Oil & Gas
|CS.114
Physical Security Audit of a Transmission Operator's OT
Physical security assessment of transmission facilities in the context of hybrid threats - at the intersection of physical security and ICS/SCADA systems.
Client
Gas transmission infrastructure operator (pipelines, compressor stations, valve stations)
Challenge
The gas transmission operator wanted to know whether someone who got past the perimeter, or entered a site as a visitor or contractor, could reach the ICS/SCADA systems of compressor and valve stations. Such access would allow changing compressor parameters, taking over valves or removing operational data. The assessment had to combine physical protection with OT security, because hybrid threats span both.
Approach
Site selection
Three representative sites: a staffed compressor station, an unmanned valve station and a regional control centre.
OSINT reconnaissance
Public maps, satellite imagery and device model information an attacker could use.
On-site audits
Perimeter protection, access control for visitors and contractors, security of server rooms and control cabinets.
Physical OT interfaces
USB ports on HMI and engineering stations, RJ45 sockets in patch cabinets, console ports on switches and PLCs, cabling.
Results
At 3 sites we found more than 40 vulnerabilities where physical security meets OT and marked 12 attack vectors to fix first.
At 3 sites we found more than 40 vulnerabilities where physical protection meets OT and classified them by severity.
We marked 12 attack vectors for remediation first, so the operator knows where to start.
The recommendations cover four layers: physical, network, endpoint and procedural.
The operator can repeat this audit model at its other sites.
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