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ReVoLTE - how to eavesdrop on a VoLTE call for under $7,000

The ReVoLTE attack decrypts a VoLTE call when a base station repeats the keystream. In the study 12 of 15 base stations were vulnerable and the equipment cost under $7,000.

Józef SulwińskiJózef Sulwiński

Published Updated 5 min read

VoLTELTEeavesdroppingencryptiontelecommunicationscryptographic attack
ReVoLTE - how to eavesdrop on a VoLTE call for under $7,000
Contents
  1. Source of the vulnerability
  2. How the attack works
  3. Conditions for success
  4. Scale of the problem
  5. What reduces the risk
  6. Who is exposed
  7. Sources

A phone call on an LTE network is encrypted between the handset and the base station, but the cipher stops protecting the call when the base station repeats the key parameters. A person with a radio analyser can then decrypt a call that ended moments earlier.

The paper by researchers from Ruhr University Bochum and New York University Abu Dhabi (USENIX Security, August 2020) shows that:

  • of three operators tested, two reused the keystream,
  • of 15 randomly sampled base stations, 12 were vulnerable,
  • the equipment for the attack costs less than $7,000.

Source of the vulnerability

VoLTE carries voice over the LTE network as ordinary data traffic. The base station encrypts it on the radio layer, between the handset and the station. A stream cipher turns the key and a few parameters (the bearer identity and a packet counter) into a string of bytes called the keystream. The same keystream must never encrypt two messages.

In vulnerable stations the second call on the same radio connection receives the same bearer identity, and the counter restarts from zero. Both calls are therefore encrypted with the same keystream.

If the keystream is the same, the XOR of two ciphertexts equals the XOR of two plaintexts. Knowing one plaintext, the other can be computed.

How the attack works

  1. Sniffing. The attacker, within range of the same base station as the victim, records the encrypted traffic of the victim’s call (a downlink radio analyser).
  2. The victim’s call ends. The attacker has about 10 seconds for the next step.
  3. Control call. The attacker calls the victim, and the victim’s phone starts ringing within 10 seconds. The base station then uses the same keystream.
  4. Recording. The attacker knows the content of this call because they conduct it themselves. They also record the encrypted traffic of the second call.
  5. Decryption. XORing the known audio with the ciphertext of the second call gives the keystream. The keystream decrypts the first call. The longer the control call lasts, the larger the part of the first call that is decrypted.

WARNING

The flaw lies in the implementation of base stations. The 3GPP specification makes the station responsible for avoiding key reuse and gives only example methods. The authors call for the specification to be made more precise and note that the same pattern appears in the description of 5G networks.

Conditions for success

Condition Details
Physical proximity The attacker must be within range of the same base station as the victim.
Reaction time The control call must start ringing within 10 seconds of the end of the victim’s call. All three tested operators used a 10-second threshold.
The victim answers the call The victim must recognise the control call and answer it. The phone may ring for as long as it takes, because the radio connection stays open.
The same radio connection The base station must use the same radio connection (RRC) and reuse its parameters.
Call duration The control call must last at least as long as the part of the first call the attacker wants to decrypt.
No media encryption Additional audio encryption (SRTP) prevents recovery of the call. None of the tested operators used it.
Equipment A downlink radio analyser and three Android phones cost less than $7,000 in total.

Scale of the problem

The researchers chose base stations at random, mainly in Germany but also in other countries.

  • Of three operators tested, two reused the keystream.
  • Of 15 base stations, 12 were vulnerable.
  • The flaw lies in the base station, and the handset does not cause it.

The researchers reported the flaw in early December 2019 through the GSMA Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure programme. GSMA asked vendors for patches and operators to install them. A re-test at German operators showed that the patches had been installed. The researchers note, however, that many operators with large deployments exist worldwide, so the scale of the problem outside Germany remains unknown.

What reduces the risk

The safeguards lie with the operator and the base station vendor. The authors point to four.

  1. The base station should use a different bearer identity for every successive connection. Why: a different identity changes the keystream, so the second call does not repeat the first.
  2. After the 32 identities are used up, the station should generate a new key, for example through an intra-cell handover. Why: the identity field has 5 bits, and wrapping the identity around without changing the key repeats the keystream again.
  3. The operator should enable media encryption (SRTP) in the IMS network and support it in handsets. Why: even with the radio layer decrypted, the audio then stays hidden.
  4. Standards should require mandatory media encryption and integrity protection for VoLTE. Why: a requirement in the specification forces all vendors to implement it.

Who is exposed

ReVoLTE requires the attacker to be close, to react quickly and the victim to answer the call. It therefore serves to eavesdrop on selected people, not for mass surveillance. Organisations whose staff hold confidential calls over a mobile network should include this in their risk assessment and ask the operator whether it has deployed the patches and media encryption.

Sources

  1. Call Me Maybe: Eavesdropping Encrypted LTE Calls With ReVoLTE (USENIX Security 2020) - USENIX Association (accessed: )
  2. ReVoLTE - the researchers' page (formerly revolte-attack.net) - Authors of the attack (accessed: )

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