OT Cybersecurity
Vulnerability management in OT environments - from identification to remediation
OT vulnerability management - vulnerability lifecycle, SSVC prioritization, compensating controls and tools. A practical guide for ICS engineers.
Józef Sulwiński
Michał StępieńPublished Updated 17 min read

Contents
- A few numbers
- Why OT is not IT - the specifics of vulnerability management in industrial automation
- Vulnerability lifecycle in OT environments
- IEC 62443 - regulatory requirements for vulnerability management
- The CISA KEV catalog and its significance for OT
- Compensating controls - when patching is impossible
- Tools supporting vulnerability management in OT
- Incidents caused by unpatched systems
- Checklist - building a vulnerability management program in OT
- From identification to continuous improvement
- Legal basis
- Sources
Installing patches in OT takes months: a plant can install them only during a planned outage, with the consent of the control system vendor. New vulnerabilities appear faster than plants can remediate them. According to Forescout data, in 2025 CISA published 508 advisories for industrial systems covering 2,155 vulnerabilities (CVEs).
In February 2021, at a water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida, the sodium hydroxide dosing setting was changed remotely from 100 to 11,100 ppm, and an operator reversed the change. The Pinellas County sheriff presented this as a break-in. In 2023 the FBI stated that it could not confirm a targeted intrusion. A former city manager pointed to employee error, but neither the FBI nor the employee confirmed this. The cause remains unexplained. According to CISA, poor passwords and an outdated operating system were the likely means of access, and the use of remote desktop software was not confirmed.
Whatever the cause, the incident points to weaknesses that raise risk: an outdated operating system, poor passwords and open remote access. A vulnerability management process finds and removes such weaknesses before an incident and, where a patch is not possible, applies compensating controls.
A few numbers
| Value | What it means | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2,155 | In 2025, 508 CISA advisories for industrial systems covered 2,155 vulnerabilities (CVEs). | Forescout, ICS Cybersecurity in 2026 |
| 22% | Only this share of OT vulnerabilities disclosed by vendors and CERTs had a CISA ICS advisory in 2025 (58% in 2024). | Forescout, ICS Cybersecurity in 2026 |
| 12% | This share of OT devices had vulnerabilities from the KEV catalog, which lists vulnerabilities exploited in attacks. | Claroty, State of CPS Security: OT Exposures 2025 |
| 68% | This share of KEV vulnerabilities in OT environments was linked to ransomware groups. | Claroty Team82, press release, February 2025 |
Why OT is not IT - the specifics of vulnerability management in industrial automation
In IT networks, the patching cycle is measured in days. The security team publishes an advisory, administrators test the patch on a pilot group and roll it out to production. In OT, the same process takes months, and some patches are never installed.
The difference results from five constraints:
| Factor | IT environment | OT environment |
|---|---|---|
| Availability | Maintenance windows allow downtime. | Many processes run without interruption, and an outage is planned months ahead. |
| Lifecycle | IT devices are replaced in cycles of a few years. | OT devices stay in the installation for many years. |
| Update control | The administrator chooses the date and scope of updates. | For DCS and SCADA systems, the vendor usually publishes a list of patches it has tested with a given system version. |
| Testing | A test environment is standard. | A test environment is rarely available. |
| Impact of failure | A failure results in data loss or service downtime. | A failure can endanger life and the environment and cause production losses. |
No “live” patching
A PLC (programmable logic controller) managing a chemical process or a production line cannot be restarted between production cycles the way a web server can. Uploading new firmware requires:
- stopping the process or switching to redundant control,
- testing the new version (ideally on an identical test bench),
- confirmation from the vendor that the patch is compatible with the existing configuration,
- coordination with the production team and maintenance services.
Maintenance outages are planned months ahead. Therefore even a critical vulnerability with a CVSS score of 9.8 (CVSS is a vulnerability severity scale from 0 to 10) can remain unpatched until the next outage.
Vendor dependency
In IT, administrators decide the patching schedule themselves. In DCS and SCADA systems, the vendor usually approves patches it has tested with a given system version, and the installation owner installs only approved patches.
TIP
Operating system patches on an engineering workstation should be installed from a list approved by the DCS vendor, because the vendor confirms the patch’s compatibility with the control system configuration.
Vulnerability lifecycle in OT environments
The vulnerability management process in OT is continuous and has five stages. Each differs from its IT counterpart.
1. Identification - discovering vulnerabilities
Information about vulnerabilities in industrial systems comes from the following sources:
- CISA ICS Advisories - in 2025, CISA published 508 advisories covering 2,155 CVEs. The average CVSS score rose from 6.44 in 2010 to 8.07 in 2025, meaning the typical disclosed vulnerability moved from the “medium” to the “high” category.
- Vendor advisories - industrial system vendors publish their own security advisories through their PSIRT teams (teams responsible for product security). According to Forescout data, only 22% of OT vulnerabilities published by vendors and CERTs had a CISA advisory. Since 10 January 2023, CISA also no longer updates advisories on Siemens products after the first release, so later changes appear only at the vendor. Vendor advisories should therefore be monitored.
- Vulnerability databases - the US National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and archives of public exploits.
- CISA KEV catalog (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) - a list of vulnerabilities actively exploited in attacks. In CISA ICS advisories from 2024-2025, the KEV catalog contained 29 vulnerabilities, 16 (55%) of which concerned Siemens products, often in third-party components built into those products.
- Passive OT network monitoring - systems such as the Tenable platform analyze network traffic. They correlate discovered devices with vulnerability databases without actively querying controllers.
TIP
Passive monitoring is the default method of identifying vulnerabilities in OT. Active vulnerability scanners can disrupt older PLC controllers, so they should be used only during a maintenance window, after agreement with the maintenance team.
2. Assessment - contextualizing vulnerabilities
The CVSS score alone is not enough to assess risk in an OT environment. A vulnerability with CVSS 9.8 in a controller isolated in a safety zone SIS (Safety Instrumented System) has a different meaning than the same vulnerability in an HMI (operator panel) with access to the corporate network.
Contextual assessment takes into account:
- Network exposure - is the device reachable from the IT network or the internet?
- Asset criticality - does the controller manage a process affecting human safety (SIL, the safety integrity level)?
- Exploit availability - is there publicly available exploit code (PoC)?
- Active exploitation - is the vulnerability listed in the CISA KEV catalog?
3. Prioritization - SSVC instead of CVSS alone
The rule “patch everything with CVSS 7.0 or higher” does not work in OT, where patching is costly and risky. CISA assesses vulnerabilities with the SSVC method (Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization), developed in collaboration with Carnegie Mellon SEI, and considers its decision tree helpful for organizations that evaluate vulnerabilities in other organizations. For organizations with a different mission, CISA points to SEI models.
SSVC evaluates five decision points and gives one of four outcomes:
| SSVC outcome | Meaning according to CISA |
|---|---|
| Act | Supervisory and leadership personnel are involved, and the team usually decides the response in a meeting. CISA recommends remediation as soon as possible. |
| Attend | Supervisory personnel are involved, for example by requesting help or issuing a notification. CISA recommends remediation sooner than standard update timelines. |
| Track* | The vulnerability has traits that may call for closer monitoring. Remediation follows standard update timelines. |
| Track | No action is needed now. The vulnerability should be observed and reassessed when new information appears. |
The five SSVC decision points:
- Exploitation status - is the vulnerability being actively exploited?
- Technical impact - partial or total compromise of the system?
- Automatable - can exploitation be automated?
- Mission prevalence - how often does the vulnerable product occur in systems on which the process depends?
- Public well-being impact - can a compromise endanger people?
NOTE
CISA provides a free SSVC calculator that walks through the decision tree online and is described as a prototype. The calculator should be included in the internal vulnerability assessment procedure as a supplement to CVSS-based classification, because it accounts for context that CVSS does not contain.
4. Remediation - patch, compensating control or risk acceptance
After prioritization, each vulnerability requires one of three decisions:
a) Installing the patch - when the vendor has released an approved update and it can be deployed in a planned maintenance window.
b) A compensating control - when patching is impossible or too risky. Options:
- Virtual patching - rules of intrusion detection and prevention systems (IPS/IDS) stop a specific exploitation vector at the network level, without touching the target device.
- Network segmentation - isolating the vulnerable device in a separate zone with restricted access (more on segmentation).
- Protocol filtering - an industrial firewall passes only authorized commands (e.g. reading Modbus registers, blocking writes).
- Monitoring - raising the detection level: alerts on unusual queries, configuration changes, new connections.
- Remote access restriction - disabling or additionally securing remote channels (secure access configuration).
c) Risk acceptance - a formally documented decision when the risk is low (device in an isolated zone, no exploit, low impact). The decision requires periodic review.
5. Verification - confirming effectiveness
After remediation, it should be checked whether:
- the patch was actually installed (not just scheduled),
- the compensating control works as intended,
- the device functions correctly after the change,
- no new vulnerabilities appeared as a side effect of the update.
IEC 62443 - regulatory requirements for vulnerability management
Requirements for vulnerability management appear in three parts of the IEC 62443 family:
IEC 62443-2-3 - patch management in the IACS environment
The technical report IEC TR 62443-2-3:2015 is an informative document, not a binding standard. It describes the patch management process in five stages:
- Information gathering - an inventory of devices in scope and of the software and patch versions in use
- Monitoring and evaluation - tracking vendor advisories, assessing applicability and risk, and deciding on installation
- Patch testing - verifying the patch in a test environment before production deployment
- Deployment and installation - notifying affected parties, installing in phases and verifying the installation
- Verification and reporting - confirming correct system operation after the update
The technical report recommends integrating patch management into the change management process, so that every change to the OT system is authorized, reviewed and controlled.
IEC 62443-4-1 and 62443-2-4 - the manufacturer and the service provider
IEC 62443-4-1 defines requirements for the product development process. The manufacturer receives vulnerability reports, assesses, fixes and discloses them, and delivers patches within the timeframes set in its policy. IEC 62443-2-4 defines requirements for the service provider, including the patch management process performed for the asset owner.
IEC 62443-4-2 - component security requirements
The IEC 62443-4-2 standard defines technical requirements that a component manufacturer should meet. From a vulnerability management perspective, the relevant requirements concern:
- secure firmware update mechanisms (digital signature, integrity verification; authentication of updates applies to components at SL-C 2 and higher),
- the ability to change default credentials at installation,
- security event logging enabling detection of exploitation attempts.
The CISA KEV catalog and its significance for OT
The Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is a list maintained by CISA under directive BOD 22-01. It contains vulnerabilities for which evidence of active exploitation exists.
For OT environments, the KEV catalog serves three functions:
- Prioritization - if a vulnerability is in the KEV, it means attackers are actively exploiting it. In an OT environment, such a vulnerability requires an immediate compensating control, even if patching is not possible.
- Vendor risk assessment - if a PLC controller manufacturer has many KEV entries without delivered patches, that is a signal to escalate or consider an alternative vendor.
- Regulatory compliance - US federal civilian agencies must remediate KEV entries within the timeframes of BOD 22-01, and CISA recommends that other organizations prioritize remediation. Under NIS2, an essential or important entity must have a procedure for handling vulnerabilities, and the directive sets no remediation deadlines. From 11 September 2026, according to the CRA, a manufacturer must report actively exploited vulnerabilities.
According to Claroty Team82 analysis, 12% of OT devices in surveyed organizations have vulnerabilities listed in the KEV catalog, and 40% of organizations have at least some of those devices with unsecured internet access.
Compensating controls - when patching is impossible
In OT, compensating controls are a permanent element of protection, because many devices stay in installations for decades, and the end of vendor support means no patches.
Compensating controls matrix
| Control | Mechanism | When to apply | Limitations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Virtual patching (IPS) | Rules of an intrusion prevention system stop the exploit at the network level. | The attack vector is known and a signature is available. | The rule does not protect against new exploits. |
| Network segmentation | The vulnerable device moves to a zone with restrictive rules. | The device does not need broad network access. | Segmentation requires an architecture redesign. |
| Protocol filtering | An industrial firewall with deep packet inspection (DPI) passes only permitted commands. | The device uses OT protocols, for example Modbus, S7comm or EtherNet/IP. | The filter requires detailed knowledge of normal traffic. |
| Anomaly monitoring | Alerts react to deviations from the pattern of normal traffic. | Monitoring supplements every other control. | Monitoring detects an attack but does not block it. |
| Disabling unnecessary services | Unused ports, protocols and interfaces are deactivated. | It applies to every OT device. | Disabling requires dependency analysis. |
| Configuration hardening | Default passwords are changed and web services are disabled. | It applies to every OT device. | Hardening does not remove vulnerabilities in firmware. |
TIP
Compensating controls should be treated as temporary - even if “temporary” means years. Each compensating control should have an assigned owner, a review date and defined withdrawal conditions (e.g. patch release by the vendor).
Tools supporting vulnerability management in OT
An effective vulnerability management program requires tools designed for the specifics of industrial environments. The tools fall into three categories.
Visibility and vulnerability identification platforms
- OT visibility platforms, for example the solution of the partner Tenable, combine passive listening with safe querying of controllers in their native protocols. They correlate discovered devices with the vulnerability database and support context-based prioritization.
- OT communication monitoring systems identify devices and map vulnerabilities. They integrate with the risk management process, which relies on risk assessment.
- Passive OT network anomaly detection systems assess vulnerabilities and use threat intelligence to correlate with the latest threats.
SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) analysis
An SBOM is a list of software components in a device. According to the CRA, from December 2027 a manufacturer must draw up an SBOM, and handing it to the customer should be written into the contract. An SBOM enables:
- automatic identification of vulnerable libraries (e.g. Log4j in embedded systems),
- tracking the end of support of components,
- faster determination of whether a new CVE affects devices in the installation.
Patch management
Patch management tools, including dedicated modules in OT platforms, support planning, testing and verifying patches while accounting for maintenance windows.
Incidents caused by unpatched systems
The history of OT cybersecurity provides many cases where unmanaged vulnerabilities led to real consequences.
WannaCry - May 2017
The WannaCry ransomware used the EternalBlue exploit (MS17-010) - a vulnerability in the Windows SMBv1 protocol. The Microsoft patch had been available since 14 March 2017 for supported Windows versions, including Windows 7 SP1. Windows XP was not covered by the bulletin because its support had ended. Victims in May and June 2017 included Honda, Renault-Nissan manufacturing plants and the British NHS.
Oldsmar Water Treatment - February 2021
In Oldsmar the cause of the incident remains unexplained (see the description in the introduction). CISA pointed to an outdated operating system and poor passwords as likely weaknesses. The example shows that an outdated system and weak access protection raise risk even when no attack is confirmed.
VPN vulnerabilities in company networks, including those with OT - 2019-2021
An NSA advisory of October 2019 lists VPN vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure (CVE-2019-11510), Fortinet (CVE-2018-13379) and Palo Alto (CVE-2019-1579) exploited by APT groups. The KEV catalog also contains a Citrix vulnerability (CVE-2019-19781). CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2018-13379 and CVE-2019-19781 were added to the catalog on 3 November 2021, flagged as used in ransomware campaigns. Pulse Secure now belongs to Ivanti.
Checklist - building a vulnerability management program in OT
- The company has an inventory of all OT assets, because vulnerabilities cannot be managed on devices it does not know about
- The OT network is monitored passively, with automatic vulnerability correlation
- Alerts for new CISA ICS-CERT bulletins and device vendors’ advisories are configured
- The vulnerability assessment procedure considers OT context, not just CVSS
- The company uses SSVC or a similar prioritization method
- Maintenance windows are determined and coordinated with patching plans
- For each vulnerability without an available patch, the company has a defined and documented compensating control
- The company has a test environment for verifying patches before production deployment
- The CISA KEV catalog is monitored for vulnerabilities affecting the company’s devices
- Contracts with vendors of new devices and systems require an SBOM
- Vulnerability management is integrated with the change management process (IEC 62443-2-3)
- Accepted risks and active compensating controls are reviewed periodically
NOTE
Under the NIS2 Directive, an essential or important entity must apply measures that include incident handling and vulnerability handling and disclosure.
From identification to continuous improvement
Vulnerability management in OT is not a one-time project but a continuous process. Its effectiveness depends on three elements: up-to-date knowledge of assets (inventory), current threat intelligence and the ability to respond (patching procedures and compensating controls).
Organizations that take this process seriously do not eliminate all vulnerabilities - that is impossible given the lifecycle of OT devices. Instead, they build a layered protection system in which every unpatched vulnerability is consciously managed: identified, assessed, prioritized and covered by an appropriate control.
Legal basis
| Step / topic | Where it is |
|---|---|
| Procedure for handling vulnerabilities at an essential or important entity | NIS2, Article 21(2)(b) and (e) |
| Remediation deadlines for KEV vulnerabilities for US federal civilian agencies | BOD 22-01 (CISA, 3 November 2021) |
| Reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities by the manufacturer | CRA (Regulation 2024/2847), applicable from 11 September 2026 |
| SBOM drawn up by the manufacturer and its availability to the user | CRA, Annex I Part II point 1 and Annex II |
| Patch management process at the asset owner | IEC TR 62443-2-3:2015, Annex B |
| Handling of vulnerability reports and delivery of patches by the manufacturer | IEC 62443-4-1, requirements DM-1 to DM-6 and SUM-1 to SUM-5 |
| Patch management by the service provider | IEC 62443-2-4, requirement group SP.11 |
Sources
- ICS Cybersecurity in 2026: Vulnerabilities and the Path Forward - Forescout (accessed: )
- CISA Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Advisories Recap for 2025 - SOCRadar (accessed: )
- Siemens SIMATIC (ICSA-23-103-10) - CISA (accessed: )
- State of CPS Security: OT Exposures 2025 - Claroty (accessed: )
- New Research from Claroty's Team82 Highlights Urgent Ransomware and Insecure Connectivity Threats to Mission-Critical OT Assets - Claroty (press release, February 2025, reprint) (accessed: )
- Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) - CISA (accessed: )
- Compromise of U.S. Water Treatment Facility - CISA (accessed: )
- Oldsmar water treatment incident (CyberScoop, 10.04.2023) - CyberScoop (accessed: )
- Florida water treatment plant hacked - The Register (accessed: )
- CISA Issues BOD 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities - CISA (accessed: )
- NSA Cybersecurity Advisory: Malicious Cyber Actors Leveraging VPN Vulnerabilities - NSA (accessed: )
- Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog - CISA (accessed: )
- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010 - Microsoft (accessed: )
- Safer and more secure digital products (European Commission, 11.09.2026) - European Commission (accessed: )
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) - EUR-Lex (accessed: )
- Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act) - EUR-Lex (accessed: )
- IEC TR 62443-2-3:2015 Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 2-3: Patch management in the IACS environment - IEC (accessed: )
Need help in this area?
Our experts will help you assess the risk and plan next steps.