Energy
|CS.117
OT security of a wind farm
OT security assessment of a key wind farm: VPN testing, SCADA analysis, hardening review of 5 critical devices and a 24-month remediation plan.
Client
European wind and solar farm operator
Challenge
The operator wanted to know whether a key wind farm could withstand attacks that might stop power generation: from remote VPN access through the SCADA system to network device configuration.
Approach
Architecture and traffic
Workshops with engineers, a site visit, passive traffic sampling and a diagram of the real topology, with zone separation verified.
External test
Manual penetration testing of the VPN gateway and publicly reachable entry points.
SCADA system
Analysis in a test environment with no impact on production: access control, sessions, privilege escalation, DoS resilience, data storage.
Device hardening
Configuration of the 5 most critical devices (router, industrial firewall, switches, SCADA server, VPN gateway) compared with CIS Benchmarks and IEC 62443-4-2.
Results
The operator knows the wind farm's actual OT topology and has a remediation plan for 0-3, 3-9 and 9-24 months.
The operator knows the actual topology of the farm's OT network and the state of zone separation, confirmed by traffic analysis.
The main weaknesses are prioritised: a flat network, firmware with known vulnerabilities, default passwords and no central monitoring.
The remediation plan is set out over three horizons: 0-3, 3-9 and 9-24 months.
We analysed the SCADA system in a test environment, with no impact on power generation.
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