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CyberAv3ngers - Iranian attacks on PLC controllers in US water utilities
CyberAv3ngers (IRGC) - analysis of attacks on Unitronics Vision PLC controllers in US water utilities (2023). Default passwords, CISA AA23-335A, MITRE ICS T0859/T0855.
Józef SulwińskiPublished 6 min read

Contents
Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, November 25, 2023. At the local Municipal Water Authority - a small utility serving just over 7,000 residents - an operator looks at the Unitronics Vision controller panel managing a booster pumping station that regulates water pressure. Instead of the usual process interface, the HMI screen displays an image of the Iranian flag with the message: “You have been hacked. Down with Israel. Every equipment ‘made in Israel’ is CyberAv3ngers legal target.”
The PLC controller - the heart of the pumping station control system - is in someone else’s hands. The operator switches to manual control. Water supply is not interrupted. But the question that security experts across the United States asked themselves that day was: how is it possible that Iranian hackers seized control of a US city’s water infrastructure without exploiting any advanced vulnerability?
The answer was simple and disheartening: the default password “1111”.
Context - CyberAv3ngers and the IRGC
CyberAv3ngers (also written Cyber Av3ngers) is a group linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s military formation responsible for, among other things, cyber operations. The group has been active since at least 2020, but began operating on a large scale in the autumn of 2023 - in the context of the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the Hamas attack of October 7.
CyberAv3ngers’ motivation was ideological and geopolitical. The group openly declared that its target was any device manufactured in Israel. Unitronics controllers - made by an Israeli company producing PLC controllers and HMI panels used worldwide, including in the water and wastewater, energy, food, and healthcare sectors - became a natural target.
Campaign timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| October 2023 | CyberAv3ngers launches a campaign targeting Israeli water systems |
| November 25, 2023 | Attack on Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa, PA - takeover of a Unitronics Vision controller |
| November 28, 2023 | CISA issues the first warning about exploitation of Unitronics controllers in the water and wastewater sector |
| December 1, 2023 | CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA publish joint advisory AA23-335A |
| December 2023 | Confirmation that at least 75 Unitronics devices were compromised, including 34 in the US water and wastewater sector |
| February 2024 | US State Department offers a $10 million reward for information about the group |
Anatomy of the attack - trivially simple, frighteningly effective
The CyberAv3ngers attack vector required no advanced tooling. The pattern was as follows:
Step 1: Scanning the internet. Unitronics Vision controllers were running with an open network port, directly accessible from the internet. They were not protected by a firewall or VPN. Finding them required nothing more than searching publicly available databases of internet-connected devices.
Step 2: Logging in with default credentials. Unitronics Vision Series controllers had a factory-set password of “1111”. In many installations - including Aliquippa - this password had never been changed. The attackers simply logged into the HMI panel using default credentials.
Step 3: Taking control. Once logged in, the attackers had full access to the control interface - they could modify process parameters, change setpoints, and display custom messages on the HMI screen. In Aliquippa, they stopped at defacement (displaying a propaganda message), but the potential to disrupt the water treatment process was real.
According to CISA data, the CyberAv3ngers campaign led to the compromise of at least 75 Unitronics devices worldwide, of which 34 were in the US water and wastewater sector.
MITRE ATT&CK - technique mapping
| Tactic | ID | Description in the CyberAv3ngers context |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T0859 (Valid Accounts) | Use of factory default passwords (1111) for Unitronics controllers |
| Impair Process Control | T0855 (Unauthorized Command Message) | Ability to send unauthorized commands to the PLC after gaining access |
| Impact | T0826 (Loss of Availability) | Potential loss of availability of the pumping station control system |
| Discovery | T0846 (Remote System Discovery) | Scanning the internet for Unitronics devices with open ports |
| Persistence | T0839 (Module Firmware) | Ability to modify controller configuration and set custom messages |
Why this attack matters
The CyberAv3ngers attack did not cause a catastrophe. Water supply in Aliquippa was not interrupted. But the incident exposed a systemic problem - thousands of PLC controllers in critical infrastructure around the world operate with default passwords, connected directly to the internet, without any protective layers.
The problem is not limited to Unitronics. Default passwords and lack of segmentation are a plague across many ICS installations - from water utilities to HVAC systems and the energy sector. CyberAv3ngers simply demonstrated how easy it is to exploit this when someone has the motivation.
The Aliquippa case also accelerated the regulatory discussion in the US. Pennsylvania congressmen introduced bills to increase cybersecurity support for small water utility operators, and the EPA and CISA intensified technical assistance programmes for the water and wastewater sector.
How to protect yourself
TIP
Change all default passwords on PLC controllers and HMI panels immediately. This is not a recommendation - it is a necessity. CISA advisory AA23-335A explicitly states that the CyberAv3ngers campaign relied exclusively on default credentials. We discuss secure password and access management in more detail in the context of remote access to ICS systems.
TIP
Never expose PLC controllers and HMI panels directly to the internet. All remote access should be conducted exclusively through a VPN with multi-factor authentication (MFA). More on the architecture of secure access to OT networks in our article on OT network segmentation.
TIP
Conduct an ICS asset inventory with particular attention to internet-facing devices. Tools such as Tenable.ot help identify controllers with default credentials and open network ports.
TIP
Deploy network traffic monitoring at the IT/OT boundary. Even if an attacker logs in with valid credentials, anomalies in network traffic (login from an unusual IP address, at an unusual time) can be detected by IDS/IPS systems optimised for OT environments.
TIP
Review CISA advisory AA23-335A and implement all the recommendations it contains. The document is publicly available and includes detailed technical guidance for operators of Unitronics controllers.
Summary
CyberAv3ngers is a case that should be discussed in every OT security training session. Not because the attack was sophisticated - quite the opposite. Because it showed how far you can get by exploiting the simplest possible configuration mistakes: a default password and a lack of network segmentation.
For operators of water, energy, and industrial infrastructure in Europe - where Unitronics and other manufacturers’ controllers are equally common - this incident should be an impulse for an immediate audit: have your PLC controllers had their default passwords changed? Are they accessible from the internet?
Sources
- IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors - CISA AA23-335A
- Exploitation of Unitronics PLCs used in Water and Wastewater Systems - CISA
- Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa hacked by Iranian-backed cyber group - CBS Pittsburgh
- Iran-linked cyberattacks threaten equipment used in U.S. water systems and factories - NPR
- CyberAv3ngers Compromise Unitronics PLCs - University of Hawaii Cyber
- Cyber incident against a water authority in Pennsylvania (2023) - CCDCOE
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