • On the firewalls between HMI stations, remote administration protocols such as SMB and RPC should be blocked unless applications need them. Lateral movement techniques use them.
  • Operator stations should communicate with PLCs and the SCADA server. Direct communication between operator stations makes lateral movement easier.
  • Access to controller programming tools should be limited to a dedicated virtual network (VLAN) for engineering stations.

The article on network segmentation in OT protection covers the architecture in detail.

4. Monitoring and detection

Detecting attempts to misuse administrator accounts complements prevention:

  • Windows logon events should be recorded on OT stations: 4624 (successful), 4625 (failed) and 4672 (assignment of special privileges). Event 4672 is also raised at every logon of the SYSTEM account, so system accounts must be filtered out, because otherwise the log is flooded.
  • An alert should report an administrator account logging on to a station where it has never logged on before.
  • Endpoint protection (EDR) should detect attempts to read the memory of the LSASS process. Sysmon records process access as event 10.
  • A network detection system for OT (NDR) should report unusual authentication traffic.

5. Hardening Active Directory in the OT zone

If the OT network uses Active Directory (in a dedicated forest or in an organizational unit of the corporate forest), the following controls should be applied:

Control Description
Administrative tier model OT administrative accounts cannot log on to IT stations and the reverse, because the compromise of one tier should not give access to the other.
Protected Users group Domain accounts in this group cannot use NTLM authentication, and the machine does not cache their credentials. The group does not apply to local accounts. Service and computer accounts should not be added to it.
Credential Guard Protects NTLM hashes, Kerberos TGTs and domain credentials in an isolated environment, but does not protect the SAM database, that is local accounts. Windows LAPS protects local accounts.
AdminSDHolder Permissions on protected objects in Active Directory should be reviewed periodically, because a change to these permissions lets an attacker keep access.
Group managed service accounts (gMSA) For SCADA services that support them, accounts with an automatically managed password should be used instead of accounts with a static password.

Credential Guard works on the Enterprise and Education editions of Windows (not on Pro) and requires virtualization-based security (VBS) and Secure Boot. Since Windows 11 22H2 and Windows Server 2025 it is enabled by default on domain-joined machines that meet the hardware requirements. Many OT stations run LTSC or Pro versions, so the edition should be checked before rollout.

6. Multi-factor authentication (MFA)

MFA for administrative access to OT stations should be introduced on jump servers, engineering stations and in remote RDP sessions to OT zones. Direct access to HMI on the shop floor makes MFA harder, so cards or hardware tokens can be considered for operators.

The IEC 62443-3-3 standard describes this as capabilities of a system. A system should be able to require MFA for access through untrusted networks and in all networks. The target level follows from the risk assessment.

Checklist for securing local accounts in ICS

  • All default passwords on PLCs, HMI panels, industrial switches and RTUs are changed.
  • Windows LAPS runs on domain-joined Windows stations.
  • Stations without a domain have a password rotation mechanism, for example a privileged password management system or a script with a secure store.
  • Operator accounts are individual. A shared operator account needs compensating measures: physical control, restriction to one station and an audit.
  • Storing passwords with reversible encryption is disabled in group policy.
  • A password used as a single factor has at least 15 characters. Where an OT system does not allow this, the exception and the compensating measure are recorded.
  • SMB and RPC between HMI stations are blocked on the zone firewall.
  • Events 4624, 4625 and 4672 are recorded on all OT stations.
  • Endpoint protection on engineering stations detects attempts to read the memory of the LSASS process.
  • MFA runs on jump servers and engineering stations.
  • Credential Guard is enabled on domain stations in a supported Windows edition.
  • Active Directory accounts with administrative rights over OT resources are reviewed at the interval set in policy.
  • Passwords are changed every time an employee with administrative access leaves.

Incident response

If a local administrator account in an OT network is compromised, the following steps should be taken:

  1. The network segment containing the station should be isolated, and the station’s connection to PLCs kept if cutting it would stop the process. According to CISA, an infected system should first be isolated from the network, because malware then cannot spread further.
  2. Powering the station down is acceptable only when it cannot be isolated from the network. Powering down destroys evidence in volatile memory, so a memory capture and a system image should be taken first where possible.
  3. Passwords should be changed on all stations in the segment, not only on the compromised one, because lateral movement may already have happened.
  4. Events 4624 of type 3 (network logon) and type 10 (remote desktop) should be reviewed on all stations in the segment, because they show the attacker’s path.
  5. The PLC configuration should be compared with the reference copy, because the attacker may have changed the logic.
  6. The incident should be reported in line with the rules that implement the NIS2 Directive in the given country.

Post-incident analysis with shared accounts is harder, because it cannot be established who performed specific actions. That is one more reason for individual accounts and logon logging.

Step / topic Where it is
Unique passwords, changing default passwords, protecting passwords (authenticators) IEC 62443-3-3, SR 1.5
Password strength IEC 62443-3-3, SR 1.7
User authentication, MFA (RE 2, RE 3), group account in a constrained environment IEC 62443-3-3, SR 1.1
Authorization enforcement, administrative tier model IEC 62443-3-3, SR 2.1
Network segmentation IEC 62443-3-3, SR 5.1; NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, 6.2.1.3
Logging and monitoring IEC 62443-3-3, SR 6.1 and SR 6.2; NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, 6.2.6.1 and 6.3.2
Passwords in OT, default and shared passwords NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, 6.2.1.4.5
MFA in OT NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, 6.2.1.4.4
Password length and the ban on periodic password changes for users NIST SP 800-63B-4, 3.1.1.2
Default passwords as a route to controllers CISA AA23-335A; MITRE ATT&CK T1694.001
LSASS memory dump MITRE ATT&CK T1003.001
System isolation and evidence in memory CISA #StopRansomware Guide

Where we help

SEQRED runs penetration tests that also cover OT networks. A test shows whether an attacker on one station reaches others through local accounts and whether segmentation blocks lateral movement. The OT security assessment is an asset inventory and a review of the network and architecture, and an IEC 62443 audit establishes the security level at which zones and conduits operate.

Further reading: the article on password security, the guide to remote access to ICS systems, including jump servers with MFA, and the article on ransomware prevention.

Sources

  1. IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities (AA23-335A) - CISA (accessed: )
  2. Windows LAPS Overview - Microsoft Learn (accessed: )
  3. Credential Guard - Microsoft Learn (accessed: )
  4. Protected Users Security Group - Microsoft Learn (accessed: )
  5. NIST SP 800-63B-4 Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management - NIST (accessed: )
  6. Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security (NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3) - NIST (accessed: )
  7. IEC 62443-3-3:2013 System security requirements and security levels - IEC (accessed: )
  8. Insecure Credentials: Default Credentials (T1694.001, ICS) - MITRE ATT&CK (accessed: )
  9. OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) - MITRE ATT&CK (accessed: )
  10. SCADAPass - Default ICS Passwords Database (SecLists) - SecLists (accessed: )
  11. #StopRansomware Guide - CISA (accessed: )

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