Attack encyclopedia
Dharma (CrySiS) - ransomware that walks in through open RDP doors
Dharma/CrySiS ransomware (2016-2020) - analysis of the RDP attack vector, RaaS model for beginners, and the threat to SCADA systems via terminal servers.
Józef SulwińskiPublished 7 min read

Contents
It is 2019. An administrator at a manufacturing plant in southern Europe logs into a terminal server via Remote Desktop Protocol. He has been doing it for years - port 3389 exposed to the internet, password changed once a quarter, multi-factor authentication never configured because it “makes remote work harder.” He does not know that for the past two weeks his credentials have been circulating on a dark web forum, purchased for a few dollars. And he does not know that someone - likely a novice cybercriminal from Iran or Eastern Europe, equipped with a ready-made toolkit and step-by-step instructions - is typing his password into an RDP connection window right now.
A few hours later, every file on the terminal server - and then on the domain controller and connected workstations - gains a new extension: .dharma. Screens display a message with an email address and a demand for payment in bitcoin.
This is Dharma - ransomware that needs no advanced exploits or zero-day vulnerabilities. All it needs are open doors that we leave unlocked ourselves.
History of the family - from CrySiS to Dharma
Dharma is the direct successor of CrySiS ransomware, whose first version was identified in February 2016. When someone published the CrySiS decryption keys on the BleepingComputer forum in November 2016, the authors did not give up - they released a new version under the name Dharma, with improved encryption.
From that point on, Dharma evolved continuously. Researchers from Malwarebytes, CrowdStrike, and Sophos documented dozens of variants - each with a new file extension (.dharma, .wallet, .arena, .java, .adobe, .combo, and many others) but sharing a common technical core and an identical operational model.
What set Dharma apart from other ransomware families of that period was not technical sophistication - it was the consistent, almost industrial simplicity of the attack.
RDP as a vector - 85% of incidents
The statistics are clear. According to analyses by Zscaler, CrowdStrike, and Sophos, Remote Desktop Protocol is the initial access vector in over 85% of Dharma incidents. The attack pattern repeats with striking regularity:
Phase 1 - Scanning. The attacker uses port scanning tools (Masscan, Shodan) to find machines with port 3389 exposed. At the peak of Dharma’s activity - 2019-2020 - millions of systems worldwide had RDP accessible directly from the internet.
Phase 2 - Brute force. NLBrute, a tool available on cybercriminal forums since 2016, automatically tries thousands of login and password combinations. Alternatively, the attacker purchases ready-made credentials on dark web marketplaces.
Phase 3 - Access and reconnaissance. After logging in via RDP, the attacker gains an interactive remote desktop session. The first step is disabling antivirus software - Dharma provides dedicated tools for this purpose, including PowerShell scripts and programs such as PC Hunter or Process Hacker.
Phase 4 - Lateral movement. Using Mimikatz to steal credentials from memory or NirSoft CredentialsFileView to read saved passwords, the attacker moves to other machines on the network. The key target: the domain controller, which allows deploying ransomware on all machines simultaneously through Group Policy.
Phase 5 - Encryption. The ransomware is launched manually or via domain policy. Files gain a new extension, and a file with contact instructions appears on the desktop.
RaaS for beginners - a criminal’s manual included in the kit
What makes Dharma unique is its distribution model. Researchers at Sophos described in August 2020 the full toolkit that a Dharma affiliate receives after making a payment on a forum. The kit includes: ransomware, tools for disabling security controls, a PowerShell script that automates most steps - and a detailed instruction manual, step by step, with numbered points.
Sophos called this approach “color by numbers” - painting by numbers. The affiliate does not need to understand how Mimikatz works or what a Group Policy Object does. All they need is the ability to log in via RDP and follow the numbered steps in the instructions.
This lowered the barrier to entry for ransomware to a level where literally anyone with internet access and willingness to pay for the toolkit could carry out an attack. In August 2020, Threatpost and Group-IB identified a campaign in which Iran-linked, inexperienced operators - described as “newbie hackers” - were spreading Dharma via RDP for purely commercial purposes.
Threat to industrial systems - terminal servers as a gateway
This is where we reach the issue that makes Dharma particularly relevant from an OT security perspective.
In many industrial facilities - energy, water utilities, manufacturing - terminal servers serve as access stations for SCADA and HMI systems. Operators log into the terminal server via RDP and from there access applications that control physical processes.
The scenario looks like this: a terminal server with its RDP port exposed to the internet (or to the corporate network without proper segmentation) falls victim to a Dharma attack. The ransomware encrypts files on the server - including configurations, SCADA project files, and historical process databases. If the terminal server has network connectivity to PLC/RTU controllers - which in poorly segmented OT networks is not unusual - encrypting the server can cut operators off from control interfaces entirely.
This is not a theoretical scenario. CrowdStrike in their 2020 report documented Dharma incidents in the transport and energy sectors where attackers - likely without realizing it - reached OT network segments through terminal servers.
The problem is that Dharma operators do not target industrial systems deliberately. They target everything with an open port 3389. This is opportunistic ransomware - it scans, attacks, encrypts. If a terminal server with SCADA access sits behind port 3389, Dharma will encrypt it just as readily as it would encrypt an accounting server.
And this is precisely what makes it so dangerous for OT. You do not need an advanced APT group to paralyze access to control systems. All it takes is a novice cybercriminal with a toolkit worth a few hundred dollars and one weak RDP password.
More on the threats associated with remote access to industrial systems and best practices for securing it in our article: Remote access to ICS - threats and best practices.
Scale of the phenomenon
At the peak of its activity (2019-2020), Dharma/CrySiS consistently ranked in the top three most frequently reported ransomware families. Coveware, a firm specializing in ransomware negotiations, identified Dharma as the most common ransomware family in incidents handled during Q1 2020.
The average ransom demand was relatively low - from a few to several tens of thousands of dollars - which distinguished Dharma from “big game hunters” like REvil or Ryuk that aimed for ransoms in the millions. Dharma earned on volume. Hundreds of smaller attacks on small and medium businesses, hospitals, government offices - each for a few thousand dollars, but at massive scale.
How to protect yourself
Protection against Dharma does not require advanced tools. It requires discipline:
- Do not expose RDP to the internet. Never. If you need remote access, use a VPN with MFA.
- Disable unused accounts. Service accounts, test accounts, former employees’ accounts - each one is a potential entry vector.
- Enforce strong passwords and MFA. NLBrute cracks weak passwords in minutes. A second authentication factor eliminates this vector.
- Segment your networks. A terminal server with SCADA access should not sit in the same network zone as IT resources. A zones and conduits architecture compliant with IEC 62443 is the minimum.
- Monitor RDP logins. Failed login attempts, logins from unusual locations, logins outside working hours - these are signals that should generate alerts.
Summary
Dharma is not a story about a sophisticated attack. It is a story about open doors. About RDP ports exposed to the internet, about passwords that can be cracked in minutes, about networks without segmentation where compromising one server means compromising everything.
For industrial environments - where terminal servers often represent the only path for operators to reach SCADA systems - Dharma is a reminder that you do not need a state-sponsored APT group to shut down a manufacturing plant. All you need is a port scanner, NLBrute, and an instruction manual.
Sources
- Threat spotlight: CrySIS, aka Dharma ransomware - Malwarebytes
- Dharma Ransomware Intrusions Exhibit Consistent Techniques - CrowdStrike
- Color by numbers: inside a Dharma ransomware-as-a-service attack - Sophos
- Iran-Linked Newbie Hackers Spread Dharma Ransomware Via RDP Ports - Threatpost
- Ransomware Delivered Using RDP Brute-Force Attack - Zscaler
- The Ongoing Threat of Dharma Ransomware Attacks - Darktrace
- Dharma (CrySiS) Ransomware: Technical Analysis - Acronis
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