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The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices. Part 10 - Validate indirections

Part 10 of Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices: validating indirections by poisoning array ends to catch fence-post errors.

Eugen WypiorEugen Wypior

Published 6 min read

PLCsecure codingOT securityIEC 62443ICS
Contents
  1. **Validate indirections by poisoning array ends to catch fence-post errors. **
  2. Guidance
  3. Example
  4. Why?
  5. References
  6. What’s next?
  7. Do you require help with secure coding of your PLCs?
  8. If you have any questions or require help in securely coding your PLCs, please contact SEQRED. SEQRED specialises in providing bespoke OT and IoT cybersecurity solutions. Our services cover such areas as Critical Infrastructure Protection, Cloud Services Security or Audits, and Threat Intelligence. For a full list of our services visit our services page – https://seqred.pl/en/services/
  9. About this article

Part 10 of the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices series, originally published by admeritia GmbH (Langenfeld, Germany). SEQRED reproduces the series under the open license granted by the copyright holder. Full specification: plc-security.com.

**Validate indirections by poisoning array ends to catch fence-post errors. **

Security Objective Target Group
Integrity of PLC variables Product Supplier Integration / Maintenance Service Provider

Guidance

Indirection is the use of the value of a register in another register. There are many reasons to use indirections.

Examples for necessary indirections are:

  • Variable frequency drives (VFDs) that trigger different actions for different frequencies using lookup tables.
  • To decide which pump to start running first based on their current run times

PLCs do not typically have an “end of an array” flag so it’s a good idea to create it in software; the goal is to avoid unusual/unplanned PLC operations.

Example

Instruction List (IL) Programming

The approach can be turned into a few function blocks and possibly even reused for other applications.

**1. Create array mask **

Check if the array is binary-sized. If it is not binary-sized, create a mask to the next size up on a binary scale. e.g., if you have a need for 5 registers (not binary-sized):

[21 31 41 51 61]

define an array of 8:

[x x 21 31 41 51 61 x]

Next, take the index value to pick up for the indirection - in this example, it is 3.

Caveat: Index begins at 0!

[21 31 41 51 61]

___________^

Index: 3

add an offset to it making up for the poisoned end. The offset can be 1 or higher, in this case, it is 2:

[x x 21 31 41 51 61 x]

______________**^ **

Index including offset: 3 + 2 = 5

and then AND the index including offset with a mask that equals the array size. In this example the array size is 8, thus index 7, so the mask would be 0x07. The mask makes sure the maximum index you can get is 7, for example:

6 AND 0x07 would give back 6.
7 AND 0x07 would give back 7
8 AND 0x07 would give back 0.
9 AND 0x07 would give back 1.

This ensures you always address a value in the array.

**2. Insert poisoned ends **

Poisoning ends is optional. You would be able to detect manipulated indirections without the poisoning, but poisoning helps to catch fence-post errors because you get back a value that does not make sense.

The point is that at index 0 of the array, there should be a value that is invalid – such as -1 or 65535. This is “the poisoned end”. Likewise, at the last elements of the array you do the same:

So, for the array above, the poisoned version could look like this:

[-1 -1 21 31 41 51 61 -1]

**3. Record value of indirection address without mask **

Then record the value of the indirect address without AND mask and offset: In this example, you’d record 51 for index 3.

[21 31 41 51 61]

___________^

______Index 3

**4. Execute AND mask and compare values (=indirection validation) **

Compare your recorded value to the value after you have done the offset and the AND mask.

**4a. Case A: Correct Indirection **

**First, offset:
** Index + Offset = 3 + 2 = 5

**Second, mask:
** 5 AND 0x07 = 5

**Third, indirection check:
**[-1 -1 21 31 41 51 61 -1]

________________^

Index including offset: 5

Value = 51 equals the recorded value, so everything is fine.

**4b. Case B: Manipulated Indirection **

If you now had a manipulated indirection, let’s say 7, let us see what happens:

**First, offset:
** Index + Offset = 7 + 2 = 9

**Second, mask:
** 9 AND 0x07 = 1

**Third, indirection check:
**[-1 -1 21 31 41 51 61 -1]

____^

Index including offset: **1
** Value = -1 does not equal the recorded value and also indicates your poisoned end, so you’d know your indirection is manipulated.

**5. Execute fault/programmer alert **

If this validated value is different from your recorded one, then you know something is wrong. Raise a software quality alarm.

Then, check the indirection value. If it is a poisoned value, you should raise another software quality alarm. This is an indication of a fence-post error.

Why?

Beneficial for …? Why?
Security Most PLCs do not have any feature to handle out-of-bounds indices for arrays. There are two potentially dangerous scenarios that can stem from indirection mistakes: First , if an indirection leads to reading from the wrong register, the program executes using the wrong values. Second , if a wrong indirection leads to writing to the wrong register, the program overwrites code or values you want to keep. In both cases, indirection errors can be hard to spot and can have serious impacts. They can be caused by human error but also be inserted maliciously.
**Reliability ** Identifies non-malicious human errors in programming.
**Maintenance ** /

References

Standard / framework Mapping
**MITRE ATT &CK for ICS ** Tactic:TA010 - Impair Process Control Technique:T0836 - Modify Parameter
**ISA 62443-3-3 ** SR 3.5 : Input validation SR 3.6 : Deterministic Output
**ISA 62443-4-2 ** CR 3.5 : Input validation CR 3.6 : Deterministic Output
**ISA 62443-4-1 ** SI-2 : Secure coding standards SVV-1: Security requirements testing
MITRE CWE CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index

What’s next?

In the next article of The Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices series, you will find out about assigning designated register blocks by function (read/write/validate)

Do you require help with secure coding of your PLCs?

If you have any questions or require help in securely coding your PLCs, please contact SEQRED. SEQRED specialises in providing bespoke OT and IoT cybersecurity solutions. Our services cover such areas as Critical Infrastructure Protection, Cloud Services Security or Audits, and Threat Intelligence. For a full list of our services visit our services page – https://seqred.pl/en/services/

About this article

This article is reproduced from the Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices project coordinated by Sarah Fluchs (admeritia GmbH) and Vivek Ponnada (Nozomi Networks), with support from ISA Global Cybersecurity Alliance and S4 Events.

The full copy of the document is available at plc-security.com.

License

Copyright (c) 2021 admeritia GmbH, Langenfeld/Rheinland, Germany.

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of “Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices” and associated documentation files, to deal in the work without restriction, including the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies, subject to preserving this copyright notice.

The work is provided “as is”, without warranty of any kind. Full license at plc-security.com.

See also

  • SEQRED’s synthesis article: Top 20 Secure PLC Coding Practices - a condensed guide
  • Full series: browse all 21 parts under the secure coding tag

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